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A Note on Terminology:
In this work, several acronyms and short forms are used. Most of these are 
either common usage from the period being discussed or correct current forms. For 
purposes o f succinctness, I have shortened certain titles without using the standard 
form o f the time.
For example, “Director of Military Operations and Intelligence” has become 
DMOI rather than the DMO and I  (the form used in correspondence), which to me 
seems rather unwieldy.
I have attempted to use a single standard short form for military rank within 
the text o f this work. I have not, however, altered the format used in primary source 
documents. The format I have used for indicating rank within the text is as follows:
Private Pte. Lance-Corporal LCpl.
Corporal Cpl. Sergeant Sgt.
Warrant Officer, 2nd Class W02 / Company Sergeant Major CSM 
Warrant Officer, First Class WO 1 / Regimental Sergeant Major RSM
Second Lieutenant 21t. Lieutenant Lt.
Captain Capt. Major Maj.
Lieutenant Colonel Lt. Col. Colonel Col.
Brigadier Brig. Major General Maj. Gen.
Lieutenant General Lt.Gen. General Gen.
I have also observed several military conventions:
- Though an infantry regiment generally consists of more than one battalion, in this 
work, the terms “regiment” and “battalion” will be used interchangeably in reference 
to the Lake Superior Regiment, which was effectively a single-battalion unit during 
the interwar period.
- An officer holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Canadian Army may be 
referred to as “Colonel”.
•Subalterns of the rank of Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant may both be referred to 
as “Lieutenant”.
•Although the term “Warrant Officer, 1st Class” (WOl) refers to the rank of the 
Non-Commissioned Officer and “Regimental Sergeant Major” refers to their 
appointment as the senior NCO of a battalion, these two may be used synonymously, 
providing that the NCO holds both the rank and the appointment The same applies 
for the rank of W02 and the appointment o f CSM.
t




The intent of this work is to determine to what extent the Lake Superior 
Regiment of the Non-Permanent Active Militia1 fulfilled both its military and civic 
role in the Lakehead cities of Fort William and Port Arthur, Ontario during the 
twenty-year period from 1920 to 1940. It is not intended that this work provide an 
analysis of the social makeup o f the militia or of Canadian defence policy during the 
interwar period, nor is it intended to provide a profile o f the Canadian Army or the 
Non Permanent Active Militia as a whole. It is important, however, to examine the 
evolution of the Canadian military in general and the militia in particular in order to 
understand the environment in which the Lake Superior Regiment operated during the 
period in question.
It is likewise important to realize that the militia cannot be seen simply as an 
adjunct to the nation’s regular army, but must be viewed as a separate and distinct 
tradition within the state which predates the modem standing army. In undertaking 
the study of any modem military organization, understanding the military structures of 
both the country and the period being studied is of paramount importance. This 
requires a thorough familiarity with the subject of military history itself:2 One
1 During the period to be dealt with in this work, Canada’s military forces were divided into 
Permanent Active Militia and Non-Permanent Active Militia units. This structure is similar, but not 
entirely analogous to the form of the British military at the time. The Permanent Active Militia came to 
be referred to as the “permanent force” and was, in effect, Canada’s standing army. TheNPAMwas 
the “militia" or “reserve army”. In this work, the terms “NPAM” and “militia” are synonymous. For 
an intriguing comparison o f “regular” and “reserve” armies from an economist’s perspective see 
George J. Neimanis, “Militia vs. the Standing Army in the History of Economic Thought from Adam 
Smith to Friedrich Engels” in Military Affairs. vol. 44 no. 1, February 1980, pp. 28-32.
2 The merits o f the study o f military history have been pondered by many scholars both within Canada 
and without Some o f the more lucid and relevant commentaries include M. G. Dyer, “Military History 
and War Studies at Canadian Universities" in Military Affair*, vol. 33 no. 1, December 1969, pp. 
385-393; Albert N. Garland, “Some Thoughts on the Writing o f Military History” in Military Affairs, 
vol. 34 no. 4, February 1971, pp. 18-20; Major H. E. D. Harris, “The Value o f History to the Soldier” 
in The Army Quarterly De fenJmimal .  vol. 85 no I October 1062. pp. 70.87; Alan R. M illet “The
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2
cannot generalize when bandying about terms like “militia” or “reserve army”. It is 
crucial to differentiate between the various military entities that have come into being 
since the rise of the modem nation-state. The reserve army of today’s industrialized 
nation, though often sharing certain common elements with its forbears, is altogether 
distinct from its 17th, 18th, and even 19th century militia predecessors.3
Through any analysis o f a particular military organization in a specific time 
period, we also come to realize that there can exist several distinct forces within the 
overall military structure of a state. In most cases, these are comprised of a regular 
force and embodied reserve. Each of these organs has its own function within the 
state and both are most often deemed essential but nonetheless, may not always 
function in concert and may even be in conflict. This is because any study of this 
subject cannot fail to reveal that in the modem world, military organizations are 
inherently political.4
Study of American Military History in the United States" in Military Affairs, vol. 42 no. 2, April 1977, 
pp. 1*30; Paul J. Scheips, “Military History and Peace Research” in Military Affairs, vol. 34 no. 1, 
February 1970, pp. 2-6; R. G. Albion, Introduction to Military History, (reprinted from 1929 D. 
Appleton-Century Company Inc. edition, New York: AMS, 1971); War as a Social Institution: The 
Historian'* Pawpactiwa, Hcmc IV Clartunn and Thnmaa P . Cochran ed« Maw York; 1941); and E. 
W. Sheppard. The Study o f M ilitary History f Aldewhnt: 1952).
3 A good example is the historiography of the American militia. There are a multitude o f works which 
examine incarnations of the American militia during various time periods and each of these makes clear 
the distinction between the militias o f different eras. See, for example, Ronald L. Boucher, “The 
Colonial Militia as a Social Institution in Salem Mass.: 1794-1775”, in Military Affair* vol. 37 no. 4, 
December 1973, pp. 125-130; and William Shea, “The First American Militia” in Military Affairs 
vol. 46 no. I, February 1982, pp. 15-18, for examinations o f early militia units. John K. Mahon’s 
“Bibliographic Essay on Research into the History o f the Militia and the National Guard”, in Military 
Affair*, vol. 48 no. 2, April 1984, pp. 74-77, is replete with sources worthy o f further examination.
4 The degree o f political involvement o f military forces varies enormously between different 
governments, but even in states where the army has been most apolitical (typically, western liberal 
democracies), a definite social link between military and political elites exists and has always existed, 
to feet, it quickly becomes apparent to anyone examining the military as an organization that it must be 
studied in relation to the society in which it exists. For works which deal with the interaction o f 
military and political elites, see Conrelli Barnett, “The Education o f Military Elites” in (Wweming 
RlltM- Stndfe* in Train my i d  Selection fRupatt Willmwnn ad. NewYoffc 1969); Sjtldigiaild 
fiftvtmwiim; M m Studfet in Ctvil-Milrffy Bgltinn*. rMfchuol Howard. aH London: 1957); 
n in fin y  nf M.ii«—y PnUHr« /•Quiwt p ti.mtwiftmi mA New York: The Free Press o f
Glencoe Inc., 1962); md Armed F w w  « a sa fety  riucque* Vmrkmm- ad The Hague: Mouton
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In order to gain a better understanding, in a broad context, of the unique 
position of militia or reserve forces in Canadian society, it is useful to look at the 
analogous militia forces o f the United States and Britain and determine the degree of 
influence that these two nations may have had on the development of the Canadian 
militia, given the extent to which they have influenced the development o f the 
Canadian military in the post-Confederation period.5 What becomes quickly apparent 
is that the very form and nature of a nation’s military is greatly influenced by the 
circumstances o f its creation and the events in its history. One need look no further 
than the very distinct military traditions of Canada and the United States, two nations 
that, despite their many similarities, have demonstrated very divergent patterns of
and Co., 1968). For a perspective on the interaction o f military and civilian elites in Canada, see 
Stephen Harris, Canadian Bu m : The Malting n f A Professional A m y. 1860-1939. (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1988); and Howard Graham, C iti« n  and Soldier. (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1987). For an excellent analysis of Canada’s power structures, see John Porter, H k  
Vertical MomIc; An Analysis o f  Social C lan ind Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1973).
5  liV* “» a n A  T-ritnrial im y "  ■" a n A  P w » VnA'
The Viking Press Inc., 1971) by Michael Howard; and The National Guard in Politics. (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) by Martha Derthick, which specifically discuss the National 
Guard and Territorial Army as distinct entities within the state should be examined. Each o f these 
works explores the origins o f modern military forces in some manner or another Both Derthick and 
Howard hint at the “organic” nature o f the reserve forces they each study, institutions which, as they 
develop and grow, are often influenced by several different interests, but seldom controlled by any 
single one. Essentially, both Derthkk’s analysis of the National Guard’s history and rise to power as a 
pressure group in the US and Howard's exploration of the creation o f the Territorial Army, a force 
whose eventual incarnation diverged sharply from its creator’s (Lord Haldane’s) vision, support a 
common conclusion: Far from being institutions that are created from scratch based on the needs of the 
time, completely divorced from their militia predecessors, modern reserve forces are organizations 
which bear the weight ofa nation’s military heritage and exist as organic manifestations o f a militia 
tradition that often dates bock decades, if not centuries. This being so, the transformations in 
technology and organization by no means negate the palpable influence that tradition has on these 
fines. As the cases ofthe National Guard and the Territorial Army show, a military organization will 
evolve to reflect the national character u  well as the society o f which it is a part, perhaps against the 
best laid plans o f its creators, the best efforts of stakeholders or the wishes of the government. Perhaps 
Howard explains it best in concluding his chapter on the TA. with a comment on its transformation in 
the early part o f the twentieth century, observing that the British people took Lord Haldane’s proposals 
and tailored them to fit their own rather curious shape. For a more detailed examination o f the T.A. 
see E.W. Sheppard, a shn»t Hfatwy » f the ttritiA Army, (ixmdem? Constable and Company Ltd., 
1939); or Conelli Barnett, Britain md Her Army 1309-1970. fLondon: Penguin Press, 1970). For 
more information on the National Guard, see ROTCM143-60 American Military Hiitnrv; l60S.l<m. 
(Washington D.C.: Department o f the Army, 1936).
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military development Taking into account the variety of shaping influences, we are 
able to comprehend the circumstances which guided the development of the Canadian 
militia during its long history.
D
We now turn to an examination o f the development of the Canadian militia 
during the early part of the twentieth century.6 Considering that Canada, unlike the 
U.S. or Britain, was at the turn of the century, a very young country and arguably, 
scarcely a nation at all, it is appropriate to consider factors other than “national 
character” that influenced this development It is reasonable to state that as a 
dominion still very much under the sway of an imperial power, Canada’s militia was 
subject to influences absent in the development of the Territorial Army and the
6 It is useful to remember the roots ofthe militia units o f Canada. The first militia were infantry 
companies formed of volunteers, a tradition which began with the French colonists ofthe 17th and 18th 
centuries and continued through the arrival of British and American settlers in later times. These early 
companies saw action at the battles o f the colonial wars ofthe eighteenth century between France and 
England, in countless skirmishes with the aboriginal peoples of the continent, during the American War 
of Independence, and in the War o f 1812. The War o f 1812 ended with the successful defense of 
Canada by British troops supported by local militia units o f Upper and Lower Canada. (Gwynn Dyer 
and Tina Viljoen, The Defence n f r«i«n . Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1990. p. 77.) These 
companies and battalions o f the early 19th century, first formed over a hundred and eighty years ago, 
were Canada's first reserve regiments and represented a new type of military unit in British North 
America. Larger in size and better organized than previous reserve companies in Canada's colonial 
past, the militia regiments o f this era would serve as the nucleus for Canada’s 19th century militia 
(many o f the units that fought in that conflict are the predecessors of numerous modem day units of 
southern Ontario). The somewhat limited success ofthe militia in the war against the Americans did 
show that the citizens of British North America could and should provide for their own defense by 
service in part-time companies formed in settlements and towns across the land. The advent of viable 
defense forces in Canada was an important step in defining a national identity. From the early 1800s 
on, Great Britain retained garrisons in Canada only as a “pledge o f imperial concern rather than a 
badge of imperial authority”. m*ctnr i  m« i*v Tim fm iHim  M ilitiv  a Profile. Toronto: The
Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972. p. 16). For more on Canada’s military history see D. J. 
flnnri«p«iad. The Armed For*— n f r — 1867-1967, A A.ftVvmiifnt, r n m w  1967);
rv.mn.iH Mbhwi a MUftiy H inny rPAwawtnw- Heritage Publishers Ltd., 1990);
nmmnwH UnHm ruuiU  ««H W f (Tnrrmtn- nmtwmmrth mnA Cn I iH 1011V T. W. Paterson,
rmmHim. - h i f a m m  (Langley, B.C.: Stagecoach Publishing Company Ltd., 1977); and 
GJ .̂G. Stanley, i6na.io<H rrnwmtn- Macmillian Publishers Ltd., 1971). See also
tm>«iHlM»*in«> tn the Study of Military History for Canadian Students (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 
edited by C. P. Stacey; and Stacey’s book The Military Pmhlmm nf Cmarfm- (Toronto: 1940) for 
good introductions to the topic o f Canadian military history.
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National Guard. The militia o f Canada was developing at a time when the country’s 
“national character” was not clearly defined and therefore, the historian must seek 
alternate avenues by which this development can be explained.
Among the most obvious of these alternate influences was the young nation’s 
close bond to Britain. In any study of the Canadian military during the era o f British 
imperialism, the question unavoidably arises: to what degree was Canada’s military 
influenced by developments in Britain (which, in the early part of the century, still 
exercised significant influence on Canadian policy, both foreign and domestic)? 
Several monographs provide clues to the answer. In his work, Canadian Defense 
Policy, R.A. Preston broaches the subject, discussing the post Boer War reforms in 
Britain.7 He notes that unlike Australia and New Zealand, Canada did not fully 
accept British proposals at Imperial Conferences to establish sections of the Imperial 
General Staff in the Dominions.8 In fact, in Canada during the first decade ofthe 
century, the British General Officers Commanding (GOC) were replaced by the 
Militia Council, a distinctly Canadian organization.
This in itself cannot be taken as evidence of Canada’s desire to establish 
military autonomy from Britain, but it does highlight an interesting conflict between 
the goals of the young Dominion and the wishes of the United Kingdom in its efforts 
to consolidate the military structure ofthe Empire.9 Clearly, this was a period of
7 These reforms set up, among other things, a General Staff as well is  the Defense Committee, both of 
which became Imperial in name as well as in scope o f interest.
8 Richard Preston. Canadian Defemn Policy and die Development o fthe Canadian Nation 1867-1017
, p. 17, (Canadian Historical Association Pamphlets, no 25. Ottawa: Love Printing Service Ltd., 1970). 
See also Desmond Morton, “The Military Problems of an Unmilitary Power” in Revue International* 
d’Hirtnine (vol. 34,1982, p. 1-30). For a good example o f writing from the period on this subject see 
Captain Pmeat J  Chamber* The Canadian Militia. A Hiatorv o f the Origin and Development o f  the
Force. (Montreal: L. M. Fresco Publisher, 1907).
9 .Another interesting facet of this apparent conflict is brought forward in Desmond Morton, Minister* 
and ftenerakr Politic* and the Canadian Militia. IMS-1014. (Toronto: University o f Toronto PtCSS, 
1970 pp. 31-39), which focuses on the conflict between the British Generals who commanded the
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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transition when, if the Dominion was not straining at the leash of imperial control, it 
was at least asserting that Britain’s interests and Canada’s interests were not always 
one and the same.
In the early years of the century there was an increase in military activity in 
Canada and this was accompanied by a noted decline in Britain's involvement in 
Canadian military affairs. The years 1904 and 1905 were important ones in the 
development o f the Canadian military. It was in 1904 that a new Militia Act was 
passed and over the next two years, several new regiments and corps were added to 
the rolls, including many units which still ex ist10 Just as events during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (like the Boer War and the Spanish-American 
War) greatly influenced the course of military reform in both Britain and the United 
States, the changing nature o f Canada’s relationships with its neighbour to the south 
and its mistress across the Atlantic was certainly demonstrated in the creation of the 
new Militia Act. A passage in Preston’s work denotes the greater significance of this 
step:
By changing the formula that the Militia could serve “ within or 
without Canada...by reason of war, invasion or insurrection’’ (which had been 
interpreted to mean across the American border) to the wider formula 
“beyond Canada, for the defense thereof’, Borden’s 1904 Militia Act quietly 
made it legal for the government to send the Militia overseas... Canada had 
thus advanced further toward the possession o f military forces that could be 
used without restriction for the furtherance o f Canadian interests, a notable 
step towards military sovereignty and competence.11
Canadian militia during this period, and their superiors, the politicians, whose goals differed sharply 
from those o f the British military establishment in Canada. This work also discusses the creation of the 
Militia Act o f  1904.
10 The modem order o f precedence o f the Canadian forces is derived largely (though not entirely) 
from the restructuring that occurred during 1904 and 1905. (See Charles H. Stewart, The Concise
(Second Enlarged and Revised Edition), Toronto: 1982).
11 Richard Preston, n*fen«g Policy p. 13.
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This act might be construed to indicate both a rapprochement o f sorts with the 
United States, the traditional menace from the south, and a greater degree of 
autonomy for Canada in the employment o f its armed forces. This is not necessarily 
the reality.12 The Militia Act of 1904 can be more realistically interpreted as a 
reflection of Canada’s broadening interests, and the resulting desire to exercise its 
sovereignty through a military basically independent o f direct British control, yet still 
subject to British influence through the Canadian government.
As it turned out, the 1904 Militia Act was not in force for long before another 
momentous change was to occur in the Canadian military, one brought about by war. 
In one fell swoop, the First World War would transform the country’s attitude to both 
war and soldiering. With the industrialization of conflict and the mechanization of
death, the military ceased once and for all to be a hobby and became a profession.13
12 It is important to remember that until 1926, Defense Scheme One, which contemplated Canadian 
military action should the U.S. ever invade, was still in existence. As for military autonomy, one of the 
crucial tenets of Defense Scheme One was that Canada should fight a “delaying action” until British 
forces were able to deploy on this side of the Atlantic since it was quite clear to all involved that 
Canada would surely be quickly overrun without prompt British assistance. For more perspectives on 
the Canadian government and Canadian defense policy in the early part o f the century see Desmond 
Morton, “Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence, 1867-1987’ 
in Revue Internationale d’Hirtoire Militaire. vol. 54,1982, pp. 1-30; and Robert Craig Brown and 
Ramsay Cook, hkk .1921: a  Nation Transformed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1974).
13 Among the more cogent analyses ofthe Great War and its effects on both Canada and the world at 
large are Gregory S. Keaiey, “State Repression and the Left in Canada; 1914-1920: The Impact ofthe 
Fiwt WnrM M/«r» in r«n«Hi«n Historical Review, vol. 73 no.3, September 1992, pp. 282-314; James 
W. Walker, “Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment o f Visible Minorities in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force” in r u tttm  Historical Review vol. 70, no. 1, March 1989, pp. 1-26; Alan R. 
Young, “The Great War and National Mythology” in Aradicn«i«, vol. 22 no. 2, Spring 1994; Arthur 
Bowfey, Some Economic rnni»q..m rr«  n f  the C.nmt Wsr a  undonr 1930); Sandn Gwynn’S 
fascinating wamtiwc Tapestry o f War (Tnm ntn- Harper Collins, 1992); Desmond Morton. When 
Your Num ber's Up- The Canadian Soldier in the F int World War. (Toronto: Random House Canada, 
1993); Desmood Morton and J. L. Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon- Canadians end the fipeet 
Wsr 1914-1919. (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys Limited, 1989); and Jonathan F. Vance, Oath 
So Wohte; Mtmntv M ewing end the First W orld Wsr. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1997) which, like Paul Fussell’s The G m t W «r«d  WwUm Unmnw (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), but from a distinctly Canadian viewpoint, examines the impact o f this 
cataclysm on a society’s collective consciousness. For a Northwestern Ontario perspective, see 
Margaret Elizabeth Frenette’s MA. Thesis “The Great War’s Defeats: ’Doing Your Bit’ on Thunder 
Bay’s Home Front, 1914-1919” (Lakehead University, 1996).
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Among the interesting parallels that can be drawn between Haldane’s reforms 
in Britain and the establishment o f a new Militia Act in Canada, one of the most 
fascinating is the manner in which both of these were basically ignored when the 
Great War erupted. Just as Lord Kitchener, Britain’s Secretary for War in 1914, 
chose to forsake the Territorial Army structure when Britain mobilized for the 
conflict, Sam Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, ignored the 
mobilization plans which had been previously laid out when Canada went to war in 
1914. The Canadian Expeditionary Force (C.E.F.), as established by Hughes, was to 
have an adverse effect on the integrity and relevance of the militia, which units were 
shunted aside, marginalized, and transformed into mere recruiting depots for the 
C.E.F. The result of this was that further re-organization would become necessary in 
the 1920s and 1930s.14
i n
The period following World War One was a very difficult one for the 
Canadian military. It was certainly a far cry from the jingoism of the pre-war period, 
when most o f Canada embraced the British concept of imperialism and flocked to the 
colours when the need arose (as it had in 1899 in the Boer War and again in 1914). 
The ten-year period which preceded the Great War, beginning with the 
implementation of the Militia Act of 1904, had been one of unprecedented growth for 
the Canadian Militia. It had become quite fashionable in the latter part o f the 
nineteenth century for prominent citizens to join the militia as officers.15 This was
14 Stephen Harris, “Or There Would be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes uid Military Planning in 
Canada", in M ilhty Aflhfa- Vol. 46 no. 3, October 1982, pp. 120-126.
15 See, for example, Carman Miller, "The Montreal Militia as a Social institution Before World War 
P , ( i Mmm Hi«tn«v R«vii» vol. 19 no. 1, June 1990, pp. 57-64).
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the pinnacle o f the militia’s popularity. It represented the last gasp of the old militia 
tradition which, with its scarlet tunics and Crimea-era airs was already an 
anachronism of warfare in the early years of the new century, as the horrors o f the 
Boer War and World War One would demonstrate. By the 1920s, the militia, a 
product o f over a century o f development, had lost its direction in the face o f the 
transformation of war.
It is appropriate to narrow the focus of our inquiry at this point in order to 
properly establish the context for the growth and development of a particular militia 
unit. The subject of our inquiry, the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR), forms part of the 
Western Canada militia tradition. Although no real differentiation between eastern 
and western regiments exists in conventional Canadian military historiography, this 
distinction is entirely justified. The challenge of forming militia units during the late 
nineteenth century in sparsely populated frontier lands is one particular to the areas 
west of Lake Superior. This area of study offers a unique perspective which is 
exclusive to Western Canada’s history.
Just as the Red River and Lakehead regions of the nineteenth century strove to 
unite themselves with the industrialized east by means o f the railway, the main 
obstacles being a sparse population and huge distances, so did the early frontier 
militias struggle to maintain their numbers and the interest of tks populace, facing 
some of these same obstacles. Among the infantry regiments of Western Canada, 
those o f the Lakehead and Red River regions, the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment of 
Thunder Bay, and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles of Winnipeg, Manitoba16 are the two 
oldest, each of whose roots stretch back to the 1880s.
16 Many o f the founders o f western units began their military careen in the units of southern Ontario, 
including W. N. Kennedy, the founder ofthe 90th Bn. (Winnipeg) Rifles and S. W. Ray, the founder o f 
the 96th District o f Algotna Bn. o f Rifles. The history ofthe Royal Winnipeg Rifles exhibits intriguing 
parallels with that o f the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Founded two yean before the “Lake Sups”, 
the Rifles evolved along a similar yet distinct path. William Nassau Kennedy played a pivotal role in 
the creation o f Manitoba's first real militia unit. He had arrived in Manitoba as a Lieutenant in the




Although the predecessor of the “Lake Sups”, the unit that was to become the 
96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles, did not participate in the Northwest 
Rebellion campaign of 188S, it is accurate to state that this conflict was the impetus 
for its creation.17 After hostilities had concluded, the newly-formed rifle company 
was not disbanded but rather continued as part of a provisional battalion along with 
new companies formed at Fort William, Kenora and Gore Bay in 1886. In 1887, the 
provisional battalion was given the name and number designation The 96th "District 
of Algoma" Battalion of Rifles. Later in the year, Samuel Wellington Ray, the 
Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit, was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, the 
youngest of his rank in Canada.
Wolseley expedition of 1870, recruited from the 57th militia regiment of Peterborough, and had 
decided to remain in the West Upon his discharge, he reverted to his militia rank of Captain and raised 
the Winnipeg Infantry Company in response to the Fenian threat o f 1871. On October 29 1883, 
Kennedy called a meeting with twelve other settlers to discuss the question of raising a militia battalion 
in Winnipeg. These men, most with militia experience in Ontario regiments, were to form the nucleus 
of the new regiment. They saw themselves as foe guardians o f an outpost of civilization on the Great 
Plains, "as a halfway house o f a dominion stretching from sea to sea". The 90th Winnipeg Battalion o f  
Rifles was created November 9th, 1883 in answer to the need o f the citizens o f Winnipeg to organize 
for themselves a regiment as a matter of civic defense and civic pride. Capt. Kennedy was promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel and appointed Commanding Officer o f the first militia regiment west o f Ontario, 
(from Bruce Tascona and Eric Wells, Little Black Devils: A History ofthe Royal Winnipeg Riflw. 
Winnipeg: Frye Publishmg Ltd., 1983).
*7 Both David Ratz, in his MA thesis “Soldiers o f the Shield: The 96th District o f Algoma Battalion 
of Rifles 1886-96, A Social and Military Institution” (Lakehead University, 199S), and G. F. G. Stanley 
in the LSR Regimental History In the Face of  rin g e r fPnrt Arthur Ont.* The Lake Superior 
Regiment, 1960), concur on this point, though focir interpretations differ somewhat on when foe drive 
to form a militia unit at the Lakehead originated. Ratz reveals that several attempts at forming a militia 
company at the Lakehead were made before 1883. Notwithstanding this fact, it was foe Northwest 
Rebellion that enabled the formation ofthe region’s first militia unit When on March 26,1883 some 
two hundred Metis from Batoche and surrounding areas commanded by Gabriel Dumont defeated a 
force o f Mounted Police and volunteers at Duck Lake, Saskatchewan, militia headquarters in Ottawa 
took action. Instructions were issued for foe mobilization o f various militia units to form port o f foe 
expeditionary force being sent to the North West At that time there were no regularly organized 
militia companies in the sparsely settled region between Lake Huron and Manitoba, but the towns in 
Northwestern Ontario were infected with the martial spirit which enveloped other parts of Canada. An 
independent company o f rifles was formed under the command of Samuel Wellington Ray in April. 
This company was never required to take foe field, however, because in May Louis Riel had 
surrendered to Major-General Middleton and his force o f regulars and militia from Winnipeg and 
other areas in th» n f n m y r  p 2 .).




Despite this promising birth, however, the Regiment found itself confronted 
with the problems of great distances and sparsely populated regions, the same 
problems that had plagued rural militias since the early years of the volunteer system 
in British North America. These problems that created challenges of training and 
supervision in the vast area the unit covered (roughly the entire area of modem day 
Northern Ontario), combined with neglect and lack of interest from higher 
headquarters, made the survival the 96th and other units like it problematic. The fact 
was that the commanding officer, living in Port Arthur, could do little to train or assist 
many of his widely-dispersed men and probably never met those who lived on James 
Bay or other remote outposts.18 As a result, given its difficulty in mustering any force, 
the 96th was declared "non-effective" and was struck from the strength o f the 
Canadian Militia in August 1896. However, its legacy would live on.
The 1904 Militia Act had a direct impact on the Lakehead when in July of the 
following year, the 96th Battalion was revived as the 96th "The Lake Superior 
Regiment". The new unit's headquarters were located in Port Arthur, with companies 
at Fort William, Fort Frances and Kenora. Three years later the battalion underwent 
another transformation particularly reflective of the changes occurring in Canadian 
society at the time. Just as towards the end of the nineteenth century society in 
Canada had become increasingly urban and industrialized, the nature of the militia
18 Shortly after their founding, the histories o f the Lake Sups and the Rifles began to diverge.
Though both where created in response to the need felt by settlers to have a military force for the 
purpose o f defense, only one o f die two was to see action before the start o f the Great War. Herein lies 
perhaps the explanation as to why the Rifles thrived in those earlier years, while the Sups languished.
If lack o f interest (and action) could be considered a major factor in the survival o f a fledgling unit, as 
well as geographical overextension and administrative problems, then it is easy to see why this 
occurred. While the Lake Sups could ooly drill and parade month after month, the Rifles saw action 
less than a year after being founded, and twice more before 1914. If boredom was the chief enemy of 
the citizen-soldier who sacrificed his spare time to train for combat he would never see, then the 90th 
Rifles had little to fear from this file. Members of the 90th Winnipeg Battalion of Rifles fought in the 
Nile campaign o f 1S84, (hiring which the Regiment's founder, Lt. Col. W. N. Kennedy died. The Rifles 
would also serve in the Northwest Rebellion o f IMS and as part o f the Canadian contingent in the Boer 
War in South Africa at the turn o f the century. During these conflicts the Rifles suffered twelve 
fatalities and were awarded five medals for gallantry. tTMmm «nH w»n« f ittig m»cir rvviU V
i
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
began to change. Many regiments went from being predominantly rural units with 
companies spread across far flung villages and towns to battalions centered on one or 
two cities. The Lake Superior Regiment itself became a city battalion of six 
companies (later increased to eight) located in Port Arthur and Fort William. The 
former companies at Kenora and Fort Frances became the nucleus of a new regiment, 
the 98th Rainy River and Kenora Regiment. The increase in the population o f the 
region had thus allowed for the creation of two separate infantry units in 
Northwestern Ontario and the apparently insurmountable problems of isolation and 
vast distances between companies within the 96th had vanished at a stroke.19
The revival o f the 96th was a symptom of the times in other ways as well. 
Twice during its first years the regiment was called to aid the civil power in strike 
breaking and riot control, reflecting the increasing activism o f the labour movement in 
the early part of the century. The distinct social and ethnic makeup of the battalion at 
this early juncture was to inevitably place it squarely at odds with certain segments of 
the Lakehead’s burgeoning population.20
In 1913, mobilization plans were drafted by the Canadian General Staff. 
District headquarters were told that in the advent of hostilities breaking out, it was 
assumed that Canada was secure from large scale invasion, but units should be 
prepared to combat local raids and acts o f sabotage. A close watch was to be kept on 
suspected enemy agents and their possible targets. Some ofthe most obvious targets 
were located right at the Lakehead: the great grain elevators, stretching along the 
shore between Port Arthur and Fort William had a combined storage capacity o f sixty 
million bushels and were a vital depot and transfer point in the movement of grain
19 Stinky, [n the Face of Danger, pp. 3-6.
20 This period is amply covered in David Ratz’s Honours Thesis “The 96th Lake Superior Regiment 
in Aid ofthe Civil Power 1909 and 1912” (Lakehead University, 1989), and therefore needs little 
elaboration in this work.
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across Canada. It became the responsibility of the Lake Sups to guard this and other 
vital installations. The role played by militia units like the 96th LSR would become 
more important in the months to come.
When, on August 3rd 1914, German troops began moving into Belgium, the 
British government issued an ultimatum demanding their withdrawal. The ultimatum 
was ignored and at midnight on the 4th of August, Britain declared war on Germany. 
On the 5th of August, the 96th mustered with a strength of 32 officers and 240 other 
ranks. Recruiting began immediately in order to bring the battalion up to strength. It 
is a reflection of the spirit of patriotism that existed, as it did throughout Canada, in 
the isolated, sparsely populated communities of Northern Ontario that the recruiting 
drive was very successful. Initially, the 96th was to remain at home continuing its 
guard duties, while acting as a depot for the newly formed Canadian Expeditionary 
Force battalions. While maintaining their traditions and territorial affiliations, the 
militia battalions o f Canada would also provide volunteers for the CEF.
As it turned out, these militia units, including the Lake Sups, were to be the 
main source of recruits for the Expeditionary Force so that the army assembled in the 
fall of 1914, despite Sam Hughes’ complete disregard for the mobilization scheme in 
place, was largely a militia force and not a “conscript” army. Though the 96th Lake 
Superior Regiment was not to go overseas, it would receive its baptism in fire during 
the First World War through CEF units, to which the LSR contributed drafts o f men. 
The 52nd Battalion CEF, which suffered nearly 3000 casualties and garnered eleven 
battle honours during the war, came to be most closely associated with the 96th LSR, 
whose members made up the bulk of the battalion.21 The 96th LSR survived the
21 Stanley, *" tfir p—* Pmgw pp. 6-10. On August 26th, 1915, the rolls ofthe 1st Provisional
Battalion ofthe first Canadian contingent showed 5 officers and 314 other ranks from the 96th. Further 
drafts followed and other Lake Sups joined the 8th, 28th, 37th, 44th, 94th, and 141st overseas 
battalions during the course o f the Great War. In 1915 the S2nd was formed. It was the first complete 
overseas battalion formed almost entirely o f men from the Lakehead. The 52nd Battalion C.E.F. would
i
ii
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difficulties encountered during the early years, the barriers imposed by physical 
geography, sparse population and lack of interest to become a permanent part o f the 
Canadian militia.
IV
The struggle to overcome the barriers o f isolation imposed by geography and 
indifference from headquarters in Ottawa was a theme that pervaded the early years of 
Canada's first western militia regiments. Bom during a trying time in Canada's 
history, when the young sons o f southern Ontario families and immigrants alike found 
themselves isolated and facing the hostile wilderness o f the frontier, the local 
regiment came to symbolize a great deal.22 It not only served its intended purpose as 
a provisional protection force against any foe that might present itself, but was a 
source o f civic pride for the citizens of the scattered settlements north of Lake 
Superior. As the twentieth century wore on, this theme would be revisited when, 
following the cataclysm of the Great War, the militia was obliged to re-establish itself 
as a relevant segment of civil society in Canada, both as a military presence and as a
perpetuate the 96th Lake Superior Regiment during World War One and serve with distinction 
throughout the conflict, earning scores o f decorations (a total o f380), including a Victoria Cross won 
by Captain C.PJ. OTCelly, Officer Commanding “A" Company during the Battle o f Passchendaele in 
October o f 1917.
22 In his MA Thesis on the 96th District o f Algoma Battalion o f Rifles: “Soldiers ofthe Shield”, 
David Ratz outlines the significance ofthe local militia regiment and what it offered an inhabitant o f 
the Lakehead: For the affluent businessman, becoming a militia officer could be the key to social 
prominence. It was a chance to take a leadership role in the community, provided he could invest the 
money the time and energy. For the young wotker, the militia represented the opportunity for 
adventure and, perhaps, glory at home or in a distant land. It could be a welcome relief from the 
drudgery o f daily labour and a chance to forge a sense o f camaraderie and esprit de corps. Other works 
which explore these themes are Christopher J. Anstead, “Patriotism and Camaraderie. Workingmen in a 
Peacetime Militia Regiment 1907-1934.” in SocilLHittxy. vol. 26 no. 52, November 1993, pp. 
247-263; and Carman Miller, “The Montreal Militia as a Social Institution Before World War I” in 
Urtmi Hi«fnrv B -v i^  vol. 19, IK). 1, Jut* 1990, pp. 37-64.




social institution. The story of how the LSR went about accomplishing this task and 
its twenty-odd year existence between the wars constitute the bulk of this inquiry.
Chapter One will examine the LSR as a military organization, tracing the
!|
| course of the unit’s development from its re-establishment in 1921 to its eventual 
transfer to the Canadian Active Service Force in 1940 and detailing its leadership, 
structure, strength, equipment and training wherever possible. This not only allows a 
picture of the unit’s day-to-day life to emerge, but the particular issues and challenges 
highlighted in this section will provide the reader with the necessary background and 
context with which to view the following chapters.
In Chapter Two, many of the themes introduced in the first chapter will be 
developed as the Regiment’s links to the Lakehead communities (Port Arthur, Fort 
William, and to a lesser extent, the outlying towns or townships of the area) are 
examined. This section will make use o f varied sources, including archival 
documents, regimental records, news articles, correspondence and an interview to 
delve into the unit’s community activities and its relationships with different 
segments of local society, determining how it was perceived by local authorities and 
the general public of the time.
Finally, Chapter Three will highlight the unit’s involvement in a particular 
series of civil disturbances at the Lakehead. The concept of the militia as a “force for 
order” will be introduced and its practical application evaluated. This “case study” 
will provide both an example o f militia/community relations during the era and an 
insight into the policies, both official and unofficial, which governed these 
relationships, taking into account economic, social, and political developments in the 
region and in the rest of Canada during the period. It will also address the critical
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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question o f the unit’s “relevance”, both as a military formation and as social 
institution.23
Ultimately, it will be shown that it is possible to form a more complete history 
of the militia in Thunder Bay, one that goes beyond the accounts of battles and 
campaigns fought overseas. This examination will provide a perspective on a period 
of local military history which has to date remained relatively unexplored and it will 
also allow us to evaluate the LSR’s success in playing its dual role as both a social 
and military entity.
23 For more on the “relevance” o f the militia, see T. C. Wilkt, “Canada’s Militia: A Heritage at Risk” 
in Farum Conference o f Defrn«* A«nefat»nn« vol. 4 no. I, 1989, pp. 14-19.
i 1
I i.
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Chapter 1
T h e  I j lc e  S u p e rio r  B tf fa m it:  T he  M ilW a Battalion
I
The title of Chapter IV of the official history o f the Lake Superior Regiment, 
G.F.G. Stanley’s In the Face o f Danger, is “The Dull Years”. This in itself reveals a 
great deal about that author’s attitude and, indeed, the conventional opinion of 
military historians regarding the interwar period from 1919 to 1939. From the point 
of view of military activity, these were the years of uneasy peace which followed the 
Treaty of Versailles, when Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) units like the Lake 
Superior Regiment were largely left to stagnate in the face of post-war exhaustion and 
indifference. Stanley devotes a scant eleven pages of his regimental history o f the 
LSR to discussing the unit’s re-organization and its training between the wars.24 
Though this account is brief, it is nevertheless worthy o f notice as it provides a 
stepping stone to a deeper examination of the Regiment Before attempting this 
examination, however, it is useful to develop a profile o f the unit and flesh out the 
details of the LSR’s military development during this twenty-year period.
In many ways, the LSR was a typical NPAM unit o f the twenties and thirties.
It dealt with many of the same challenges that units across Canada had to face. 
However, as we shall see, there were also problems that arose out of the Regiment’s 
particular circumstances. These problems had their root in the geographic location of 
the unit and its isolation from higher headquarters. The theme of isolation and the 
challenges it brings is one all too familiar to any student of Northwestern Ontario 
history. Thus, the trials o f the LSR should be viewed in this context. Isolation was a
24 Stanley wrote this regimental history mainly for the vcterws o f die Lake Superior Regiment 
(Motor) and therefore it is understandable that two-thirds o f his book is devoted to an account o f the 
unit’s service in World War Two. (TBHMS, 978.43.58, L2/4/1, Lake Superior Regiment History 
Letter, 1946-47.)
; t! L
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major concern for the Lakehead militia during the 19th century, in the years before the
i
Great War, and in spite of improvements in communication and transportation, it 
would continue to be a concern in the years following that conflict.
n
During the early war years o f 1914-1916, the 96th LSR had performed guard 
duty on vital installations at the Lakehead while providing drafts of men to CEF units. 
After 1916, it remained simply a theoretical depot, carrying on its recruiting function 
but doing little else. For all intents and purposes, the 96th ceased to exist as a military 
unit from 1916 on and except for during the Royal visit o f 1919, played no role in the 
Lakehead communities.23 At the conclusion of the war, the CEF was demobilized, 
and despite several blunders and gaffes, most o f the Overseas force, including the 
Lakehead’s 52nd and 141st Battalions, had returned to Canada by the end of 1919 26
23 In 1919, when the Prince o f Wales visited the Lakehead, the 96th provided an Honour Guard. The
equipment inspection reports of the 96th reveal that the unit barely existed at the time of his arrival: 
“All the men on the Guards of Honour were only on the strength of the 96th Regiment for the period
the Guards were on duty - as the Regiment not being re-organized at the time, obtained them from the 
Great War Veterans Association at Port Arthur and Fort William for this particular duty.” (NAC RG 9, 
series c-1, file 1631, letter of 2 May 1921, from GOCMD #10 to Secretary, Militia Council) 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.C. Young is mentioned as the Acting CO. Lieutensnt-Colonel Young had been 
an officer before the war. He was appointed to command the 44th Bn. CEF, but was seriously injured 
in training and was obliged to return to Fort William. He was elected Mayor o f Fort William and 
served for two years (1914-15).
2* Desmond Morton’s “ ‘Kicking and Complaining’: Demobilization Riots in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 1918-19” in r-mrfim Hi«tnrif i Hnvfaw vol. 61 no. 3, March 1980, pp. 
334-360, deals with government mismanagement o f demobilization at the end of the Great War. His 
contention that the soldiers who fought in this conflict were essentially “civilians in uniform” is 
supported by the fret that once the war had ended, these men reverted to their civilian attitudes and 
‘‘showed widespread reluctance to follow military norms”,(p. 334) most being anxious to return to their 
homes and families in Canada as soon as possible. There were delays and a lack o f foresight in 
! developing a plan to expedite this return. In the end, the plan adopted was essentially a compromise 
between two apposing concepts: bringing the Corps home intact against bringing troops in order of 
priority. It showed that few were concerned about the effect delays would have on the morale or 
deportment o f the soldiers. The fact that men had endured bureaucratic delays for four yean was no 
guarantee that they would continue to do so. Sagging discipline and the negligence o f officers 
conspired with transportation delays and logistical difficulties to create the explosive situation that 
Morton documents in his article. After a number of upheavals, including a serious riot at Kimnel Park 
in which several Canadians were killed, the Ministry o f Militia and National Defense was moved to
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Now the question arose: What was to be the fate of the non-fighting militia units 
which had been overlooked in 1914 by Sam Hughes? To answer this question the 
Canadian government commissioned a special committee under the chairmanship o f 
Canada’s venerable old soldier, General Sir William Otter, to consider what the future 
of Canada’s militia was to be and how it should be reconstituted in order to fulfill its 
responsibilities.27
Otter’s committee recommended that in the future Canada should be able to 
mobilize a force of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division in the event of 
another overseas conflict. However, the main problem envisioned by the committee 
was the defense of Canadian soil against American attack. It concluded that the 
military organization of the country should be revised to ensure the rapid mobilization 
o f a force which could hold off an invasion from the south, fighting a delaying action 
until help arrived from Great Britain. This plan would come to be known as Defense
expedite the process o f demobilization, realizing that the alternative could prove disastrous. By 
February of 1920, all but a few Canadians serving prison sentences in Enghmd had returned to Canada.
There is no evidence that the soldiers of the 52nd, 94th, and the 141st were involved in any of these 
disturbances. Most Lakehead soldiers had left England by March of 1919 (Stanley, pJ8). For related 
works on the return of Canada’s soldiers after World War One, see Desmond Morton and Glenn 
Wright, “The Bonus Campaign, 1919-21: Veterans and the Campaign for re-establishment” in 
Canadian Hittnrigal Review vol. 64 no. 2, June 1983, pp. 147-160; or their book Winning the Swnml 
Battle; Canadian Veteran. and the Return to Civilian l ife 1913-1930. (Toronto: University o f 
Toronto Press, 1987), Desmond Morton, “’Noblest and Best’: Retraining Canada’s War Disabled,
1919-1923” in Journal nf Pa—rfian Studies, vol. 16 no. 3, Fall/Winter 1981, pp. 75-85; and 
Desmond Morton “Resisting the Pension Evil: Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Canada’s Board of 
Pension Commissioners, 1916-1933” in Canadian Hfatnrical Review vnl ** June 1987, pp. 199-224.
27 Stanley, in the r«w> o f Danger, p. 40. Mqor-Genetal Sir William Dillon Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O. 
joined the militia before Confederation. He had fought the Fenian raiders in 1866 and had commanded 
the Queen's Own Rifles, a Toronto militia regiment, during the Northwest Campaign of 1885. He also 
served in the Boer War, published a manual entitled: The Guide- A Manual for the Canadian Militia 
GafttUy), (Toronto: Copp Clarke Company Ltd., 1916), and enjoyed a distinguished subsequent 
career in the early twentieth century, in their honk. War and Peacekeeping rrnmntn- Key Porter 
Books Ltd, 1991), J. L. Granatstein and David Bercuson described his career up to the Boer War as 
having “paralleled the military development of the young Dominion o f Canada; he had played a role in 
virtually every important event in the country’s military history." (p. 6). There arc several worthy 
biographies of “Canada’s Grand Old Soldier” available, including Deanond Morton’s IhgiClllldillL 
General Sir William niter. ITnmntn- Hakkett, 1974).
\
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Scheme # /.28 The Otter Committee also devoted itself to a reorganization of the 
various arms o f the Canadian Army. The recommendations included a proposal that 
infantry regiments like the 96th should be re-designated, the numerical prefixes used 
by the militia since 1859 dropped, and its units reorganized on a four company basis, 
with at least one active battalion and an equivalent or higher number of reserve 
battalions.29
The recommendations of the Otter committee were submitted to the 
Department of Militia and Defense and quickly adopted. In 1921, following two 
years of upheaval during which it had been in a state of disorganization, the Canadian 
militia underwent a complete overhaul. Despite the fact that several battalions and 
corps were disbanded or amalgamated and some new units created, the 96th emerged 
relatively unscathed. On 15 July 1921 by General Order 246-21, the Regiment was 
disbanded for the purposes of re-organization and reconstituted the same day as ‘The 
Lake Superior Regiment”.30
28 Sfwiay. in the F«ee nf Danger, pp 40-41 This concern over the possibility o f American invasion 
reveals a certain wariness on the part o f military authorities and the Canadian Government regarding 
British-American relations immediately following World War One, notwithstanding the cordial 
“official” relationship between the two.
29 gt«.uy in thm Pm** nf n«ig«r p s i The reserve battalions might only exist on paper in 
peacetime, but in war they would serve as reinforcement depots for active battalions. Such was the 
case with the LSR, whose records reveal the existence of a 2nd “Reserve” Bn. to which non-parading 
officers were transferred between 1921 and 1939. (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 1602). These Infantry. Reserve 
Battalions were abolished effective 14 December, 1936 but the perpetuated C.E.F. units were continued 
by the Regiments. (“Brief Historical Account of the Lake Superior Regiment” DND Directorate of 
Histoiy, Vol. 197, file 145.221003(01)).
30 NAC, RG 24 series C-l and C-3, Vol. 197, files 145.2,14524 on “The Lake Superior Regiment” . 
In order to restore the continuity which Sam Hughes had destroyed, the LSR was permitted to assume 
the Battle Honours o f the 52nd Bn. CEF. It was thus considered the “perpetuating Regiment” o f that 
renowned battalion. This connection was more than merely an official one. Many officers who came 
to serve in the LSR after the war had been members o f the 52nd during the war, including several of its 
Commanding Officers. It is also worth noting that all of the officers who joined the Regiment upon its 
reconstitution in 1921hmA »>«» rgfwby in Hu. p .— n tiy w  
p. 41). The unit also inherited two battle honours o f the 8th Bn. CEF(“Ypres, 1915” and “Festubert, 
1915”) through its contribution of personnel to that Battalion in the early months of the war. (General 
Order llO of 15 September, 1929.)
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The new establishment consisted of a headquarters and four companies with 
an authorized total strength of 33 officers, 508 other ranks, and 5 horses (to be stabled 
in the basement o f the Port Arthur Armoury).31 Headquarters, “A” and “B” 
Companies were located in Port Arthur and “C” and “D” Companies in Fort 
William.32 This double-company system was, on paper, similar to the arrangement 
which had existed before World War One. The 96th had been established as a “City 
Corps” before the Great War with two companies in each city of the Lakehead, No. 5 
Company at Fort Frances, and No. 6 Company at Kenora (by G .0 .236 of 1 
December 1905). These last two had been detached from the 96th in 1910 to form the 
nucleus of a new regiment, the 98th Rainy River and Kenora Regiment The 
company structure that had existed from that point was to continue through the 
twenties and thirties. Likewise, the unit would remain under the command of 
Military District #10, the district to which it had been assigned before the war.33 In 
May of 1922, the unit was issued a new cap badge to go with its new name. This
NACRG24 series c l, reel c-8366 file 8626-5 This was the usual authorized establishment o f a 
NPAM Battalion during the inter-war period. The NPAM Battalion’s establishment at wartime 
strength was set at 33 officers and 646 other ranks.
32 General Order 206-20. Several other General Orders issued on IS July 1921 established the 
structure of the unit: General Order 120-15 established a four Company system for the LSR. G.O. 
29-20 and 246-21 established the 1st Bn., LSR (perpetuating the 52nd Bn. CEF) and the 2nd (Reserve) 
Bn., LSR (perpetuating the 94th Bn. CEF). The 94th Bn., CEF was replaced by the 141st Bn., CEF on 
1 September o f the following year.
33 in pw» nf rwnyw p dA [n the early part o f the century, the Department of Militia and
Defense divided Canada into a number of military districts for administrative purposes. These districts 
were commanded by Colonels, Brigadiers or, on some occasions, Generals. The officer in charge o f a 
district was referred to as the “District Officer Commanding” (DOC). Military District #10 (also 
referred to as Militia District #10 in some documents) was comprised o f the militia units of Manitoba 
and Northwestern Ontario. The LSR was not brigaded with any other unit o f MD #10 in the annual 
Militia List. It was categorized under “other troops in the District”. As will be seen, problems arising 
from of this arrangement were to be experienced by the regiment on several occasions.
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badge included its new motto: “Inter Pericula Intrepidi” (or “Fearless in the Face of 
Danger”).34
During the interwar years, the unit was blessed with a pool of experienced 
Great War veterans from which to draw officers and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs).35 Enthusiastic leadership and sound guidance was of critical importance to 
the regiment in those early days, the climate of war-weariness being not at all 
conducive to the health of a militia battalion. The unit, separated by over 700 km of 
rough roads and rail from headquarters in Winnipeg, developed an independent bent 
very early on, mostly out o f necessity. The Lake Superior Regiment, unlike its 
brigaded brethren of Manitoba, was a solitary formation, training alone nearly the 
whole year. It was also a small formation; Although the surviving records of the 
LSR during this period seldom reveal the unit’s actual total strength, given the 
records available, it is probably safe to say that the Battalion never achieved its 
authorized numbers in those early years. The records for serving officers, for 
instance, reveal that the unit was chronically understrength.36 There are several 
reasons for this dearth in numbers.
34 Militia General Order No. 71,1 May 1922, describes the authorized badge as follows “In gilt with 
silver monogram. A double circle inscribed,‘The Lake Superior Regiment’. Within the circle on a 
plain disc the letters ‘L.S.R.’ in the form ofa monogram. On each side o f the circle a spray o f maple 
leaves. At the top, a beaver on a log, resting on the circle and between the points of the sprays. The 
whole supported by a scroll inscribed “Inter Pericula Intrepidi”. This new badge replaced the old 
“96th” badge which had been authorized by General Order No. 85, 2 July 1910. Described as “A circle 
inscribed “Lake Superior Regiment” surmounted by a beaver on a log; below a scroll bearing the motto 
‘Animo et fide’. In the centre o f the circle the numerals “96”, and on either side, a wreath o f maple 
leaves.” ( Stanley, fa the Face o f Dinger, p. 42.)
33 The first Commanding Officer o f the re-organized unit was Lt. Col. J. D. Young, a highly 
decorated officer o f the 52nd who rose to the rank o f M ĵor during the war and was a recipient of the 
Military Cross (2 Ban), as well as the Distinguished Service Order and a Mention in Despatches.
/s— Uy i« tk» n fn —iyw p u s  i He was joined by Captains J.C. Hunter, D.M. Bowron,
K.N.B. Mackenzie, and T.L. Williams (Mentioned in Despatches), as well as Lieutenants H.E. Smith,
W. Gibson, J.S. Cattanach (who, as a Sgt, received the Military Medal during the war), J.A. Dube and 
W.A. Csrley.
36 NAC, RG 24, voL 206, vol. 1599, voL 1602. “Lake Superior Regiment” Active Militia Files.
i  f
I t
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
In some ways, the experience o f World War One had turned many against the 
militia. Some questioned the relevance of a militia or peacetime “reserve” army. In 
the eyes o f the Canadian public, the militia had certainly not played any great military 
role in the recent conflagration. By Sam Hughes’ mobilization scheme, masses of 
untrained men had been recruited into Canadian Expeditionary Force ( not militia) 
battalions, trained, and thrown piecemeal into the slaughter o f the Western Front.
Yet, these men had given a good account o f themselves and, in some cases, had 
achieved glory in the fields of France and Flanders. Could it not be reasonably 
expected that in the unlikely event o f another war the same would occur again? An 
event which reinforced this attitude and compounded the problem was the creation of 
the League o f Nations, an organization designed to safeguard the peace which had 
been bought at so great a cost. The League was a symbol of the new pacifism which 
pervaded the international policy of the western powers after the treaty of Versailles 
and for some, it was also a convenient excuse for neglecting matters pertaining to 
national defense.37
The natural response of the majority of citizens o f the Lakehead, like that of 
the rest o f Canada after four years of personal suffering and privation, was to try to 
put the war behind them and get on with life. For these people, the militia served only 
as a reminder of the dark days of 1914-1918. Stanley comments on the attitude at the 
Lakehead: “The roaring twenties (...) were the years o f the flapper, jazz, short skirts, 
the Charleston and American prohibition. Life was made to be enjoyed and not to be
37 Stanley. In the Ficc o f Danger pp 42. A more detailed perspective o f the Canadian public’s 
attitude regarding the military following World War One can be found in the article by Alan R. Young, 
"The Great War and National Mythology." in ;*"«■'« vol. 22 no. 2, Spring 1994; in Desmond 
Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the S«rn«H R ttU - Canadian Vetetana and the Return tn Civilian 
Life. 191S-1930. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1917); and in James Eayrs, In Defence o f 
Canada Vnl if: From the Greet War to the Great Depwiihm." (Toronto: 1964). All o f these works 
discuss in depth, and from various perspectives, the Canadian view o f the Great War.
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frittered away on dull matters like militia drill.”38 Indeed, this fairly sums up the 
attitude of most Canadians during the decade.
The task of increasing the strength of the LSR, bringing it to a state of 
efficiency and keeping it there was therefore a daunting challenge for the leadership 
of the regiment The realities of government policy, as will be shown in a later 
chapter, conspired to make this endeavour even more difficult There was, for 
instance, the matter of money. The Canadian government provided very little in the 
way of equipment and uniforms, or a training budget. When the old arms and 
uniforms began to show signs of wear, very little was done to replace them. As for 
the fancy pre-war dress tunics that might have appealed to potential recruits, these 
were mostly kept in storage. As a result, unless he joined the regimental band, the 
militia soldier was forced to parade in a drab unattractive uniform and to train with 
weapons that were obsolete if not altogether useless.39 This image did little to draw 
new young recruits to the colours. There was also little the LSR could do to attract 
the veterans, many of whom preferred to spend time in Legion Clubs reminiscing 
about their service overseas rather than practicing the soldiering skills they had 
wished to be done with after the war.
38 Stanley, IntheFaca nfnm ger pp. 42-43. Also, see Joseph Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History. 
(Thunder Bay Ontario: Lchto Printers Ltd., 1981); and T. Tronrud and E. Epp (eds.), Thunder Bey: 
Fmm Rivalry to Unity (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Inc., 1995), for 
perspectives on life at the Lakehead during the twenties.
39 Stanley, in the Feee nf nenger. pp. 43-44. Major Jim Symonic’s“ The Lake Superior Regiment 
(motor) Reunion Sept 13-15. 100 years o f Service. Northwestern Ontario’s Fighting Regiments, 
1885-1985” special insert fe ljkshB id iiuog(10 September 1985) also offers some recollections 
from the era: “The LSR trained (...) with WWI rifles and Lewis guns, some obsolete and some useless. 
Uniforms were the khaki tunics with choker collars and web puttees left over from 1915-1919.
Summer training was carried out in Shilo Manitoba and most o f the time the boys from the Lakehead 
had to play the role o f the “enemy” in the training battles against the Manitoba Militia district” p. 15. 
The LSR, isolated as it was from the rest o f Military District #10, was accustomed to fending for itself, 
even, it would appear, in its field training exercises. With regard to dress uniforms, it was the singular 
privilege o f the Regimental band to sport flashy scarlet dress tunics.
i
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Despite these obstacles, the militia spirit gradually began to revive in the 
Lakehead during the twenties, aided by the efforts of men who, whether because of 
patriotism or other motives, were willing to offer their time, experience, and money 
in service o f the Regiment. In October of 1923, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter, who had 
previously served as the Adjutant o f the LSR, succeeded to the command o f the 
Regiment40 He was succeeded in turn by Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Crazier in 1924. 
In 1927, Lieutenant Colonel F. Y. Harcourt was appointed to command the LSR. He 
was followed by Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Ruttan in 1930.
As will be demonstrated below, all of these men pursued a specific policy in 
what we would now call the “management” of the LSR, adopting approaches, with 
varying degrees of success, aimed at safeguarding the survival o f the militia in Port 
Arthur and Fort William. The short tenures of all of these Commanding Officers, 
however, meant that regardless o f their dedication to promoting the welfare o f the 
unit, they were given little opportunity to improve the lot o f their soldiers. It was in 
this manner that the militia system o f promotion guaranteed that only the most active 
and energetic of colonels could make a difference during their brief term of command.
Throughout the twenties and thirties, the military life of the regiment changed 
very little. The LSR offered limited opportunities for employment, to the tune of ten 
days of militia pay per year. There were weekly parades at both the Port Arthur and 
Fort William Armouries (the latter an unused store on Simpson Street) on Tuesdays, 
the occasional range shoots at the Mount McKay Range (budgetary circumstances
40 Stanley. In the Face of Hangar p iT  At this point, the officers ofthe unit included Maj.D.M . 
Bowron (appointed Deputy Commanding Officer in November o f 1923), Majors H.A. Ruttan and A. F. 
Macdonald; Captains S.H.W.S. Wilson, H. E. Smith, W. Mackenzie, G. W. Gorman, O. Steen, W. F. 
Ede, W. E. Wigmote, and A. M. Morrison. The unit also had a Quartermaster, Lt. G.C. Hutcheson, a 
Paymaster, Lt G. W. Smith, a Medical Officer, Major G. E. McCartney, and a Chaplain, the Rev. W.
H. Pavy. (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 206, VoL, 1599 and Vol. 1602, files “ Lake Superior Regiment”)  The 
departures or transfers o f half o f the founding officers within the first two yean reveals something 
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permitting), and a yearly week long exercise at Camp Shilo in Manitoba. There were 
also NCO training courses at Fort Osborne in Winnipeg for those wishing to qualify 
for higher rank.
The unit’s training was under the supervision o f the Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry instructional cadre whose NCOs’ primary task was to ensure 
a high standard o f performance in military matters like dress and drill .4l Aside from 
the supervision of the instructional cadre, the LSR had a great deal of autonomy in the 
conduct o f its day-to-day operations. Inspections by senior officers were a rare 
occurrence.42 Once again, this was likely a result of its isolation from headquarters.
It was not until the outbreak of the World War Two that the Battalion began to 
undergo periodic general inspections.43
41 Interview with Colonel EJ.O. Gravelle on IS January 1999. The instructors were usually PPCLI 
soldiers stationed at the Lakehead. (The PPCLI were a permanent force infantry regiment with a 
battalion stationed in Winnipeg). These activities will be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters.
42 The Port Arthur Daily NewfrThmnicle reported on 20 October 1930 of an inspection by Brigadier 
General T. V. Anderson o f a Regimental exercise on 18 October 1930. The article described the 
exercise which, along with a classification shoot of Lewis Guns at the Fort William range to be held 
later, formed port ofthe annual efficiency o f  personnel competition in Military District #10. After a 
morning of rehearsals and lunch at the Armoury, the unit was paraded for the DOC’s inspection of 
personnel and arms and then went out to the field to conduct a “war game”. The Brigadier addressed 
the troops after the attack was completed and expressed his satisfaction with the day's proceedings.
43 The results o f these inspections were generally recorded on a standard military form entitled: 
“Permanent Active Militia Annual Confidential Report (C 4974)”. These reports were designed for 
assessing Permanent Force units, militia inspections rarely being this thorough. The format was as 
follows:
Abridged Report ofthe Annual Inspection for the fiscal year_____
Inspected at— On— by—  The Last Annual Inspection was made— by— .
I. CO: efficiency and fitness for his position 2.2nd in Command: efficiency and fitness
3. Officers: efficiency generally, naming any esp. good 4.WOs, NCOs, men: Efficiency, Class 
and physique
5. Guns and small arms, pattern or mark, condition, whether complete
6. Equipment, pattern and condition, whether complete.
7. Clothing, (incl. boots) condition- does it comply with dress regulations?
8. Horses, suitability and condition, horsemanship riding and driving.
9. Harness and saddlery, suitability condition whether complete.
10. Strength: A Officers, B WOs, C NCOs, D Privates
II. How fig above or below establishment in officers and men
12.Efficiency o f unit at gun, machine gun, light gun or rifle practice, drill, and its regular duties
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IV
Over the course of the twenties, as militia units like the LSR struggled to 
re-establish themselves, the function of both the NPAM and the regular army was 
re-appraised and its role in the event of war determined. In accordance with the Otter 
Committee’s report, a plan for home defense in the event of an American invasion 
began to take shape under the direction of Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence (DMOI). This was Defense Scheme #1., 
predicated on the maintenance of British naval supremacy, which would ensure that 
reinforcements could arrive from Great Britain in the event of war.
The Washington Conference of 1922, which had established the principle of 
naval parity between the US and Britain, in essence put an end to any realistic 
implementation of the scheme, before the Canadian plan had been formulated.44 The 
movement of the Dominion of Canada from the defense orbit of the United Kingdom 
to that ofthe United States in the years that followed was inevitable. This occurrence, 
when considered alongside other developments during the period, can be seen in the 
larger context of Canada’s loosening of its ties to the Empire during the interwar years 
when “the tendency was for the dominions to go their own ways”.45
13. Discipline 14. Books and Records IS. Canteens
16. Barracks, Armouries and quarters generally 17. Deficiencies in Arms and equipment
18. The deficiencies or irregularities reported at the last inspection have been corrected or corrected 
except: 19. General Observations:
44 Nevertheless, planning on Defense Scheme #1 continued until 1926, though it was never 
completed.
45 ftwtar Thm Shmrm‘ A Short HlHnrv nf HrM«h fiHperfrlinw 1MO.IQ81 New York:
Longman Inc., 1984, p. 267. In discussing this tendency, Porter brings up as examples the refusal o f 
Canada to back British policy in defending the straits o f Chanak against Mustapha Ketnal in September 
of 1922 and Canada’s first treaty with a foreign power negotiated without reference to Britain in 1923 
(the Halibut Fisheries Treaty with the United States). The Imperial Conferences ofthe inter-war yean 
and the Statute o f Westminster (1931) p ve Canada complete freedom in conducting its own affairs.
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Two other schemes were also considered, though it was mainly Defense 
Scheme #3 that was to absorb the attention of the Canadian General Staff during the 
thirties.46 This plan, though subjected to numerous revisions, directed that Canada 
would mobilize an expeditionary force for service overseas while making provisions 
for home defense in the event of a war overseas. After a period during which 
Canada’s defense planning had lacked direction and priorities, by the 1930s, military 
districts across Canada had been given information relating to their role in Defense 
Scheme #3 by the Department of National Defence (this despite the fact that the 
scheme had not yet been officially adopted). Accordingly, each military district was 
expected to assist in developing a plan whereby its units would either mobilize or 
provide security on the vital installations across Canada. Each district was allocated 
new duties as Defense Scheme #3 was modified during the decade and it was the task 
of the district staff to select units that would carry these duties out.47
The militia had suffered neglect or indifference throughout the twenties 
because o f the political and economic climate of postwar Canada; this situation did 
not change completely during the thirties. As the situation in Europe deteriorated, 
many conscientious officers sought to improve the readiness of Canada’s military. 
Through an arrangement with Great Britain, selected officers of the Canadian army 
were enrolled in staff courses at the Imperial Defense College,48 This undoubtedly
46 gf*wUy p«t. nfn«ngw pp dA-A*i Defense Scheme #2, like #1, was a home defense 
scheme. It began u  a contingency plan in the case of an attack by Japan but never reached its final 
form. During the thirties it was revised as a tri-service defense scheme for the defense o f Canadian 
neutrality in the event ofa war between the US and Japan, s—»RMmtH a Pumhw Thm rvfon** a f the 
irnA.ftnAd Planning far War in North America 1167.1039. (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977).
47 It would seem that the LSR, isolated as it was from MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg, was 
sometimes forgotten or simply passed over during this process. There were few if any directives during 
this period regarding home defense or mobilization plans Throughout the thirties, the LSR conducted 
its training with no dear idea of what its role in the scheme was to be.
48 NAC RG 24, reel 5030. The Imperial Defense College was established in January o f 1927 (file
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helped to give some senior officers a broader outlook regarding strategy and tactics, 
but it also served to instill flawed thinking regarding mechanization and the 
employment of armour. These flaws would quickly become apparent at the outset of 
World War Two, and the Allies were to leant a bitter lesson from the German 
Blitzkrieg.*9 Certainly, there were some new initiatives in certain areas: it was 
during this period that efforts were made to clarify the Permanent Force’s role in 
training the NPAM.50 But these were the years o f the Great Depression, and 
initiatives were often abandoned in the face of fiscal realities.
V
At the Lakehead, the command o f the LSR passed from Lieutenant Colonel 
Ruttan to Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Dear, a local doctor, in 1933. Lieutenant Colonel
H. Cook took over in 1937 and commanded the unit until December of 1942.51 
During the tenure of these three officers the Lake Superior Regiment was given an
113) Members ofthe Permanent Active Militia who attended agreed to serve for a minimum period 
afterwards. The Army Officers who attended 1DC were: 1927 Maj. Gen. AGL McNaughton, ‘28 Brig 
JS Brown, *30 Brig WG Beeman, '31 Col. RJ Orde, ‘32 Brig HE Boalc, ‘34 Brig HDG Crerar, ‘36 Col. 
MA Pope, ‘37 Brig CR Pearkes, ‘38 Lt Col. GR Turner, ‘39 Lt Col. ELM Bums. Some of these 
officers went on to distinguish themselves during the Second World War (see David Bercuson and J.L. 
Granatstein, Dictionary o f r — di— M iiit«v H8«tnty Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). One 
of the duties o f the Imperial Defense College staff was to inspect NPAM units across Canada. The 
LSR was visited by members o f the IDC on several occasions. Lt Gen. Maurice A. Pope provides an
iwt— «riwg ayn.m r o f hi« tinv  mt tha m f  in hi« ■■itnhinyphv Soldier* and Politician! fCanada;
University orToronto Press, 1962).
49 Rnhin Higham. The Military Intellectual* in Britain: 1018.1030 New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1966. pp. 7-21,26-31,49-50.
50 NAC RG 24 series c l reel c-5079, file S69S During 1931 and 1932 the Chief o f the General Staff 
(CGS) General A. McNaughton considered a proposed establishment estimate o f expenditure required 
to maintain a permanent force o f 1000 officers and 9000 Other Ranks to train 90 000 members o f the 
Non-Permanent Active Militia for 30 days annually which had been submitted by Lt. Col. H D Crerar 
(Dec 291931). This plan was not adopted, however, and the Militia continued to parade 10 days 
annually throughout the thirties.
51 St— U y  In  th»  F—  o f  T V n g f  p  4 T




infusion o f new blood. Throughout the decade, the ordinary militia soldier continued 
to train using the same outdated equipment and arms. Nonetheless, in Port Athur and 
Fort William, a new generation o f young officers and men were attracted to the 
colours. Some of these officers would eventually command platoons, companies, and 
even the battalion itself during the Second World War. Likewise, many o f the young 
privates who joined the Regiment during this period would also rise in rank to 
become NCOs or even officers during the war.32 Unfortunately, it must also be noted 
that many officers and men of the Regiment who joined during the interwar period 
would, for various reasons, never have the opportunity to serve overseas with the 
Lake Superior Regiment53
52 NAC RG 24 Militia Pay Lists, LSR. This new generation included men like Lt Colonel Robert 
Angus Keane DSO and Major Herbert George Dawson DSO who joined as Lieutenants in I93S as 
well as Lt Colonel E. J. O. Gravelle and CSM Raymond Cousineau who joined as Privates that same 
year. The Regiment became a family affair for some: In 1938 Edward Styffe joined the Regiment, 
followed shortly thereafter by his brother Roy in 1939. These young officers were the sons o f Oscar 
Styffe (1885-1943), a Norwegian immigrant who ran a successful timber business. Oscar, who had 
graduated from a state military academy in Northern Norway in 1906 at age 21, was deeply interested 
in community affairs and had been a member of the board of trade. He was elected to Port Arthur city 
council in 193S, 1936 and 1937. In 1936 be became honourary Vice Consul o f Norway in Port Arthur. 
Both Roy and Edward served with the Regiment as Majors during World War Two. Edward was 
killed in action on 14 August 1944 in France, but Roy survived the Northwest campaign. In 1946, the 
three surviving Styffe brothers, John age 38, Hobart, age 35 and Roy, age 27, took over the 
management o f their father’s firms, Oscar Styffe ltd. Cumber) and Gravel and Lake Services Ltd. (a 
harbour tug business), rtfthn Styffe D«r«-R Styffii 1885-1943: The man and his companies. Thunder 
Bay: LU Library, 198S. (Northern Studies Resource Centre Collection); and Stanley, In the Face of 
Danger p. 351).
53 m—uy in F«r* nf rwnger pp. 91-92 In this study, a sharp distinction must be drawn between
•war NPAM Battalion called the Lake Superior Regiment and the Canadian Active Service
it known (after January 1942 as the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor). The years 1940 to 1944 
witnessed a fundamental transformation in both the makeup and character o f the battalion and it cannot 
be said that the unit which set foot in France in July o f 1944 was essentially the same Regiment which 
had departed the Lakehead thrcc-and-a-half yean earlier Through the weeding out process that must 
inevitably accompany any training for war, die Lake Sups lost many militia era NCOs and officers 
during the early yean ofthe conflict As Stanley himself puts it, u(jn Debert) the weeding out of 
category men continued. This meant unfortunately, the loss o f popular officns and NCOs, o f men 
who had supported the regiment back in the dull discouraging militia days, when neither government 
nor public opinion did much to encourage the volunteer soldier, who had offered their services in the 
first mad days o f mobilization (...) Those subjected to this “unkind quirk o f fete” included Major 
Bennett, M^jor Marshall, Captain Bartley, Captain Phillpott, Lieutenant Cryderman and RSM 
Donaldson o f  whom Lieutenant Colonel Keane wrote in 1946, “our first Regimental Sergeant-Major, 
(...) was largely responsible for the fine esprit de corps and produced the framework o f our W.O.'s and
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These new “Lake Sups” were often the children of men who had served in the 
Great War, and they themselves now came to serve under the superannuated officers 
who had led their fathers and uncles a generation before. It was probably not the 
promise of remuneration that brought these men into the fold, for the pecuniary 
rewards o f the job were negligible. Along with the opportunity o f acquiring military 
skills and discipline and the thrill o f competing with one’s peers, there were other, 
less tangible and obvious benefits to joining the militia for both officers and ORs 
(other ranks). These benefits, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, included 
many incentives and advantages inherent in the regimental system of the Canadian 
Army which compensated for the meagre pay.54
Sergeants.” (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 29 January, 1946). Lieutenant Colonel Cook and 
Major McLeod were also obliged to leave the unit during its time in England. (Stanley, pp. 104-105)
54 The Militia Pay list dated 17 Feb 1928, gives the following pay rates for the NPAM:
Officers:
Colonel 920 per diem 13.60 with allowances (married) 12.40 with allowances (single)
LtCol. 120 11.90 10.70
Maj. 6.50 10.30 9.20
Capt. 5.80 8.40 7.50
Ll 3.60 6.20 5.40
2Lt , 3.00 5.60 4.80
Non-Commissioned Members:
WOl 3.70 6.00 5.20
W02 3.40 5.70 4.90
QMS, CSM 2.80 4.90 4.20
Coy QMS,S/Sgt. 2.20 4.20 3.50
Sgt. 1.90 3.90 3.20
LSgt, CpI. 1.60 3.50 2.80
LCpl. 1.40 3.30 2.60
Pte. 1.20 3.10 2.40
Boy .60 1.70
Given that a militia soldier could not be paid for more than 10 days annually, a private’s annual 
earnings would not exceed $12 for an entire year, (allowances were not paid for normal parading.)
f
I
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VI
Following a reorganization o f the Canadian militia in 1936, Defense Scheme 
#3 was officially approved by the Minister of National Defence, Ian Mackenzie, in 
1937 and circulated to the various Military District Headquarters in the following 
year. It held that the primary objective would be the raising of a field force, or Mobile 
Force as it came to be designated, comprised of a corps headquarters, two infantry 
divisions and a cavalry division for rapid deployment overseas. Although no plan 
was put in place for the expansion of this force, conventional thinking at the time 
generally followed the proposals put forward by Otter that a force of six infantry 
divisions would ultimately be raised in the event o f a war. In view of the technical 
advances of the interwar period, however, the proposed cavalry division was dropped.
Unfortunately, the reorganization of 1936 was a reflection of both antiquated 
British thinking and the unwillingness of the government to spend money on defence.
Though some cavalry and infantry regiments were converted to artillery and armoured 
units, they did not receive the equipment and weapons necessary for their new tasks.
Aside from the elimination of the cavalry division, the so-called “Mobile Force” of 
Defense Scheme #3 remained unmodified. In 1937 it was still composed of 
old-fashioned infantry divisions (comprising four infantry battalions and one machine 
gun battalion per brigade).55 In light of the revolutionary mechanization of armies 
during the thirties, this force could hardly be called “mobile”.
Because the planners never contemplated any threat greater than a raid on 
Canadian soil by the enemy, preparation for home defense was established as a 
secondary priority. Prior to the circulation of Defense Scheme #3, the DOCs of each
55 Stanley, In the Face of Danger, p. 45, p. 86. The composition o f the Mobile Force was not fixed 
permanently. It was to be modified yearly at the discretion o f the DND based on the reports from the 
District Officers Commanding. Battalions were selected on the basis of both efficiency and geographic 
location. With its lack of mechanization, the Mobile Force could hardly live up to its name.
i t
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district had largely used their own initiative in planning measures for security and 
home defense.56 It was during this period that the LSR’s isolation from headquarters 
in Winnipeg was truly felt. This was not simply a question of geography, but one of 
psychological remoteness. If members of the LSR had felt removed from the rest of 
the district in earlier years, they might, with justification, have felt abandoned by their 
superiors in Winnipeg after the introduction ofthe scheme.
It was clear from MD #10’s response to the directives laid out by the Scheme 
after its official adoption that the LSR was not to play any role in the District’s plan. 
The Lake Sups were not to be a part of the Mobile Force,57 nor would they be called 
upon, for the time being, to perform guard duty of any vulnerable points along 
Canada’s communication system.58 The Lake Sups, it would seem, had been left 
without employment. It was not until September of 1938, as the tempo of military 
activity in Canada quickened in response to alarming developments in Europe, that 
any reference was made to the task of defending the vital installations in the area of
56 NAC RG 24, series C-l, reel c-8301,7 July 1937 letter to DND secretary re: Protection of 
Armouries and War Equipment Contained Therein from Brigadier B. W. Browne, DOC MD #10 
stated that a force of 1 NCO and 6 ORs at the Port Arthur Armoury and 2 ORs at the Fort William 
Armoury would be deployed for guard duty if circumstances dictated.
57 Stanley, fn FKfi o f Danger. p. 46. When General Order 133 was issued on 1 September 1939, 
the NPAM units selected for the Mobile Force from MD #10 were all based in Winnipeg. They 
included the Fort Garry Horse, The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders o f Canada, The Winnipeg 
Grenadiers (M.G.) and the Winnipeg Light Infantry (M.G.). Had all o f these units been selected for 
immediate mobilization, this arrangement would have left the city of Winnipeg nearly denuded of 
NPAM infantry units.
58 NAC RG 24, series C-l, reel c*8301, file 5129, p 8. In a Secret Communication on 18 April 1938 
to the District Officer Commanding (DOC) MD #10 regarding Defense Scheme #3 the DMOl writes: 
“With reference to section 13(b) o f Defense Scheme #3,1 am directed to inform you that in the event o f 
war with Japan, Military District 10 will be required to dispatch one infantry (rifle) battalion to MD 11 
on a peace establishment and with peace equipment... I am to ask therefore that you submit without 
delay, for approval by National Defence Headquarters, the name ofthe battalion selected for this duty.” 
It is interesting to note that the battalion selected was the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. (Designated by CR 
Grant, Lt CoL, DOC MD 10 on 22 April 1938) whose dispatch would require the reorganization o f 
MD #10’s infantry brigade. The LSR was an “unbrigaded unit” and at that point, had not been 
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Port Arthur and Fort William.59 An examination of the correspondence between the 
District Officer Commanding MD #10 and the Department of National Defence 
reveals the lack o f knowledge concerning the Lakehead on the part of the former, and 
the inherent parsimony of the latter with regard to expenditure on home defence even 
as war loomed on the horizon.
In response to a directive issued by the A/DMOI, on 22 February 1939 the 
DOC MD #10 sent “Proposal for Defense Scheme 3, Protection of Vulnerable 
Points” to the Secretary, Department of National Defence whereby the LSR would be 
tasked with running a ‘Training Company" and guarding the elevators at the 
Lakehead. An excerpt from the document reveals the scope of this proposed 
undertaking:
Detail of Guards For Vulnerable Points MD 10
H Guarding of Grain Terminals at Port Arthur and Fort William
1. Unit: LSR
2. Points to be guarded: 27 elevators
3. Guards: a) 8 officers (elevators fall into four main groups, 2 officers per group)
b) 2 NCOs IS ORs: to each elevator (27)
4. HQ and administration 3 officers, 3 NCOs, 20 ORs
5. Training Coy: 2 officers, 4 NCOs, 50 ORs




The response to this proposal was sent from National Defence Headquarters 
on 25 February 1939. It was the opinion of DND that the estimated strength of the
59 NAC RG 24, series c-l, reel c-8301, HQS 3498, vol. 9, Sept 9,1938. re: Defense Scheme no. 3: 
Protection o f vulnerable points. The A/DMOI directed in Appendix A, p. 3 that “Guards will be 
provided only for the elevators at the terminals at Port Arthur and Fort William.” (and no other grain 
elevators in MD #10.)
60 NAC RG 24, series c-l, reel c-8301, Secret Communication, 22 Feb 1939, from DOC MD #10 to 
Secretary, DND. Proposal: Defense Scheme 3, Protection o f vulnerable points.
1




force needed to guard the elevators was too high and that at its current strength of 175 
(all ranks), the LSR would be unable to recruit and train men in sufficient numbers to 
fulfill its role. The secretary noted that during World War One a total of 344 soldiers 
were employed in performing these duties. It was suggested that other measures be 
considered, such as the erection of fencing and cooperation with the civil and private 
authorities, to reduce the numbers of NPAM members involved in this duty. The 
DOC MD #10 was therefore directed to submit a new estimate to DND.61
On 2 Mar 1939, the DOC Brigadier J.L. Gordon submitted the new estimate 
for Military District #10, including the caveat that the frontage to be covered was 
approximately 18 miles in length, that the elevators were dispersed, and that there 
were two vital points to be guarded: the machinery for loading ships and trains, and 
the receiving machinery. The DOC also had concerns over sabotage and civil unrest. 
The new estimates were as follows:
Alterations:
HQ 2 officers 2 NCOs 5 ORs
Guard Duties 8 54 243
Training Detachment 2 4 50
Administration 1 I 15
TOTALS 13 61 313 62
NAC RG 24, series c-l, reel c-8301, 25 Feb 1939 Reply from Secretary, DND, re: 
Communication of 22 Feb 1939, from DOC MD #10. Consideration having been given, the Secretary 
writes: “Para 4: With reference to your proposal for the guarding ofthe grain elevators at Fort 
William and Port Arthur, however it is felt that the proposed strength o f the guards is excessive. It is 
noted that during the great war the maximum numbers employed on this task amounted only to 13 
officers and 331 on - a total o f344 as opposed to the S19 proposed by you. Further, at some 
unascertained date prior to Feb 1917, the whole o f the wartime guard was withdrawn, the responsibility 
for protection then devolving on the civil or private authorities normally responsible in peace.
ParaS: Moreover, it is noted that at the time of the last inspection for which a report is available (May 
1937) the LSR had a total strength o f only 175. To raise this to over 600 by recruiting will obviously 
require some time. But the greatest risk(...) will likely occur in the early stage ofthe emergency.
Risks will have diminished by the time unit has recruit full strength indicated. Unit would be busy 
recruiting at the very time it should be guarding the elevators.”
62 NAC RG 24, series c-l, reel c-8301,2 March 1939, New Estimates for Defense Scheme #3, DOC 
MD #10. The DOC, Brig. JL Gordon also added that “The above would only be sufficient if there 
were no civil unrest and if the elevators were not operating. In the event o f any civil unrest or during 
periods o f normal activity, personnel should be increased by 162 ranks to 13 Officers, 61 NCOs, and
i t
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Subsequently, on 6 March 1939, Brigadier Gordon was directed by national 
headquarters to seek co-operation from the RCMP for “inside protection1’ of the 
elevators. It was also expected that the elevator owners would use their own 
| employees to guard against sabotage attempts. In any event, the debate over the guard
! at the Lakehead proved to be unnecessary. Lieutenant Colonel Cook had made it
clear at a battalion commanders’ conference that year in Winnipeg that to post men as 
guards at the grain elevators was both impractical and a waste of public money owing 
to the vulnerability of these structures from the waterside.63 It would appear that 
neither DND nor Military District #10 headquarters had any realistic concept o f the 
logistical requirements o f defending the Port of Thunder Bay and the former had no 
intention o f coming up with a workable plan for defending the elevators from a 
waterborne threat This “home defence scheme” was therefore summarily 
abandoned.
VII
When Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939, the Chief of 
the General Staff sent out a telegram to the DOCs of all military districts (with 
reference to Defense Scheme #3) confirming that Canada was now at war with the 
Third Reich.64 Even before this formal declaration of war, Defense Scheme #3 had 
come into operation. During the summer o f 1939, various staff appointments had 
been agreed upon and on 25 August, the first militia soldiers were called out on 
service. On I September, orders were issued for the mobilization of the Mobile
475 ORs. In the event of an organized threat, the necessity of patrolling the railway would increase 
totals to original figure.”
63 Stanley. In the Face of n« iger p 4S Ar the outbreak o f the war, the LSR was not ordered to guard 
neighbouring vulnerable points as it had been in August o f 1914. Guards were posted only at the Port 
Arthur Armoury.
64 NAC RG 24 series c-l, reel c-8301, p. 160, Telegram of 10 Sept 1939.
, f
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Force, which would be redesignated by a special Order-in-Council the “Canadian 
Active Service Force” (CASF). Accompanying these orders was a schedule listing 
both those units which would become part of the two Divisions of the CASF and 
those which had been designated for defensive tasks, as provided for by Defense 
Scheme #3.65
Through the winter of 1939-40, not being part of the first two overseas 
divisions, the LSR could do little but watch events unfold and wait to see which units 
would form part of the Third Canadian Division. In the meantime, the militia unit 
continued to train as such, conducting drill parades and lectures at the Armoury. This 
was in keeping with the prevailing policy of the time, which left militia units which 
had not been transferred to the Active Service Force a fair amount of autonomy.66 
Officer and NCO classes were held on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday 
nights for those that wished to qualify for higher rank.
In February, a recruiting drive took place, but the LSR could not promise 
overseas service to new recruits, only opportunities “for advancing the military 
knowledge and usefulness o f those who are desirous of doing their bit for home 
service, or ultimately joining the Canadian Active Service Force if they desire.” 
Lieutenant Colonel Cook pointed out that “the transfer from the NPAM to the active 
force is entirely voluntary, but it will be readily appreciated that the recruit from a 
training unit is preferred.”67 Though war had broken out, the Lake Superior 
Regiment remained in every sense of the word a militia unit The heightened level of 
military activity was purely voluntary.
66 Stanley, In the Face o f Danger, p. 48. As already noted, the LSR was not a part o f either the first 
or second Division o f the CASF.
66 NAC RG 24 vol. 15093, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the militia,1939 stated: “The 
Militia is responsible for its own discipline and entrusted with its own internal administration.”
67 s .  in a - l» y  »n fhf F*™ "f 17ingri p. 49.
iI
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In the Spring of 1940, NPAM units across Canada waited anxiously for word 
on the composition of the Third Division. The civic authorities at the Lakehead 
responded to wartime enthusiasm by supporting the Regiment’s bid to be transferred 
to the CASF. In March of 1940, the Port Arthur City Council resolved to petition the 
Department of National Defense on this matter.68 In spite o f this support, some held 
little hope that the unit would in fact be included in the Third Division. It was 
pointed out that along with the LSR, the Winnipeg Light Infantry and the Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles of Military District #10 still remained unmobilized. There was little 
hope that all three would be “appeased” by the government. Moreover, as one critic 
has noted, “what chance would the Lake Superiors stand against The Winnipeg Light 
Infantry with the Commanding Officer of the latter unit a member of the Federal 
Parliament?”69
In spite of pleas from Northwestern Ontario communities, the LSR was 
dismayed (but probably not surprised) to discover that it had been passed over in 
favour of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles when the units of the Third Division were 
announced in May.70 That very month, however, an announcement was made in the 
House of Commons that nine more battalions would be mobilized as part of a fourth 
infantry division. On 1 June, a special news dispatch was sent to the Lakehead
68 Thunder Bay Archives, Port Arthur City Council Minutes, 95 series 17 ,11 March 1940. .
The city council resolved to petition the DND “that when the Third Division ofthe Canadian 
Expeditionary Forces is formed, the Lake Superior Regiment, which is the perpetuating militia unit of 
the Glorious 52nd Overseas Battalion, be incorporated to once again represent the district.”
69 Stanley, in the Face nf Danger, p.49. That this fact would be considered so important to the 
fortunes ofthe unit speaks volumes o f the power o f political patronage in the militia. This will be 
elaborated upon in the next chapter.
70 Stanley, fa the Face of Danger, p. 49. These pleas included a telegram from the Mayor o f Port 
Arthur to the Minister o f National Defense sent early in May which read: “ Understand from Canadian 
Press release that recruiting for the Third Canadian Division will be started within two weeks, and units 
for incorporation in that division are being designated. Would respectfully refer you to resolution of 
our Council requesting incorporation o f local unit, The Lake Superior Regiment.” Stanley also notes 
that the communities ofNipigon, Geraldton, and Fort William sent endorsements o f this request
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informing the public that the LSR had been named by Defence Minister Norman 
Rogers as one of the nine battalions of the new division.
A report in the local newspaper by Royd E. Beamish, a member of the LSR 
himself, stated that the Lakehead unit, which for many years had been one of the most 
active battalions in MD #10, was to be brigaded with two regiments from Old 
Ontario, the Irish Regiment of Toronto and the Elgin Regiment o f St. Thomas. The 
reporter considered it quite significant that the unit had been mobilized on its own, 
rather than as part o f a composite battalion and believed that this could be “considered 
as full recognition of the esteem with which the unit is held by national defense 
authorities.”71 On 2 June 1940, Lieutenant-Colonel Cook received confirmation that 
the LSR was to be transferred to the CASF and he and Captain J.E.V. Murrell, the 
Adjutant ofthe LSR, were summoned to MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg.72 On 3 
June 1940, Lieutenant-Colonel Murrell left Winnipeg to return to Port Arthur and 
begin the process of recruiting and training in earnest. Upon his return, organization 
was started for mobilization.73
71 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chmnide. 29 January 1946 (TBPL, #73 Military Forces and Defense 
-Thunder Bay.) Beamish added that S ofthe 18 infantry units called up would be composite battalions 
embracing two or more cities. He also reported that the unit’s present strength was about 300 men.
72 NAC, RG 24, LSR War Diary serial no. 942 Volume I, June 1940, Port Arthur.
“On 2 June 40, Lt. CoL H Cook notified by MD 10 that LSR to be mobilized immediately: 11th Bn., 
4th division. Lt Col. Cook instructed to take Capt. JE Murrell and Lt PM Arthur to Winnipeg. Left at 
2230 hours.” This is the first entry in the LSR War Diary which chronicles the Regiment’s 
transformation from a NPAM battalion in 1940 to the battle-hardened unit it had become by the end of 
the Northwest Europe campaigns in 1945.
73 NAC, RG 24, LSR War Diary serial no. 942 Volume 1, June 1940, Port Arthur. Entries on June 3 
and June 4. The Regimental War Diary, which recorded the day-to-day history o f the unit, gives a 
good impression ofthe frantic activity at the Lakehead in the month following the unit’s mobilization. 
Of particular interest are the periodic strength returns, which give an idea o f the unit’s rate of growth: 
Volume 1
3 June 40: Lieutenant Colonel Cook Capt J.E Murrell and Lt RJ Arthur in Winnipeg discussing 
mobilization instruction. Capt. Murrell and Lt. Arthur left Winnipeg 1845 hours for Port Arthur.
4 June 40: Organization started for mobilization. On duty: Capt. Murrell, Lt R Keane, Lt. R J 
Arthur, Lt (OM) J McCormack, 2!t WM Babe, Major GE Bain (WG), Lt DM Morrison, 2lt 1C 
Wilson. Lieutenant-Colonel Cook left Winnipeg for Port Arthur at 1845 hours.
I
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Thus, the First Battalion74 of the Lake Superior Regiment, a Non-Permanent Active 
Militia unit since its re-organization in 1921, was transferred to the Canadian Active 
Service Force and the militiamen began the long, hard process o f preparing for war.
5 June 40: Recruiting continues from NPAM personnel. Following Officers taken on strength at this 
date: Capt NW Shields, Lt HG Dawson, Lt IC Mcgillivray, Lt JL McCormack, Lt HJW Cargo, Lt 
EC Styffe, Lt MW Babe, Lt MJ Francis, 2lt TS Jones 2lt JW Mcinnis, 2h D Arthur. On duty: Lt 
Col. Cook, Lt RJ Arthur, Major GE Bain, Major Murrell and Capt. R. Keane. Daily strength return: 
18 Officers, 2 1 OR. The recruiting is going along well. Small squads are being formed on the floor 
for elementary training.
6 June 40: Recruiting continues from NPAM only the officers are all working to a late hour, doing
clerical work of all lands.
7 June 40: recruiting continues from NPAM. personnel appointments to date from 2/6/40:
Major Murrell 2ic Regt, Capt Keane, Adjt, Lt. E Styffe, Trans O, Lt Babe, Int O
8 June 40: 2lt Oscar F. Dmmbrille taken on strength. Lt Cargo, Lt Francis, Lt Styffe, 21t Mclnnes, 
2Lt Jones, 2Lt Wilson, 21t Dumbrille with ORs proceed on command to Fort Osborne barracks, 
Winnipeg, on a Junior Leader Course.
11 June 40: Promotions among NCOs and WOs: RSM, WOI Donaldson, WJ; A/T/ Sgt Rickard, F; 
A/P/Sgt. Burke, GH; A/O/R/Sgt Burt, AH.
12 June 40: Major Nee land taken on strength, strength return: 21 Os, 176 ORs.
17 June 40: Lt Andrew Calder Green RCAMC appointed MO, Capt AWS Bennett, taken on strength
18 June 40: Appointments: F Comes to be A/RQMS from 17/6/40
19 June 40: strength return 26 0 , 255 ORs 
30 June 40: strength return 26 0 , 403 ORs
Battalion Orders: 7 June 1940 
Training as detailed by Major Murrell
Training Cadre: Capt PhiUpott, Lt McGillivray, Pte. (A/Sgt) P Malach, Pte. R Woods, Pte. WP 
McLean.
74 The Lake Superior Regiment became a Two Battalion Regiment after 26 July 1940, when the 2nd 
Battalion, LSR, was established under the command of Lt Colonel Dear, the old CO ofthe NPAM 
LSR. This battalion was never to be mobilized but nevertheless, carried out the vital role of recruiting 
and providing reinforcements for the First Battalion throughout the war. The slate o f officers in the new 
Battalion six months after its creation was as follows: Captain H.U. Weston- quartermaster, Major 
Walter Ede, Major O McGuirk- 2ic, Major NJG McKinney, Capt WM Porter-paymaster, Capt WA 
Heaver, Lt AL MacFariane, Lt RHD Loucks, Lt Allan Gray, 2lt W Aitkens, 21t T.A. Miller, 21t 
George Eoll, 2lt LA Spencer, Lt EX. Mac Kay, 2 It George Tindall, 2 It S J . Clark, Lt Harry Chapman- 
MO, 2lt WH Peach, 2lt GJ Greer, 2!t W. Mulock, 2lt HA Field, Captain GR Dixon- Adjutant Captain 
B. McMullin /Pott Arthur Daily Ncwi-Chronicle. 18 December 1940, TBPL Local History File #92 
Military forces and defense, Thunder Bay) Stanley devotes several pages to a description ofthe 2nd 
Battalion's activities in fn ffr* n f Hangar (pp. 318-322).
i
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Chapter 2
T h e  L » ltt S u p e rio r  Regim ent; T h e  Social Institu tion
I
In considering the development of the Canadian militia between the wars, the 
historian is hampered by a dearth of literature of a military nature dealing with that 
era. This is largely because, for the most part during this period, Canada’s military 
lay dormant. The nation fought no wars, the government introduced no major 
military reforms after 1921, and little effort was made to modernize the Canadian 
Army until the eve of World War Two. Canada’s military historiography is replete 
with works which examine the Army during each of the wars, but very few which 
have anything o f worth to say about the dismal period between 1919 and 1939.75 It 
would appear that until quite recently, the prevailing rule for historians has been that 
if a military organization was not engaged in fighting a war, it was unworthy of study.
One o f the few exceptions to this rule is the autobiography of L t Gen. 
Maurice Pope, who comments extensively on his time with a southern Ontario militia 
unit during the twenties and thirties, providing an invaluable account of the 
challenges faced by the peacetime militia during this period. One of the most 
insightful sections of this book is the excerpt from Pope’s paper dealing with the 
militia in which he explains the underlying reasons for the success of the Canadian 
militia system:
The NPAM is an organization evolved by Anglo Saxons and is 
particularly well suited to the genius of that people. It is basically a voluntary
7* There are, however, a few first hand accounts written which describe the challenges inherent in 
“getting up” a NPAM unit in the interwar yean. For example, a section of Gordon S. Howard’s 
Memoir* o f a ritfagn Soldier 1918-1945 (privately published) deals with the efforts o f the young 
World War I Artillery veteran in forming a reserve battery in rural Saskatchewan. He provides a vivid 
description o f the activities of new recruits and veterans, the use o f makeshift guns, camp and the 
struggle to acquire an armoury for the battery. Also discussed is Howard’s involvement in the Wheat 
Pool, Canadian Legion, and Agricultural organization, suggesting a definite pattern o f community 
activity.
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system, the members o f which enlist for a term of years and undergo annually 
a stated period of training, either at camp or at local headquarters. In a 
happily situated country such as Canada, the militia system is adequate to her 
needs-primarily for the reason that her needs are small. But the point to be 
noted is that should a unit aspire to a really satisfying standard of efficiency, 
much more is necessary than the 10 or 12 days of annual training for which 
Parliament makes provision. Now the curious thing is that among 
English-speaking city corps this additional training is freely given and in 
generous measure. Thus without additional expense to itself the State obtains 
more than it demands; it has capitalized on the enthusiasm of the individual. 
This extraordinary condition is probably unparalleled in any other civilized 
nation not forming part o f the British Empire. It is not easy to assess the 
underlying reasons which make such a state o f affairs possible. In the first 
place, many persons join the militia in the belief that they are thereby 
discharging a public duty. Others see in it an agreeable hobby. Another class 
may be attracted by the display of uniform, the satisfaction derived from 
public parades and by the enhanced position in the community to which they 
may arise through their associations with the militia.(...)76
It is significant that only one of the three major factors that Pope outlines as
reasons for joining the militia, the discharge o f a perceived “public duty”, can be
considered an altruistic motive.77 The other two motives (that o f the “agreeable
hobby” and that of the“ enhanced position within the community”) contain a definite
element of self-interest. The message is clear: the militia does not simply demand
something of the citizen, it provides something in return.
76 Lt Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of a Canadian Soldier Canada: 
University of Toronto Press, 1962, pp. 86-87. The General is quite correct in pointing out that 
additional training was given in generous measure. Considering that the militiaman o f this period was 
only paid for ten days service annually, a simple calculation reveals that many members of the militia, 
parading for a half-day once a week for the entire year and allowing for occasional absences, were 
probably parading the equivalent o f about twenty to twenty-five full days a year. (54 weeks x .5 days 
paraded = 27 days annually) In other words, at least half o f the time, the militiaman paraded without
p«y-
77 However, it is quite possible to make the argument that this “duty to the state” was seldom the only 
reason for joining the militia. An examination o f the concept of “duty to the state” , with its roots in 
philosophical notions of nationalism, is a complex subject which warrants closer analysis than can be 
accomplished here. For works which delve into this concept see Peter Paret, “Nationalism and the 
sense o f Military Obligation" in Military Affairs, vol. 36 no. 4, October 1972, pp. 92-96; Jock 
Haswell, Citizen Armies. (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1973); Total War and Social Change 
(Arthur Marwicked., London: 1988); Theodore Ropp. War in the Modem World, murhmm \  C r 
Duke University Press, 1977); and Alfred Vagts, A History o f Militarism: Romance and Realities o f a 
Profession. fNew York: 1937).
I
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General Pope grasped that the value of the Non-Permanent Active Militia lay 
not only in its function as a military force but also as an embodiment of the citizen’s 
duty to the state and an institution which provided social opportunities as well as 
military training to all members. Herein lay the genius o f the militia system: its 
duality o f function. Had it been an organization solely devoted to military pursuits, it 
is doubtful that in an era of fiscal restraint and relative peace, it could have survived 
by simply offering “opportunities” to young men for conducting hours o f tedious drill 
and training with outdated equipment. In many ways, its secondary function, that of a 
social institution, was the key to the militia’s success.
It is an inalienable fact that any competent NP AM commanding officer of the 
twenties and thirties recognized the necessity of creating a strong bond to the 
community in which his unit was based. The militia’s secondary function became 
crucial to its survival when the fulfillment of the militia’s primary function was made 
so difficult. The interwar period was an era of indifference toward the military when, 
as Richard Preston puts it, “the fundamental connection between military strength and 
national sovereignty was not fully understood”. 78 It is as important to examine the 
“social” function of the NPAM during this period as it is to look at its “military” 
activities. It is only in looking at both facets, the proverbial “two sides of the same 
coin”, that we come to achieve a true understanding o f a militia unit during this era. 
That is not to say that these facets must be examined separately from each other. 
Indeed, as any serious study will reveal, they are inexorably linked.
The indifference o f government toward the militia during this period was 
particularly acute when dealing with a unit’s community activities. This fact is
78 PfchM-d Prwtnn ranaHimn Defense Policy, p. 19. As evidence o f this lack of understanding, 
Preston states that in the thirties, Mackenzie King increased the establishment of the Permanent Force 
and the Active Militia, but reduced its appropriations to below pre-Worid War One levels. It is 
important to recognize that any study o f a NPAM unit in the twenties and thirties entails an 
understanding o f the major difficulties faced by such an organization during this period.
i
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reflected in the paucity of official records on this subject kept by National Defence 
Headquarters (NDHQ) and even the regiment itself. We are forced therefore to look 
elsewhere for clues which enable us to paint a picture of the social life of the LSR. It 
is not possible to rely on the official published history of the unit. As is the case with 
many regimental histories, focused as they are on the exploits o f men at war, George 
Stanley’s In the Face of Danger largely ignores the “social aspect” o f regimental life 
in the twenties and thirties, painting a picture of a supposedly dull and cheerless 
existence for the NPAM Lake Superior Regiment in the interlude between the wars.79 
But, if this was a dark time for the military, what kept the young militiaman involved? 
How did the unit justify its existence? What was its true social role?
Through a study of the Lake Superior Regiment’s interaction and involvement 
in the social life of the Lakehead region, it is hoped that a more complete picture of 
the inter-war militia will begin to take shape. An examination of correspondence 
(both “official” and unofficial), newspaper articles, and the assistance of firsthand 
accounts, reveals that contrary to popular opinion, the twenties and thirties were an 
important era for Canada’s military, if not in terms of military development, then 
certainly in regard to the establishment of social links and community activity.
79 David Ratz’s Master’s Thesis: “Soldiers o f the Shield: The 96th District o f Algoma Battalion o f 
Rifles, 1886-1896; A Social and Military Institution” (Lakehead University, 199S), pp. 17-18; and 
W.A.B. Douglas and B. Greenhous’ “Canada and the Second World War The State of Clio’s Art”, in 
Military Aflhirs. vol. 42 no. 4, February 1978, pp. 24-28; provide further insights into the value o f 
Regimental Histories. Reginald H. Roy provides a review of In the Face o f Danger in the Canadian 
Historical Baview. vol. 24, no. 2, June 1961, p. 154. For examples o f Canadian Regimental History, 
RiMirinn A ronton. A History o f First H u « r«  iare.ioan (Can»A»- 1981); Capt Leonard 
Curchin and Lt. Brian D. Sim, The Elgin*: The Story o f the Elgin Regt. (RCACI and its Predecessors 
(S t Thomas, Ontario: Sutherland Press, 1977); Brereton Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial 
History o f the R oy I Canadian Dragoons (Ottawa: Guild o f the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983); 
Brereton Greenhous et al., Semper R w a r  The Hisrnty nf the B eyl Hamilton Light Infantry 
(Wentworth Regiment! 1862-1977. (Canada: W. L. Griffin Ltd., 1977); Colonel Paul P. Hutchison, 
Cmnmla’« Hlarlr Watch The First Hundred Veers 18*9.1 WP (Panada- The Royal Highlanders o f 
Canada Armoury Association, 1987); and Bruce Tascona and Eric Wells- Little Black Devils: A 
History o f the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. (Winnipeg: Frye Publishing Ltd., 1983).





Recollections of a Militia Soldier:
In an effort to gain a more complete picture o f the regiment as a social 
institution, it is important to understand what the unit meant to the individual 
involved in a general sense. Not simply as a “job” a “pastime” or a “hobby”, but 
rather, as a “life” or, more accurately, “lifestyle”. Since its beginnings, the Canadian 
militia has been modeled upon the regimental system of the British Army which, 
though it has undergone many changes and much restructuring, has been in use since 
the late seventeenth century.80
The regimental system is based on the concept that the regiment must be an 
organization whose mandate goes far beyond providing military training. To its 
detractors, the regimental system is inefficient. Its critics charge that in addition to 
high administrative costs, competitive regional recruiting and the decentralization of 
support resources, the regimental system is rife with praetorianism, parochialism and 
nepotism. To its supporters, it is a socializing agent which provides a sense of 
family, looks after the individual soldier’s welfare, and promotes group pride, 
adherence to tradition, and fighting spirit In dealing with a concept this broad, it is
80 Charles Messenger. History o f the British Army. 1/nwtnn- Bison Books Ltd., 1986, pp. 12-19. 
Though the roots o f the regimental system can be traced back hundreds of years (to the British 
mercenary companies who fought on the continent), the first true modem infantry regiments of the 
British Army were founded following the Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660. These included the 1st 
and 2nd Regiments o f Foot Guards (later known as the Grenadier Guards and the Coldstream Guards) 
and the Dunbarton Regiment (later, the First Regiment o f Foot or the Royal Scots) who trace their 
origins back to 882 and as their “Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard” nickname indicates, are considered the 
oldest regiment o f the British Army. For more on the infantry regiments of the British Army, see 
Frederick Myatt, The British Infantry 1660-1945. The Evolution o f a Fighting Force. fDorset UK: 
Blanford Press, 1983). John Keegan provides a unique perspective on the regimental system in 
“Regimental Ideology” in War Economy end the Military Mind. (Geoffrey Best and Andrew 
Wheatcroft, eds. London: 1976).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
therefore useful to examine a soldier's sum total o f experiences. It is in this manner 
that we may develop a comprehensive picture of life in a militia unit.
The LSR Song
Come let us sing about the LSR 
We are the better unit here by far 
We do our tactics more efficiently 
And do our fighting at the bar 
We drink our fill o f whiskey rum and beer 
And love the lovely ladies when they’re here 
So don’t sigh, don’t cry when you see us go by 
Just remember we’re the LSR81
This little ditty eloquently expresses the sense of camaraderie, pride and 
friendly competition that characterized the unit in the years leading up to the Second 
World War. Although time has dimmed the memories of those who experienced life 
as militiamen at the Lakehead in the years before World War Two, there are still some 
who can recall what it was like to train with the Lewis Gun, or wear the ancient 
cast-off puttees of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. One of these few is a man with 
a particularly valuable perspective, having known life in the militia both before and 
after the war as well as having experienced the mobilization, training and eventual 
deployment of the Lake Superior Regiment (motor) during the northwest Europe 
campaign of 1944-45.
Edward Gravelle, a former Commanding Officer of the unit who joined in 
1935 as a private, described the atmosphere in the Regiment during the latter half of 
the thirties as one o f “confidence and enthusiasm”.82 Part of this confidence, as he
81 Written in 1936 by Staff Sgt Elgin W. Smith, 1st Battalion, Lake Superior Regiment (TBMMA 
collection).
82 Lt. Col. (ret) E. J. O. Gravelle (1919 • 1999) was one o f the most well-known and admired 
members o f the Regiment. His career in the military spanned three decades, during which he held 
every rank in the Army (with the exception of WOl/RSM) from private to Lt Col. He joined the LSR 
in 193S as a 16 year old private and was commissioned during the war. He rose to the rank o f major
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saw it, was derived from the fact that all of the unit’s senior officers (Commanding 
Officers, Company Commanders, and Seconds-in-Command) were World War One 
veterans and frequently highly-decorated soldiers. He believes that the young troops 
of the unit were undoubtedly influenced by the dedication of these experienced 
leaders who were capable of instilling an intangible quality in young part-time 
soldiers that Gravelle characterizes as “a change in attitude”. The former CO recalls 
that young men were drawn to the military in those days chiefly because it offered 
discipline, group activity, and because it was an organization with “social 
overtones”-  a chance to be with other people who had similar interests. It was the 
training, the opportunity to compete and his own keen interest in learning that 
attracted Gravelle to the unit.
During the thirties, the Lake Superior Regiment was based primarily in Port 
Arthur. Gravelle states that during this era geographic considerations played a 
significant role in determining which unit a soldier would belong to and, therefore, 
transfers between units at the Lakehead only tended to occur if a member of the 
militia was moving from Port Arthur to Fort William or vice-versa. Although the 
Regiment shared the Armoury in Port Arthur with an artillery detachment, the 18th 
Medium Battery, based in Fort William, and the 4th Field Ambulance, which is 
famous for being the first Lakehead NPAM unit sent overseas, transfers between 
these units were few and far between.83
during the conflict and commanded “A” Company during the campaign in northwest Europe. He was 
wounded in action three times and earned several decorations, including a “mention in despatches”. He 
returned to the Lakehead at the end of the war and continued to serve with the Regiment. He was the 
Commanding Officer ofthe Lake Superior Scottish Regiment firom 1951 to 1958. An interview was 
conducted with Colonel Gravelle on 15 January 1999.
83 The only other major NPAM unit at the Lakehead based in the Port Arthur Armoury which 
Gravelle does not mention was Number Three Company, 10th Division Signals, Canadian Corps of 
Signallers, which was formed in Port Arthur in 1923, with Major AWS Bennett (who also served with 
the LSR) in command. He was succeeded by Major H.S. Hancock, who was in turn succeeded by 
Major A.F. Macdonald. Major Macdonald relinquished command in May o f 1934 and was succeeded 
by Acting Major McNeill. The News-Chronic le reported in 1934: “Both units (meaning the LSR and
iI
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Although most Lake Sups during this period were Port Arthur men, 
Headquarters, “A” and “B” Companies being located at the Port Arthur Armoury, 
after the start o f World War II the unit did establish a more substantial presence in 
Fort William and Dry den.84 The LSR Regimental Band, also headquartered in Port 
Arthur, played a significant role in the life of the unit. On many occasions, when the 
unit underwent its annual inspection, the band would play as the inspecting officer 
reviewed the troops. Gravelle, who had been involved in the military since the early 
thirties as a cadet, recalls in particular, the contribution of Bandmaster Gutteridge, 
who had the band as well trained and well-disciplined as any musician could ever 
have done.
Gravelle relates that because of the “bare bones” nature of funding during this 
period, the troops of the regiment went without much o f the equipment needed to 
perform even the most rudimentary training. This did not really induce discontent or 
frustration among the soldiers of the Regiment because, as he claims, most were 
largely ignorant of what equipment might otherwise have been available. On 
occasion, because of low attendance (the regiment sometimes comprised as few as 
thirty or forty members, parading as many soldiers as there were members of the 
band!), company drill was often performed with a Right Marker and Left Marker 
holding a length of rope between them to represent a “notional” platoon. To Gravelle,
#3 Company, 10th Div. Signals) have their headquarters in the Armoury, Park Street, while the First 
Lake Superior Regiment also has two companies in Fort William.” fPort Arthur Daily 
Ncwt-Chronicle. 23 June 1934, “Colonel Ray and Colonel Dear attended annual New Years Day “at 
home” oo 1 January 1934”)
84 According to Gravelle, “C” Company o f the LSR was based out o f Fort William and trained in 
McKellar Park behind the Old Armoury, a former Post Office, which was eventually abandoned in 
favour o f a building on Simpson street built in 1930-31. As we have already seen, records reveal that 
both “C” and “D” Companies were in Fort William. It is quite possible (though by no means certain) 
that until the start o f World War II “D” Company was most often understrength, arid therefore, was 
only considered a Company for administrative purposes. As has already been mentioned, during the 
war the unit also established a Second Battalion, comprised ofmen not on “Active Service”. This 
formation was dissolved after World War II.
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these conditions merely serve to show the dedication of the members who paraded 
regularly, once a week, on Tuesdays. The troops were only paid for ten days of 
service annually, but most came in on their own time throughout the year, the “money 
aspect”, not being a crucial part of the job’s appeal.85
According to Gravelle, the nature of the militia at the time was such that 
disaffection was never really a factor. Because there was no contract to sign, a young 
recruit was simply taken on strength and went through on “Part Two Orders” (the 
official documentation, most o f which no longer exists). There were no repercussions 
for those who failed to parade. As Gravelle puts it, “You were there because you 
wanted to be there, and if dissatisfaction came about for one reason or another, you 
merely didn’t show up anymore.” The strength of the unit on parade therefore 
became a useful tool for measuring the morale of the troops. “If your strength was 
there, everyone was happy, if you found that there was a ton o f them disappearing, 
then obviously something was making them not come back”. Unfortunately, this 
method made it quite difficult to keep track o f precise numbers within the unit at any 
given time.
Discussing the unit’s training, Gravelle relates that outdoor exercises were 
chiefly one-day shoots held three or four times a year at the Mount McKay rifle range 
(which would continue to be used extensively right up until the 1990s).86 He
85 This view is corroborated by Monty Phillpott in his letter to Harry Smith “Notes on the activities 
ofthe LSR prior to Mobilization June 1940” (held by the TBMMA). He writes “All schemes or 
activities extra were at no expense to the public. Very small command pay allowed to C.O. for reg't 
fund. Most o f pay turned in to regmental (sic) And.” There is some discrepancy in GraveUe’s and 
Phillpott’s accounts of how pay was allocated. According to Phillpott, soldiers were ooly paid for 5 
days a year, plus 6 extra days if  camp was attended. This docs not correspond with several other 
sources which, as we have seen, state that 10 paid days were allocated for each soldier annually, 
however this is a minor inconsistency. We must assume that Gravelle’s description, supported as it is 
by archival sources, is more accurate.
86 In “Notes On The Activities o f the LSR”, p. 1, Phillpott writes “Several Schemes were put on, 
mostly at platoon level. Food and transport paid for by the Company Officen and their wives. Two 
weekend camps were put on at the Mt. McKay Range at the expense o f the officers and what help we 
could arrange from different contractors. The annual classification was fired at these camps by all
i
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remembers the presence of the PPCLI Instructional Cadre at the Armory, identifiable 
by the letters “I. C.” worn on their lower sleeve. Although these drill instructors were 
seldom above the rank of Lance-Corporal, as far as the soldiers of the Regiment were 
concerned, they might have been “the God almighty him self'.87 These permanent 
force instructors were held in such regard that upon the outbreak of war, many of 
them were appointed as Warrant Officers or Regimental Sergeant Majors and a few 
were even commissioned as officers. Occasionally, the unit was also paid a visit by 
an instructional cadre RSM, certainly an event of great significance, and perhaps 
tenor, for the young soldiers of the LSR! Another highlight of the year’s training 
calendar for Gravelle and his young comrades was “Summer Camp", a yearly event 
whereby the soldiers of the unit traveled to Camp Shilo in Manitoba for a week of 
tactical exercises, the unit’s one major trip out o f town.
Discussing the composition of the unit, Gravelle recalls that the officers ofthe 
unit came from a number of different backgrounds, and not all were upper-middle 
class professionals: several worked for the government, there were a few grain 
elevator inspectors and Gtavelle’s company commander was a bank employee. The 
enlisted men o f the unit were also from varied social backgrounds, but he notes that 
the Sergeant’s mess, which, like the Officer’s mess, formed a great part ofthe social 
life o f the Regiment, seemed to be a social class unto itself within the unit.88 He
nolo. The ML McKay Range had a road cross it at about the hundred yard range. This road had to be 
closed 24 hours ooce every year. The government allowed two days pay to mount sentries on the road 
for twenty-four hours”.
87 Gravelle interview. Similarly, Phillpott writes in “Notes”: “An instructor from Winnipeg came 
down every year to help train us for Annual Inspection. All Provisional Schools were staffed by 
Permanent Force Instructors” (p.2).
88 Phillpott, “Notes”, p.2. All offioen were mcmben of the officers’ mess and were expected to attend 
mess Auctions. Moat ofthe officers had mess kits and the mess endeavoured to put on a mass dinner 
once a month. According to Phillpott, these dinncn became difficult to finance after “one o f the 
stewards absconded with the fonds”(l).
|
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recalls that although there was no mess for junior enlisted ranks, ambitious Corporals 
were permitted to join the Sergeant’s mess. Without resorting to a statistical analysis 
of occupations and social status among the officers and men of the LSR, certain facts 
can be deduced: For example, given the relative frequency with which enlisted men 
(particularly veterans of World War One) made the leap to the officer’s mess, it 
would appear that by the interwar period, the tradition of the class-based rank 
structure inherited in the 19th century from the British Army had already eroded a 
significant amount at the Lakehead, although there may have existed vestiges of 
elitism and snobbery.89
Ethnicity was a more difficult factor to quantify for Gravelle because, 
according to him, this was never considered an issue within the LSR. The one 
exception to this rule was the case o f “visible minorities’*. He recalls that several 
aboriginal Canadians were members of the unit, and these men tended to stand out by 
virtue o f their excellent marksmanship on the ranges. This tolerant attitude toward 
the membership of visible minorities in the Regiment is perhaps somewhat surprising. 
It stands in stark contrast to the reluctance o f authorities to enlist minorities into 
C.E.F. battalions during the First World War, but the passage o f time and the vastly 
different circumstances of wartime active service and peacetime militia service (for 
example, the great difficulties in recruiting for the latter) must be acknowledged as 
important factors.90
89 For a discussion o f social clan distinctions within military onaniiations. «ec David Englander i d  
Janies Osborne, “Jack, Tommy, and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class”, in 
UjjgmjGaLiBUDIlLvol.21,1971, pp. 593-621; Sue E. Berryman,
and H. Wallace Sinaiko, eda., USA: Perfamoo-Braiaey’s, 1961).
90 See Jamea W. S t G.. Walker, uRace and Recniittnant in World War I: Enlistment of Viaibk 
Minorities in the Canadian ExpedMomny  Force" *  a««t—r vol. 70 no. 1.1919, 
pp. 1-26 for more on the subject o f minorities in (he C.E.F.
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Like ethnicity, religion does not seem to have been a particularly salient 
feature o f the Regiment’s makeup from Gravelle’s perspective. That the Regimental 
church, was an Anglican one had more to do with the presence of the 52nd Battalion’s 
old colours (enshrined within the building) than the predominance o f adherents to the 
Protestant faith within the unit The former CO noted, however, that several Pastors 
of St John’s Church were to serve as the Padre o f the Regiment over the course of its 
history.
Regarding the function of the unit as a social institution, Gravelle recalls that 
the relationship between the community at large and the Regiment was “of a very 
high quality”. This relationship was maintained by active participation in city events, 
parades, and Remembrance Day services. “Whenever any event was held in the 
Officer’s Mess or The Sergeant’s Mess it was very well attended by civic dignitaries”. 
Gravelle remembers outstanding occasions, like the visits to Port Arthur of members 
of the Imperial Defense College (senior members o f Commonwealth armies who 
attended the IDC in England) during their tours o f Canada, when the Regiment would 
assemble on the floor o f the Armoury and the band would perform for the visitors’ 
entertainment
In the thirties, the Regiment maintained a cordial relationship with the military 
units in Duluth, but this association was not as strong as it would be in later years.
The social highlight o f the year for the troops was the annual “Men’s Christmas 
Dinner”, when the unit’s officers served the troops supper at tables set up in the long 
corridor in the basement o f the Port Arthur Armoury. Another popular event was the 
New Year’s Day Levee, which featured visits between the Sergeant's and Officers 
messes and were attended on occasion by the mayor, members of parliament and 
government officials from Ottawa.91
91 Both o f these annual tndhkns have ben naiaiained by the Thundir Bay Gariaaa a d  the Lake 
Styrior Scottish R fjnxnt, the d ticcn d u  o f the LSR, up to the pmw« (toy. For mora oo the w ioua
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These recollections paint a vivid picture o f a regiment that, having survived 
through the lean years of the twenties and thirties, was poised to take its place among 
the units of the Canadian active service force upon the outbreak of World War Two. 
The early months of the war also saw a transformation in the makeup of the officer 
complement o f the Regiment, as World War I vets were replaced by young NCOs 
who were commissioned.92 He also notes that when the Regiment went on active 
service, a number of men from outlying areas around the Lakehead communities came 
to Port Arthur to join the unit. Among these were several natives from nearby 
communities and reserves. Prior to the war, the “transportation factor” had made it 
impractical for men in rural areas to parade with the unit93 By 1940, however, with 
the transfer of the unit to the CASF, the Lake Superior Regiment ceased to be solely 
the “Lakehead1 s” Militia and became something much more substantial: an infantry 
battalion preparing to go to war with soldiers drawn from far and wide across 
Northwestern Ontario.
m
Having discussed the perceptions o f a soldier who served in the LSR during 
the thirties, we must now examine the events o f two decades which shaped these
Regimental traditions o f the Canadian Army, see Edward C. Russell, r.wtnm« m>h Tradition* ofthe 
p— <tt— AwwH iCMnmd*' Deneau and Greenberg Publiihen Ltd., 1910). For more details on
the LSSR’s dress rod regimental traditions, see Miles G. Penny, “The Lake Superior Scottish 
Regiment o f Canada. Thunder Bay, Ontario” in Journal o f thg r a w d li Military Collector Society. 
September/October 1912, pp. 4-9; and ‘‘the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Regimental Catechism” 
(TBMMA: privately publiihed).
92 Gravelle pointed out, as an aside, that by 1943-44, the Corps Commander had ordered that no one 
over the age o f 40 could be on active service.
93 According to Gravelle. after the war, the unit underwent another tigniffranr transformation. Those 
that had been a pmt o f the militia prior to mobilization but who had not gone overseas, did not return to 
the Regiment. Peritapa tbcre was the feeling that their time had pasted. The post-war Lake Superior 
Regiment was a unit o flta h  young troops, anchored and led by a core ofveterans who, as time went 
on, paduaUy dropped out and moved on with their civilian lives.
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perceptions. The foundations o f the Regiment having been discussed in a previous 
chapter, it is appropriate to concentrate on the development of the unit's relationship 
with its community. The creation, or more accurately, re-establishment of links 
between the Regiment and the Lakehead community began almost before the Great 
War had ended. As we have seen, during World War One, the old pre-war militia 
unit, the 96th Lake Superior Regiment, had fulfilled several functions at the 
Lakehead.94 By 1918, the Regiment was moribund. The “interim" Commanding 
Officer of the unit, however, took advantage o f the few opportunities which presented 
themselves for public exposure at the conclusion of the conflict. These included 
patriotic public gatherings and rallies93 as well as public receptions for returning 
soldiers.96 Actions like these ensured that the local militia would not fade away 
completely during those uncertain years between the end of the war and the 
re-establishment of a viable militia force.
Following the re-organization of the Canadian militia in 1920, L t Col. J. D. 
Young, the new Commanding Officer of the LSR, made several important decisions 
regarding how the unit would present itself to the public. One of these was the
94 TBMMA: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Historical File, p.3 In addition to guard duty at the 
elevators and the Kakabeka Falls power plant 18 miles outside the cities, the 96th LSR, at we have 
seen, also provided several drafts organized for active service prior to the mobiliation o f the 52nd 
Battalion C.E.F. in 1915. These drafts totaled approximately 1000 officers and men.
93 The Fart WiH»—» n»i»v tImmJomwmI. rwgmhw i6. 1911 "Crowds see colours o f 52ndBn.” p. 
1. The Battalion’s colours returned to the Lakehead several months before the men o f the unit came 
home and a public exhibition ofthe colours war organized. During this rally, Lt Col. Young spoke to 
the crowd at length. His remarks included statements about the deplorable presence o f "aliens” at the 
Lakehead: “2 out o f every 3 boys seen on the streets o f Fort William today were aliens. This must be 
rectified.’' -certainly a sign o f the times.
96 Th« Fart Wiiu—  rhiiy Tdim Jm iM i December 27,1918 “Reception to Soldiers” p .}. One of 
the largest o f there occurred on March 29,1919, when the first drafts from the 52nd Battalion C.E.F. 
returned to the Lakehead (TBMMA, photo 199S.001.166h and Stanley, loA gfH R ilffiH ffiL  PP- 
31-39). In 1919, the Lakehead was alao boat to a convention ofthe GWVA (Grant War Veterans 
Association) in Jammy. (Pott Arthur Dnily News-Chronicle, Jan 151919, “War Veta Meeting" p. 8 
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retention of a strong affiliation with the 52nd Battalion C.E.F. The basis for this had 
already been promulgated by General Order No. 29 of 15 March 1920, whereby the 
First Battalion, Lake Superior Regiment was named the perpetuating unit of the 52nd 
Battalion CEF.97 It was hoped that former members of the 52nd Battalion would 
recognize in the Lake Superior Regiment of the NPAM a descendant or “successor” 
of their wartime unit and be moved to continue their active participation in an 
organization for which many felt a great deal o f affection and pride. Indeed, if any 
unit could claim descent from the 52nd, it was the Lake Superior Regiment Its 
pre-war incarnation, the 96th LSR, had contributed the bulk o f the troops for that 
battalion when it went overseas in 1915.98 The CO of the LSR was also depending 
on the fact that the name recognition of the 52nd would prove a positive factor in 
recruiting efforts. This is made quite clear by newspaper articles and press releases of 
the time.99
97 DND Directorate o f History, Vol. 197 File: The Lake Superior Regiment 145221003 (D l) This 
designation, however, did not entitle the LSR to bear the 52nd Battalion’s Battle Honours. This right 
was granted by the King on 15 September, 1929.
98 Prior to November, 1915, the 96th LSR sent drafts o f men to the 8th, 28th, 37tfa and 44th Battalions 
C.E.F. (DND Directorate of Histoty, VoL 197 File LSR 145221003 (D l).) On November 3,1915, 
the first complete battalion ofthe Regiment, the 52nd (New Ontario) Battalion C.E.F. left for France.
A second battalion, the 94th Battalion, under Lt O il. Macklin left on June 16,1916, and a third, the 
141st “Bull Moose" Battalion under Lt Col. McKenzie left early in 1917. All three had been raised at 
the Lakehead and wen comprised mostly of local men. The 52nd joined the Third Canadian Division 
upon arrival in England but the 94th and 141st were broken up and used as reinforcements throughout 
the division. In all, over4000 troops and officers wen recruited by the regiment and dispatched on 
active service. By the end of the war, the casualties numbered 140 officers and 2119 other ranks. 
(TBMMA: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Histoty File, pp. 3-4).
"  Tim Bn— Arttmr n«iiv Menn-fliraMieig July n , 1921. p.l “ Reorganization of Fifty-Second 
Battalion is About Complete" This article makes quite plain the fact that an affiliation with a Canadian 
Expeditionary Force Battalion was o f great significance to the new NPAM unit:
14 After a considerable amount o f work on the part o f the Officer Commanding (ik ) and the 
Adjutant, the Fifty Second Battalion o f the Canadian Militia has reached the state o f reorganization 
where it is poos&le to commence enlistment It is the aim in the militia to perpetuate the number and 
record ofthe old fifty tecond New OnmrioBmtalion CEF which made a neme o f undying glory on the 
fields o f France mid Flanders. Under the new organization ofthe Canadian militia, the new battalion 
will be known as the First Battalion (52nd battalion CEF) Lake Superior Regiment.
The officers are all ex-eervicc men, some ofthem having served with the old Fifty second.
il
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Another important decision taken following a meeting o f the unit’s officers 
held on 14 Julyl921, was to establish a regimental band. As the Port Arthur Daily 
Ncws-Chronicle reported the following day: “It was decided to commence the 
reorganization campaign by establishing a first class band, by which means it is hoped 
the battalion can be built up to full strength. This band will also, in the future, give 
band concerts in the armouries and elsewhere, to raise funds with which to equip the 
armouries with a gymnasium and to make it a meeting place for veterans and their 
friends.”100 The desire of the unit’s officers to raise a band at this early juncture 
indicates something of the importance of this type of “auxiliary” organization to the 
viability NPAM battalion, an importance derived more from its “civic” function than 
its military one.101
Though it is difficult to determine what might have occurred had the unit 
embarked upon a different path, it is fair to say that both the decision to maintain a
The cadre o f officers is not complete and the Commanding Officer is anxious to have it completed, and 
would be pleased to have « y  officer who served overseas either with the Canadians or the Imperial 
Anny who wiabes to join communicate with him or any o f the officers listed below.
The corps is anxious to complete its strength before the visit o f Baroo Byng and the other 
generals in order that it may take pert in the pageant being prepared for their reception, and form a 
guard o f honour for the Governor General.
So a cordial invitation is extended to all overseas non-conunissioned officers and men and the 
younger men ofthe Twin Cities who would like to identify themselves with the otganizmion and keep 
up die traditions o f the old Fifty-second.
The new unit will be outfitted in khaki icrvke dress, with the same equipment as wai worn 
overseas.”!...)
100 The Part Arthur Daily Ncws-Chronicle July IS, 1921.pl “King Sends a Silk Flag to Fifty 
Second” As the quote from this article indicates, the establishment o f a band waa expected to aid in 
recruiting. The article goes on to relate that the battalion had recently received a “silk flag” from HRM 
King George V (the Regiment's Colours). These were later to be officially presented to the unit.
101 The organization o f a military band was purely optional for a NPAM unit It was by no means a 
military necessity. The (Nod's (taction, once the regiment was established on a firm footing, was 
mostly in the realm o f “public relations”. It was the crucial job of fostering public awareness o f the 
military in the community while also providing a uaeftil service. By any reckoning, this was a job the 
LSR Regimental Band performed admirably under the direction of bandmaster Lieutenant W. 
Gufteridge, a former member o f the Royal Horse Guards (Blues) (TBMMA photo 199S.132.0025 Lt 
W. Guttcridge June 1933). In 1934,Gulteridge was succeeded by S.C.McCraody who carried on the 
fine musical tradition ofthe LSR.
| (
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close affiliation to the 52nd Battalion and the decision to form a regimental band were
wise ones. From the early 1920s on, the regiment was to establish a relationship with
the communities of the Lakehead with the 52nd Battalion affiliation and the activities
of the LSR band as its principal foundations. Events like the annual 52nd Battalion
Association Reunion Dinners, first held around 1924, provided opportunities for
many members ofthe LSR who were also 52nd Battalion veterans to make social
connections with the local dignitaries who were frequent guests to these functions.
These Dinners, which continued to be held annually throughout the interwar years
also served to promote the activities of the LSR through the performances of the
Regimental Band, which was frequently featured as part of the evening’s festivities. 
102
The dinners and social functions were merely one o f the many common 
threads between the wartime and peacetime incarnations ofthe Regiment A more 
substantial connection between the wartime and peacetime soldiers was the 
membership of many veterans in the Officer’s and the Sergeant’s Messes at the 
Armoury and the membership of many members o f the Lake Superior Regiment in the 
Legion and other veterans’ clubs.103 This was only natural, as many of the
102 TBMMA doc 1995.1S2.004c and doc 1995.lS2.004d: The 52nd Battalioa Association's mutual 
meetings were frequently held at the Poet Arthur Annoury, the headquarters o f the Lake Superior 
Regiment In “Notes on the Activities of the LSR prior to mobilization June 1940”, Monty Phillpott 
wrote to Harry Smith: “Once each year the S2nd Old Boys had a parade and dinner and took out the 
colours (good feed etc. for the colour party)". By the late thirties, the annual dinners had become 
nuyor community events attended by the Lakehead’s most prominent citizens. The 52 Battalion 
Association's 14th annual rotation dinner held at the Royal Edward Hotel in Fort William on June 3, 
I93S, featured music by the LSR band (under the direction o f bandmaster S.C. McCready). The 15th 
annual Reunion Dinner, held at the Port Arthur Hotel on June 3,1939, also featured music by LSR 
Band and was attended by several city council members from Port Arthur and Fort William.
103 More an the establishment o f the Legion chibs and the Great War Veterans Association (which, in 
Port Arthur, became the Canadian Legion on g October 1926) can be (bund in Desmond Morton and
1915-1930. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 19S7). A brief history ofthe Port Arthur Branch 5 
ofthe Royal Canadian Legion by Theo Allen is included in the 1957 Convention BulUrhi Nw n  
publication pp. 30-63.(Notihcrn Studies Resource Centre). Among the more protninaat members o f 
the legion who were also officers in the LSR were: W. E. Wigmore, Milton Francis, Harry Hogarth,
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Regiment’s Officers and Senior NCOs were veterans with strong ties to their wartime 
comrades. Perhaps the most important connection was that created by public 
perception. In the eyes o f the public, there was a defacto link between the 52nd and 
the LSR-they were one and the same. In some of the newspaper reports o f the time, 
the militia unit is referred to as the “First Battalion (52nd Battalion C.E.F.), Lake 
Superior Regiment”. This perception was encouraged by the LSR, which, after 1929, 
appeared in public with the colours o f the 52nd Battalion. This, o f course, was the 
Regiment's right as the perpetuating unit ofthe 52nd.104
The association between the 52nd and the LSR was not the Regiment’s only 
military affiliation. In 1933, King George V was “graciously pleased” to approve an 
alliance between the Lake Superior Regiment o f Canada and the Northamptonshire 
Regiment o f the British Army.105 This practice was quite common at the time and 
was a symbol ofthe link between Britain and the Empire, a link which, by the thirties, 
was more symbolic than political. Aside from some correspondence and vague 
gestures o f goodwill, this alliance, like the casual relationship that the unit had with 
the Duluth National Guard, did not seem to play a significant part in the day-to-day 
life of the Regiment
Such was also the case with the Regiment’s association with local service 
clubs, which had come into existence at the Lakehead in the years following World
George Braphy, Harry Hunan, Dr J. A. Crazier, Hany Walgate, Thonaa L. Williams, L.S. Dear, A. H. 
Evans, A.W.S. Bennett and Neil Campbell, who was one o f the proponents of the change from GWVA 
to Legion at the general meeting o f 29 June 1926. Campbell was also wry active in the carty yean o f 
the branch's existence.
104 TBMMA photo 199S.1S2.003 “Parade o f old Colours at S t John's Church”. The Lake Superior 
Regiment was officially granted the S2nd Battalion's Gram War Battle Honoun by General Order 110, 
IS September 1929. (NAC RG 24 vol. 197, file: the Lake Superior Regiment).
approved by General Order No. S 7 ,1933, remained unchanged by the subsequent redcsignatkms ofthe 
r gn —A m m h n  MnrrtMmpfrmahif B jg iw n t wfrti m whI o«W  tnfcnftry h tflfc iM . An
affiliation between the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment and the Royal Anglian Regiment, the 
descendants o f them units, exiata to this day.
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War One. Although several LSR officers were active in these organizations, the unit 
itself did not collaborate with these clubs in their endeavours. The links established 
by these relationships were mostly among the upper-stratum of Port Arthur society, 
and did not extend down to the enlisted men of the NPAM. Nevertheless, the social 
activities o f the Regiment’s officers could be o f benefit both to themselves and to the 
unit in terms of recognition and prestige, particularly in regard to their affiliation with 
one of the local service clubs which, as an editorial in the Port Arthur Daily 
News-Chronicle stated, were “more than mere luncheon dubs.”106
IV
Just as the beginning of the thirties saw an influx of new young recruits into 
the Regiment, so did it bear witness to a renewed effort by the unit to involve itself in 
community life. It is during the ten years which preceded the Second World War that 
the battalion truly became a fixture at public events. The LSR, however, did not limit 
itself to participation in purely “military themed” events (like the occasional visits of 
General Officers to the Lakehead), participating in Port Arthur’s 50th Birthday 
celebration on March 25,1934,107 parading publicly during King George V’s Silver
106 The Port Arthur n«iiv  Mewt-Thmnigla 20 October 1930. Editorial: “What good are service 
clubs?” Tbe service clubs of Port Arthur at that time included the Rotary Club, the Kiwanis Club and 
the Gyro Chib. All three were generally recognized and lauded for their contributions to tbe city.
107 The Pn* Arthur n«»tv Maw«-f1mn»iieUi 7A Meerfi IQH p 3 “Programme A rranpd at Armnmv
Sunday” and 26 M odi 1934, p.l “In Churches and Public Service City Celebrates Its Birthday” The 
paper repotted that 2500 people attanded a conceit put on in the Armoury by the LSR band under the 
direction ofthe new bandmaster, S. C. McCready. This event was attended by numerous dignitaries 
and (bnner mayors o f Port Arthur, including Colonel S.W. Ray, the Mayor o f Port Arthur in 1911-12 
and former CO ofthe 96th District o f Algoma Rifles. TBA 3052, series 17, Port Arthur City Council 
Minutes: resolution 11632 mover alderman McCuaig, 2nd: alderman Bartlett: Resolved:” That the 
clerfcbe aatrucSed to write a letter o f appreciation to the Canadian Broadcasting commission and to 
those responsible for the celebration ceremonies o f PA’s 50lh Birthday on Sun March 25,1934. also to 
the LSR bond the Port Arthur legion singers and all others who assisted in making for the success o f  
this celebrationf...)”- March 26,1934.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
Jubilee celebration on May 6,1935,108 and the coronation celebrations of King 
Edward VUI and King George VI in subsequent years,109 in addition to the 
Declaration Day (August 21) and Armistice Day (November 11) services in Port 
Arthur and Fort William, for which the battalion’s messes also occasionally hosted 
social functions.110
By 1939, as the tempo o f defence preparations quickened in response to events 
in Europe and the Far East, there was an increase o f interest in things military.
Stanley relates that when “the Lake Superiors, with other militia units ofthe area and 
veterans of the Great War, paraded at the Cenotaph in Port Arthur and Orpheum 
Theatre in Fort William on April 24th, in commemoration of the battle of St. Julien, 
the streets were lined with thousands o f onlookers.”111 The event which perhaps 
most raised the profile of the local unit prior to the Second World War was the Royal
108 The Part Arthur Daily News-Chrnnicle. M«v 7th. 1935 n.l “Long Parade is held despite the 
weather” and TBMMA photo 199S.lS2.002d King George V Silver Jubilee Celebration May 6th 
193S, Parade oo Cumberland, LSR and Band. The Chronicle reported that Colonel L. S. Dear paraded 
with the “several unhs"(sic) of the Lake Superior Regiment, Pott Arthur and Fort William, as well as 
the Tenth Signal Corps. Among the bands leading the parade were the “first Lake Superior 
Regimental" Bend led by Bandmartar M cCready, and the “Lake Superior Regiment bugle hands".
109 The Po«t Arthur n .ilv  NeiMuThmniclB May 12,1937. "Estimate 15000 see Pott Arthur Parade. 
The Regiment’s contribution included a colour party, the band led by Bandmaster McCready,(  
marching ahead ofthe 125th field artillery band o f Duluth} as well as the ltth  Medium Battery o f Port 
Arthur and the Regiment itself led by Col. Dearjmd accompanied by Col. McDevitt o f the American 
Artillery. TBMMA, doc 199S.IS2.004b: Coronation Celebration programme May 12,1937 (  The 
parade order names tbe LSR band and the LSR as third and fourth in the order o f march, respectively.) 
Phillpott wrote that one Officer and One RSM were selected to attend the Coronation. But it is not clear 
whether any attended (M.D. 410 Headquarters seems to have reserved all the designated places).
110 TBMMA. Sergeant's Mess, 1st Battalion, LSR (52nd Battalion CEF) Military Armistice Ball 
Programme, Nov 11 ,193S. (doc 199S.lS2.004a) Declaration Day Aug 29,1937 LSR Band (photo 
199S.152.0Q2e) Annual Decoration Dey Services Sun, Aug 21,1931, LSR band present by permission 
of Mqj. H. Cook, OC. (doc 199S.lS2.004e) Armistice Service, 20th Anniversary, Nov 13,1938, music 
by LSR h—d (doc1995.152.0041). In "Notes on the Activities o f the LSR prior to Mobilization June 
1940" (held by TBMMA), Monty Phillpott offers recollections on the Regiment's activities: "All 
Lakehead units paraded through ft** Arthur and attended church service in Armoury on Armistice
111 Stanley, fgjbgUGgjoCDBIB; p. 47 and Phillpott to Smith: "Same units paraded through Fort 
William on S t Julian’s (sic) Dey (Nearest Sunday to April 23rd.), the day the battle o f St. Julian in 
World War started (in 1915). Services held hi the Orpheum Theatre of Fort William.”
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visit of 1939. In May of 1939, the LSR was given the task of providing an honour 
guard for King George VI on the occasion of the monarch’s visit to Port Arthur, an 
event witnessed by thousands at the Lakehead.112
During the thirties, the Regiment also endeavored to foster a closer 
relationship with civic authorities, inviting city officials to attend not only social 
functions, but “military events” like inspection parades.113 It would appear that this 
policy paid dividends for the unit as during the decade, the Regiment was to receive 
increasingly large annual grants from Port Arthur City Council for its band, which by 
July of 1939, reached $900 per annum114 -a n  impressive sum if one takes into 
account that these were the years o f the Great Depression. This financial support was 
also to continue into the war years when the band became an important part of the 
recruiting effort at the Lakehead.113
112 g—by In rtw r.f rw ifr p ±1 Snminiir Pury m m* Priiw— r h f w  innr
(NSRC), Souvenir Album, Consolidated Press, Foit William (NSRC), and TBMMA photo 
199S.001.166a. Geoife VI inspected the LSR Guard o f Honour during his Port Arthur visit, May 23, 
1939. The guard, under the command o f Captain J. E. V. Murrell, was complimented by the King on 
their appearance and bearing. This was not die only time that a guard o f honour had been mounted at 
the Lakehead. Phillpott writes: "Several guards ofhooour were mounted by the Lake Sups for the 
visits o f all Governor Generals and far the visit o f the King and Queen in 1939, when the artillery also 
mounted a battery to fire 21 guns.”
113 TBA 30S2, aeries 17 Port Arthur City Council Minutes: letter from LSR inviting Port Arthur 
aldennen to attend inspection June 13,1933. submitted June 12. These inspections, though infrequent, 
provided opportunities for the Regiment to display its skills to senior commanders like the District 
Officer Commanding. n v p « t  Arthur naiiytfaiw-qiKmieU m  om im r 1930).
114 TBA 3052, aeries 17, Port Arthur City Council Minutes: Resolution I20S6, June 10 ,193S: 
Report #20 o f finance committee, June 7 1933:99...” that a grant be made to LSR bond o f400$”. 
Resolution 12433 July 13,1936: Report 425 o f finance committee, July 3,1936. l . . .MQnnttoLSR 
bond: 400$”. Resolution 12695 July 14,1937: Report #20 o f finance committee, July 4,1937 
3...nOnot to LSR bond 750$ as provided for in estimates”. Resolution 13074, July 25,193$: Report 
#30 o f finance committee, July II, 1931 #5 Mchecque (sic) be issued to LSR bond for 900$ as provided 
for in estimates”, and Resolution 13450, July 24 1939: finance committee report #4 ..."that a checque 
(sic) be iaausd for 900$ as set out in the estimates”.
| 113 TBA 3032, series 17 Pott Arthur City Council Minutes: August 26,1940, September 30,1940
and December2,1940. Grants o f $1000, $100 and 250$ to LSR band.
:I
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Further evidence o f the close relationship which had developed between the 
Regiment and civic authorities are the official condolences sent by the Port Arthur 
City Council upon the death o f Colonel S. W. Ray in March of 1939, widely regarded 
as the founder of the prototypical Lakehead Militia Unit, the 96th District of Algoma 
Battalion of Rifles.116 All o f these examples serve to indicate that the relationship 
between the LSR and the communities at the Lakehead may very well have been, as 
Colonel Gravelle indicates, uof a very high quality” by the late thirties. As it turned 
out, the cities of Port Arthur and Fort William (as well as the outlying communities of 
the Lakehead) would soon have new opportunities to demonstrate their support for the 
Regiment through various means during the spring and summer o f 1940.
V
The success of the Regiment in establishing ties to the community during the 
inter-war years meant that by the outbreak of World War Two, the unit could count 
several prominent local politicians among its boosters, including the Mayor of Port 
Arthur and several members of City Council. As we have seen, this support was most 
clearly manifested in March of 1940, when both the Mayor and Council sent a 
request to the Department o f National Defence that the LSR be mobilized and 
included in the Third Canadian Division.117 The show o f support, however, was not 
limited to the communities o f Port Arthur and Fort William, where the unit’s profile
116 TBA 3052, serial7, Pm  Arthur City Council Minutes: resolution 13344, Mereh 7: Report 7 of 
finance committee, March 7 1939, I: “That this council sincerely regrets the lou  to our community of 
a very much loved and valued citizen in the posing o f Colonel SW Ray sod wish to express their 
sincere sym pathyRay. a real estete broker md bunker, had been e prominent citizen o f Port Arthur, 
serving m Aldermen and Mayor a  well a  being very active in several athletic dubs and fraternal
117 Stanley, »■ * fn - iy r  p 10 —a TBA -MKT PnH Arthur rhv rauwcil Minute*. OS MriM
17, Resolution 136(5 II Match 1940: Report #6 o f finance canuniHM, Mteeh 4,1940.
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was raised as its tempo of activity and visibility at the Lakehead increased.118 
Several community leaders from other Northwestern Ontario towns also expressed a 
similar desire that the LSR be mobilized. This is not surprising, considering that 
some o f these communities, like Kenora, had a historic link to the 96th LSR.
In the late thirties and the early months o f the war, the LSR had made 
appearances at public gatherings in several Northwestern Ontario towns, creating new 
links as well as renewing old ones.119 The results o f these efforts were to pay 
dividends after the mobilization of the unit on June 5th, 1940 when several recruiting 
parties were dispatched to the small towns of Northwestern Ontario and yielded 
impressive results.120 On June 19th, when general recruiting for the Regiment began 
in Port Arthur and Fort William, “there was none of the hysterical excitement, the 
shouting and the flag waving of the earlier war”.121 Those who came did so with a 
sense o f curiosity or a sense of purpose, and at any rate, there were more recruits than 
could be easily processed. Stanley characterizes the response as “if  not 
overwhelming, at least satisfactory”.122
118 The increased activities o f the unit included the mounting o f a guard at the Armouries of Poet 
Arthur and Fort William. (TBMMA photo 1997.022.002m Nov 8,1939, guard at Pott Arthur 
Armoury.)
119 Stanley, in th*. « f n —ggr p ao p t r  and TBMMA doc l99S.132.004g. For example, at 
the veterans’ goodwill assembly dedication ofthe Dryden War Memorial on September 3,1939, music 
was provided by the LSR band, under the direction of bandmaster McCready.
120 NAC RG 24, LSR War Diary serial, no. 942, Vol. 1-3, July-Aug 1940. and Stanley, in tkp of 
Q u ggt, p. 53. The war diary contains several entries detailing the success of these short expeditions, 
which frequently returned with ten or twenty new recruits at once. Stanley relates: “In addition to men 
from the twin cities came others from Kenora, where at one time, there had existed a company ofthe 
old 96th, from Dryden and Fort Frances, the mill towns o f the west and from Gcfakfcnn, the mining 
community to the North. They represented every activity within the community, clerks, mechanics, 
labourers, lumberjacks, miners, and almost every nationality in that ployglot population o f New 
Ontario, Englishmen, Scotsmen, Irishmen, Ukrainians, Finns, Poles, Frenchmen, Indians, half-breeds, 
Canadians aU.”
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As the Regiment grew in size, it became necessary to find accommodations 
for those recruits who had come from outside Port Arthur and Fort William.123 
Initially, the Sailor’s Institute in Port Arthur and the Salvation Army hostel in Fort 
William were used for this purpose and later, the Forestry Building, the Library, and 
the Administrative Building o f the Ontario Hospital were offered as space for billets. 
McKellar Park in Fort William and the grounds of the Technical School in Port 
Arthur were made available as training grounds for the Regiment, which in spite of a 
chronic lack of instructors, uniforms, and basic military equipment, conducted 
training as best as it could. During the course of the summer, as basic equipment and 
uniforms slowly filtered in, patriotic enthusiasm within the rapidly expanded unit was 
maintained by the officers and NCOs and, as Stanley maintains, “partly, too, by the 
interest shown in the progress of the regiment by the people o f the Lakehead.”124 
This interest manifested itself in various ways, ranging from the 
aforementioned provision o f billets and training grounds to the donation of goods and 
equipment125 Kind actions such as these helped boost the morale o f the new recruits 
as did some of the measures undertaken by the regiment itself. Continuing the 
precedent set during the militia years, the unit formed a new brass band (with 
musicians who could be qualified as stretcher bearers) and also established a pipe 
band o f four pipers and three drummers, which “did much to maintain the spirit ofthe
quickly recruits could be attested and undergo ■ medical examination, just tome o f the many 
bureaucratic difficulties which plagued the Regiment during tbe eerty days o f mobilization.
123 NAC RG 24, LSR War Diwy serial, no. 942, VoL 2. By 31 July, 1940, the unit’s strength return
is listed as 26 officers, 901 other ranks.
I2S a m b y  iw » r r w f r  p “During this period a number o f local men and groups
csme to the assistance o f the unit by providing binoculars, pistols, compasses end welfare benefits." 
Stanley makes qiecial mention o f one o f the most generous o f these donations, by Mr. J. F. Hewitson, 
"who famished the whole unit with running shorts and qrorts singlets and shorts for P.T.".
Ii
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troops” and “was in constant demand on route marches.”126 The unit also cemented 
its link to the community by its organizing of a “concert party and chorus” known as 
“the Superior Songsters” which performed for the public at the Colonial Theatre,127 
as well as by its participation in city sports, an endeavour that only came to an end 
when the unit was ordered to move to Camp Borden in Southern Ontario.128
By the end of August, the Regiment had completed its transformation from 
Non-Permanent Active Militia unit to Canadian Active Service Force battalion. It 
was to undergo many more significant transformations and re-organizations before it 
saw action nearly four years later. At this early juncture however, before the rigours 
of training and the natural process o f selection took their toll on some o f the more 
senior men, the officer complement o f the battalion was overwhelmingly composed 
of erstwhile militia officers who had joined prior to 1939. This core group of leaders 
included, among others, the “capable” Lt. Col. Cook, who had served in the military 
since 1915,129 Major J.E.V. Murrell, the second-in-command, who would command 
the Regiment in England and Captain R. A. Keane, the Adjutant, who would take 
over command of the unit following Murrell’s wounding on the 9th o f August, 1944,
126 »" ti«» p«w nf nmg«r pp Stanley goes on to remark: “Usually one piper was
allotted to each company not only to keep the awkward legs o f new recruits moving in comparative 
unison, but also to lift their blistered feet over the weary miles.” -One of the many roles which the 
bagpiper has fulfilled since his appearance in the British Army.
127 TKe Port Arthur Daity Newi-fhmnicle to August 1040. The chorus director was Bert Dockrey.
128 The Port Arthur Daily WewuCjimnlete. Sept 3 1940. Several LSR entries enhanced the Labour 
Day Sports meet held in McKellar pork in 1940. More on the military’s participation in sports at the 
i during World War Two in Ron Lappage, “The Competitive Spirit in Sports”, p. 172 in
Thmiriar Revr From Rivalry to Unity (Tronrud and Epp, eds., Thunder Bay: TBHMS Inc., 199S).
129 NACRG 24 scries C-l, reel C-4979, file I32S, DND Abridged report o f inspection. LSR CASF 
Inspected at Port Arthur and Fort William on 10 August 1940. This inspection report includes the 
general remarks o f western Canada's inspector general, Maj. Gen. W.A. Griesbach, regarding Colonel 
Coolc ”23. The CO Lt-Col. Herbert Cook is a contractor in civil life. A quiet spoken but apparently 
capable man to whom this battalion, I think, may be safely entrusted.” The report also includes a 
listing o f the battalion’s officcrs.(Sec below)
; r
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and would hold it until the end of hostilities.130 The continuity evident in the officer 
corps from the militia era into the unit’s “active service” era (1940-1946)131 shows 
without a doubt that the LSR of the NPAM was an organization whose leadership 
took its role as a military force quite seriously. The efforts of the Regiment to 
establish and maintain links to the community, particularly in the years leading up to 
the war, demonstrate that the unit took its role as a social institution equally seriously.
For its efforts in the latter area, the unit reaped a windfall o f support and 
enthusiasm in the middle months o f 1940 from the citizens of the Lakehead that 
transcended mere patriotism. An entry in the Regimental War Diary for October 
10th, 1940, reads:
10 October 1940
At 1115 hrs, the first section o f the Battalion., namely HQ, A and B 
Companies moved out of the Armoury under command of Maj. Murrell and 
entrained from Port Arthur at 1201 hrs for camp Borden (train consisted of 12
130 NAC RG 24, vol. 206,1599 and 1602, LSR files, and Stanley, fa tfa> r « »  o f Danger p.55. 
According to Stanley, the other officers who were on tbe battalion’s strength by the end of August 
included: Battalion H.Q.: Lt M. W. Babe, Lt. A.C. Green, Headquarters Company: Major RH.
Nee land, Lt H.G. Dawson, Lt I.C. McGiUivray, Lt J.L. McCormack, Lt RJ. Arthur, Captain R.A. 
Bartley, A Company: Major w. McLeod, Capt R. G. Walgate, Lt. MJ. Francis, B Company: Capt 
A.W.S. Bennett, Lt J.D. Morrison, Lt E.G. Styffe, C Company: Capt. DM . Marshall, Capt. N.W. 
Shields, Lt. HJ.W. Cargo, D Company: Capt M.F. Phillpott, Lt T.S. Jones, First Line 
Reinforcements: 2lt I.C. Wilson, 2lt J.W. Mclnnis, 2k D. Arthur and 2k O.F. DumbriUe (All the 2tts 
listed were, in fact qualified as Lieutenants by August 10,1940 according to Griesbach's inspection 
report).
131 NAC RG 24 series C -l, reel C-4979, file 8328, and Stanley, fa tfa» f—•  a f n ig t f  p. 55, p. 134. 
Notwithstanding this continuity, o f all of the officers who were members o f the Battalion in August of 
1940, only Murrell, Keane, Babe, Dawson, R. J. Arthur, Francis, E. G. Styffe, Cargo and Dumbrille 
would accompany the battalion to France in July o f 1944 (perhaps an indication o f the rigours of 
training for war and the high standard of physical fitness required). However, three other members o f 
the Regiment who were listed in Griesbach’s report as officers (taken on strength in September) but 
are not mentioned by Stanley, 2nd Lieutenants R. Styffe, HA. Colquhoun, and R.E. Purves, would also 
be with the Regiment when k crossed over to France. Also, as already mentioned, several former 
militia NCOs would also cross over to France as Officers in their old unit At the time of Griesbach's 
inspection, eight NCOs were taking the officer qualifying course at MD 10 and attached to the 
Regimental Wing of the District Depot in Winnipeg, the first batch o f many NCOs to become officers 
in fee CASF, LSR. These were: Mtdach, P., A/CSM; Rogers, W.R., A/CQMS; Hardy, LA., 
A/CQMS; Murray, T.H., A/Sgfc Neil, J, A/SgL Skinner, W.H. A/CSM; Mackenzie. R.D., A/CSM; 
and MacRae, A., A/SgL O f these, Malach, Murray, McKenzie and McRae would go over to France in 
July o f 1944.
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Officers and 408 ORs). At 1215, the rest of the Battalion left Port Arthur 
Armoury under the Command of Lt. Col. H. Cook and entrained from Port 
Arthur for Camp Borden at 1301 hrs. (train comprised of 12 officers and 429 
ORs) Wet drizzly rain falling but huge crowds lined the sidewalks as the two 
parades moved through the streets headed by the band in their scarlet 
uniforms and an immense crowd gathered at the CPR station to send off the 
boys with a cheer, a song and not a few tears.132
And so it was that when, on October 10th 1940, the Lake Superior Regiment 
CASF, departed the Lakehead for Camp Borden, it was given a warm farewell from 
the people who had come to recognize this erstwhile militia battalion as truly “The 
Lakehead’s Own”.
132 NAC RG 24 LSR War Diary, serial, no. 942. The war diary gives an interesting day-by-day, point 
form account of the unit's activities from Griesbach’s inspection to the unit’s departure to Borden. A 
portion o f the Diary (6 Aug-9 Oct) is reproduced here. Of particular interest are the several events 
sponsored by local organizations for the Regiment’s entertainment and the depositing of the colours at 
the Regimental Church:
Vol. 3
6 Aug 40: Muster parade PA and FW. Received notification from MD 10 to be prepared to move to 
Camp Borden ASAP.
7 Aug 40: Battalion segregated into companies. CandD in FW and remainder in PA.
8 Aug 40: First parade by companies. Training by companies commences.
10 Aug 40: GRIESBACH inspected the Regiment this morning, accompanied by new DOC Brigadier 
Riley.
12 Aug 40: Several Huts constructed at Current River for use o f troops that may be quartered there in 
the near future.
16 Aug 40: Sgts and 52 Old Boys dance.
17 Aug 40: Out oftown members ofthe regiment guests at Port Arthur chapter IODE picnic in Current 
River Park
18 Aug 40: Full Battalion parade at 1400 hrs, St Johns Church, PA, to deposit colours for the 
“duration”
23 Aug 40: Grade Fields Concert in PA assisted by the Regimental Concert Party. Port Arthur 
Detachment of the Battalion there as guests. Battalion parade with our own band and the McGillivray 
Pipe Band.
Vol. 4
6 Sept 40: Battalion paraded in FW. LSR Band provided music.
9 Sept 40: Battalion parade in PA. LSR Band assisted by McGillivray pipe band.
27 Sept 40: Three additional officers taken on strength: 21t Roy Styffe, 2lt Ralph Purves, 21t Robert 
Coiquhoun
30 Sept 40: Unit strength: 29 officers, 946 ORs, 5 ORs attached.
Vol. 5
8 Oct 40: Warning Order arrives for Battalion move to Borden.
9 Oct 40 Advance patty under Capt Walgate departs for Borden.
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Chapter 3 
T h e  L ake S u p e rio r  Regim ent;
C om m unity R ele tiom  an d  C ris is  D uring  th e  In tem ra r  Period
I
Considering the inherent duality of the Non-Permanent Active Militia 
battalion of the twenties and thirties which has been revealed over the course of the 
previous chapters, it is appropriate to determine to what extent units like the Lake 
Superior Regiment were able to reconcile two roles which, as will be seen, were 
occasionally at odds. As a social institution, the Non-Permanent Active Militia 
depended upon the goodwill and support o f the community in which it was based. It 
was from this community that it drew recruits, raised funds and benefited from 
patronage. However, as a military unit, a militia regiment depended upon the ability 
to both train frequently and to exercise some type of military function to preserve a 
modicum of relevance.
This necessity was particularly true of the period being discussed, during 
which the NP AM was hamstrung by a lack of current weaponry and serviceable 
equipment and plagued by general public indifference. When these facts are viewed 
alongside the demonstrated reluctance of the militia’s military and civilian masters to 
employ the NPAM in times of crisis, we are left with the unavoidable impression that 
in strictly military terms, the militia was basically a “phantom force”, expected to 
provide a military presence within the community in which it was based but do little 
else.133
133 Among the better sources which discuss militia aid to the civil power is Desmond Morton, uAid to 
the Civil Power The Canadian Militia in Support o f Social Order, 1967-1914” in The Canadian 
Historical Review, vol. SI, no. 4 December 1970, pp. 407-42S. Also, see James J. Hudson, “The Role 
ofthe California National Guard During the San Francisco General Strike o f 1934” in Military Affairs. 
vol. 46 no. 1, April 1982, pp. 76-83; and Alan M. Osur, “The Role o f the Colorado National Guard in 
Civil Disturbances” in M ilitary Affairs, vol. 44 no. 1, February 1980, pp. 28-32; which provide 
examples o f National Guard “aid to the civil power” operations in the US. A work which encompasses 
the period discussed is JJB  Pariseau. Disorders. Strikes and Disasters; M ilitary Aid tn the Civil 
p«w y in ranifa tsx7.iQTt (Ottawa: Directorate o f History, National Defense Headquarters, 1973).
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An examination of civil disturbances at the Lakehead during the interwar 
period reveals a catalogue o f frustrations and missed opportunities for the LSR, when 
the use of the militia in aid o f the civil power was dismissed or not even seriously 
considered. (This is particularly striking when the considerable community “police” 
activity of the 96th LSR between 1906 and 1914 is taken into account). It is possible 
that authorities had no faith in this organization. It is also quite likely that the military 
hierarchy discouraged any use of militia forces outside of their regular function, 
which was essentially to train periodically under certain constraints and serve as a 
reserve force to the regular army or “Permanent Force”. To justify these assertions, 
we need look no further than the attitudes which were revealed in the course of 
settling a controversy during the late twenties and early thirties; the issue of “Sunday 
training”.
Because of the part-time nature of militia employment during this era, it was 
necessary for a NPAM unit to conduct its training after normal working hours or 
during weekends. It was on this point that a controversy arose during the inter-war 
period, and the efforts made by the Department of National Defence to come to an 
agreeable solution reveal the underlying prejudices and agendas of military and 
civilian authorities and illustrate the challenges posed by the dual nature of the 
Non-Permanent Active Militia. An examination of this issue provides a prologue for 
a closer examination of certain events which occurred at the Lakehead during the 
early thirties.
n
During the 1920s, in response to concerns raised over the conduct o f exercises 
on the Lord’s Day, the Chief o f the General Staff (CGS) sent a message to all District 
Officers Commanding (DOC) on December 1st, 1927, stating: “In cases where 
exercises are held on a Sunday, care should be taken to avoid giving them
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unnecessary publicity... particular care should be taken to keep them out of the 
newspapers.”134 This communication was acknowledged by all DOCs, including 
Major General H.D.R. Ketchen, the DOC of Military District #10 (to which the LSR 
belonged), who, on 5 December 1927, agreed to adhere to the directive regarding 
tactical exercises and war games on Sunday, the traditional “day of rest”.
It is clear that no mention was made o f ceasing military activities on Sunday, a 
measure which would likely have severely hampered training, effectively eliminating 
two-day weekend exercises. It was simply decided that individual units should use 
discretion in conducting military exercises on the Sabbath Day in order to not offend 
religious sensibilities. This was a good example o f an attempt to placate civic groups 
while maintaining the integrity o f the militia’s training scheme. This issue, however, 
was far from settled and was to be resurrected a few years later when, in a 
communication on 29 November 1932, the CGS requested a report on the Hastings 
and Prince Edward Regiment Infantry Association competition; an unsanctioned 
event that had occurred on a Sunday and that had drawn complaints from members of 
the clergy.135
After consulting with the Commanding Officer of the Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment, Brigadier N.B. Anderson, the DOC of Military District #3 
explained that the exercise was voluntary and occurred following a regimental 
meeting and dinner held in the vicinity of Belleville.136 The justification offered was
134 NACRG 24 series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5208. Letter from CGS to all DOCs.
135 NACRG 24 series C-l, teel C-5075, file 5208. Letter o f 29 November 1932, Colonel W.C 
Berman for CGS to DOC Militia District #3.
136 NACRG 24 series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5208. Letter o f 11 December 1932, from Brigadier 
N 3 . Anderson, DOC MD #3 to CGS. Anderson stated his opinion in the letter that the exercise 
conducted by the unit, a skills competition incoiponting tactics and fieldcraft, was no different than 
skiing or playing golf and that he did not think steps should be taken to prevent officers from 
conducting these types of activities at their leisure.




that this was not a proper military exercise, but rather a military competition held for 
the enjoyment of the members of the Regiment Thus, upon the recommendation of 
the DOC MD #3, the matter was dropped by National Defence Headquarters.
The issue came to the fore once again in May of 1935, this time in British 
Columbia. On 3 May 1935, a report was sent to the CGS from the DOC MD #11 
detailing a protest lodged by the Ministerial Association of Greater Victoria in July of 
1934 over the common practice of Sunday shooting.137 A reply was sent to the DOC 
of MD #11 by Colonel G.R. Pearkes on behalf of the CGS stating:
It is considered admirable that NPAM units that wish to maintain the 
interest of their men by arranging weekend and voluntary shoots should not be 
prohibited from so doing, provided that such shooting is not contrary to the 
law of the province. (...) It is not desired to have to take any action that might 
deprive keen Non Permanent officers and men of a means outside o f the 
routine training by which they can improve their military efficiency.138
This directive was in keeping with the policy outlined in 1927 but on 10 July
1935, another order was sent by the CGS to the DOC MD #11: “I am directed to
inform you that no firing of machine guns or rifles by the militia is to be permitted on
rifle ranges in Victoria on the Sabbath day.”139 This directive originated from the
Minister of National Defense’s office who, under pressure from civilian authorities
faced with repeated complaints, overruled the CGS on this matter. This resulted in
the shutdown o f the range for nearly two years. The key statement in the 1927
directive which is easy to overlook is that DOCs and regimental commanders were
ordered to follow the law of the Province with regard to Sunday shooting.
Considering that DND installations fell under the jurisdiction o f the federal
137 NAC RG 24 series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5208.3 May 1935 Report on Heal’s rifle Range 
Sunday shoot
138 NAC RG 24 series C-I, reel C-5075, file 5208 14 May 1935. Col. GJL Pearkes (for CGS) to 
DOC MD #11 re: Report on Heal’s rifle Range Sunday Shoot
139 NAC RG 24 series C -l, reel C-5075, file 5208, letter o f 10 July 1935, Pearkes to DOC M D #ll.
i
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government, had they wished to do so, military authorities could have argued that 
militia ranges or, for that matter, public ranges when in use by the NPAM, did not 
fall under the jurisdiction o f the provincial government (although this interpretation 
might not have stood up to a careful scrutiny o f the Militia Act).
On IS May 1937, the DOC MD #11, Brigadier D. J. MacDonald, submitted a 
report to the CGS recommending the re-opening of the Victoria rifle range after an 
investigation revealed that the complaint was lodged by a former range caretaker, who 
objected to working on Sundays without additional remuneration. After consulting 
with the deputy minister on 28 May 1937 and following several bureaucratic delays, 
the CGS authorized the re-opening of the range on 11 September 1937.140 It is 
indicative of the concern that the Department o f National Defence had for relations 
with civilian authorities that, in spite of a questionable motive and based on a 
spurious complaint, a single person could force the shut down of a range for nearly 
two years.141
The approach used by military authorities in dealing with this problem over 
the course o f a decade (1927-37) provides clues on “unofficial” DND policy at this 
time regarding the militia. The willingness of senior military officials and their 
political masters to sacrifice the military function of the militia in favour o f preserving 
its civic function as a symbolic presence, the ambivalence of authorities toward 
promoting the welfare of the militia, the decidedly apprehensive attitude regarding the 
employment o f NPAM personnel in any capacity aside from “regular training”;142
140 NAC RG 24 series C-l, reel C-S07S, file S208, DND correspondence o f IS May, 28 May and 
11 September 1937.
141 NACRG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. This conclusion is backed up by the fact that on 
13 September 1940, a report was submitted to DND by MD #11 stating that no further complaints over 
the use of ranges on Sunday had been made. Clearly, the shutdown had in fact been precipitated by a 
single complaint and this was, in fact, an isolated incident in MD #11.
142 This idea o f “unofficial policy” is derived from the contrast between lip-service paid by politicians
S
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all of these are indicative of a lack of faith in, and commitment to the militia. These 
themes brought up by the “Sunday training” issue can be related to incidents and 
developments at the Lakehead during the thirties. The intention, however, is not to 
infer broad trends, but to note general tendencies (as demonstrated by events in Port 
Arthur and Fort William) and to make some headway in differentiating between the 
real role and value of the NPAM and its perceived function during this period.
I ll
It is important to understand the circumstances which brought about a series of 
dramatic events at the Lakehead during the Depression. This was a drama in which 
the LSR was destined to play a role, albeit a minor one. On October 24,1930, a 
confidential memorandum was sent to the Adjutant General o f the Canadian Army by 
C.J. Desbarats, the deputy minister of Defence which read: “The Attorney General of 
Ontario has informed the minister that if the disorders at Port Arthur and Fort William 
increase, it may be necessary for him to apply for aid from the militia. Would you 
please take this into consideration so that if the call should come suddenly, the 
department may be prepared to meet it.”143
and government authorities to the promotion of the militia’s welfare and the measures taken to ensure 
its survival: A good example o f what the government professed to be its desire is seen in a speech by 
the Minister o f National defense given in London Ontario on October o f 1930 and reported by the 
Canadian Press: u,It is important that the Canadian militia should be maintained in a high state of 
efficiency, perhaps more so at the present time than it ever has been in the past”, declared hon. Donald 
M. Sutherland, Minister o f National Defense, at a dinner tendered to him by the officers o f MD #1 here 
tonight “No one hopes more than I do that there will be no more trouble,” he continued, “but if  a man 
only uses common sense and ordinary judgement, he will see that there are no particular signs that 
point to world peace at the present time. “ All over the world, with the exception ofthe United States 
and Canada, there is a great deal o f trouble brewing, and I ask you, as sensible people, should we do 
away with the very small force that we have at the present?*” rrhc Port Arthur Daily Ncws-Chroniclc,
1 November 1930.”Would Maintain the Militia’s Strength for Eventualities”).
143 NACRG 24 series C -l, reel C-5075, file 5678. Confidential Memorandum of 24 October 1930, 
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The disorders to which the Deputy Minister referred had their roots in the 
labour strife which plagued the communities of Northwestern Ontario in the early 
years of the Depression.144 The year 1930 was a difficult one for the people of 
Northwestern Ontario. Logging and paper production had been particularly hard hit 
by the nation’s economic slump. Indeed, “Several Ontario mills were forced to shut 
down completely in 1930... Only one of the four Lakehead mills, the Great Lakes 
Paper Mill, managed to continue production, but it experienced slowdowns which 
caused the layoff of large numbers of workers.”143 In the face of this adversity, many 
workers turned to labour unions for support. Though it is impossible to relate in 
detail the developments which led up to the crisis, a brief summary of events will 
provide the context for what was to occur later.
In the spring of 1930, the bodies of Janne (John) Voutilainen and 
Viljo(Victor) Rosvall, two Lumber Worker’s Union representatives who had 
vanished the previous winter, were found. They had last been seen alive on 
November 19,1929, leaving Maki’s Lumber Camp to cross the frozen Onion Lake. 
The findings of the Provincial Police investigation into their disappearance and death 
which ruled out foul play were backed up by the post mortem conducted by three 
local surgeons on Voutilainen’s body. Local union-officers, however, were not 
convinced. Employers had been determined to suppress the union and there had been 
several violent confrontations in the lumber camps. The union believed that the two
144 For analysis o f government policy, both leading up to, and during the Depression, see James 
Struthers, “Prelude to Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-1928” in 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 58 no. 3, September 1977, pp. 277-294; and Blair H. Neatby, Xha 
Politic* o f  Chan«- Canada in the Thirties. (Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1972). For an overview of 
the Depression, see The Depress*™ in Canada (Michael Horn, ed., Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman 
Ltd., 1988).
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men, who had been sent to the Maki Camp at Onion Lake to organize workers as part 
of a general strike, may indeed have been the victims of foul play.
At the inquest into the deaths, on April 23,1930, Dr. C. N. Laurie explained 
that the presence of three surgeons at a post mortem was unusual, “but was done for 
the purpose of satisfying all parties.”146 The conclusion reached by the examiners 
was that both men had drowned. This did not sit well with many labour leaders who 
insisted that the men had been murdered- their cause now had two martyrs. When on 
April 28th, 1930, the “largest funeral cortege that ever passed through Port Arthur”, a 
procession that included more than 2000 members of the Lumber Worker’s Union 
and affiliated organizations, passed the communist headquarters on Bay Street and 
people standing on balconies saluted “with emblems of red”,147 the casual onlooker 
could not have been blamed for believing that trouble was brewing at the Lakehead.
As often occurred during an era when people were seeking an outlet for their 
fears and frustrations, many turned to those “fringe” organizations who offered hope 
and solutions to the crippling problems brought on by the Depression.148 At the 
Lakehead, which was a stop-off point for transients and where scores of unemployed 
arrived daily from points east and west, thousands began to listen to socialist
146 Joseph M Matim. Thunder Bay: A History. Thunder Bay. Ont: Lehto Printers Ltd., 1981. pp.
314-315. In an interesting coincidence, Dr. C.N. Laurie, who attended “partly on behalf of the crown 
and partly as an independent witness” had, in Act, served as the C.O. ofthe old 96th LSR from 1905 
to 1911. Nor was he the only “Lake Sup” present Dr. J. A. Crazier, who, as the Crown’s appointee, 
had actually performed the examination, had also served as the LSR’s C.O. from 1924 to 1927. 
(Stanley, In the Face of Danger, p. 333.) The third surgeon present, Dr. G. E. Eakins, attended as a 
representative o f “friends o f the dead man.”
147 M u m . Thunder Bay: A History, p. 3 IS. Mauro writes: “Voutilainen and Rosvall were buried 
while the decade ofthe 1930’s was still young. They were not forgotten, however; their deaths 
symbolized for some citizens the struggle o f labour versus big business in Thunder Bay during the 
Great Depression.” The link between these deaths and the strife which was to follow in later months is 
quite apparent
148 Two works which discuss the Northern Ontario experience of the Great Depression are Barbara R. 
Huffs HBA Dissertation “Northern Ontario Relief Camps, 1932-1936” (Lakehead University, 1994) 
and Laurel Scfton Mac Do well, “Relief Camp Workers in Ontario during the Great Depression of the 
1930s” in Htinrical Review, vol. 76 no. 2, June 1995, pp. 205-228.
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speakers, attend union rallies, and march in demonstrations led by left-wing agitators. 
In the eyes of the civic authorities, these alarming events were the manifestation of an 
insidious threat -  that of communism. In particular, it was the Finns and Ukrainians 
of the Lakehead that were identified with this subversive movement and thus, like the 
Greeks and Slavs before World War One, became scapegoats for most of the 
disturbances.149
The fact that the Finns and Ukrainians at the Lakehead were singled out as 
threats was likely due not only to their perceived “communist tendencies” but also to 
both the relative sizes of these two ethnic groups, and their rapid growth during the 
interwar period. In 1931, the 3252 Finns of Port Arthur made up 16.4 percent of the 
population (compared to 10.5 percent in 1921), and were, in fact, the second largest 
ethnic group in the city (not the third largest, as Mauro contends) after people of 
“British” origin (which included those of English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh descent). 
The Ukrainians were the third largest ethnic group in the town, at 1062 souls, or 5.3 
percent of Port Arthur’s population of 19818. In Fort William, the 3322 Ukrainians, 
comprising 12.6 percent of the city’s population o f26277, were the next largest single
149 In Thunder Bay: A History, pp. 31S-316. Mauro clarifies the use o f the label “Communist” 
during the interwar period. The term “communism” did not carry with it the same connotations of 
political ideology as it does in its current usage. He explains: “Unionism, socialism, communism met 
and intermingled in a chaos o f proclamations and credos in the 1930’s. Authorities contused the terms 
even more. Little or no effort was made to distinguish between the three distinctive movements. They 
were lumped together as one inseparable, intolerable political manifestation -  Communism. .Nor did 
officials hesitate to pinpoint the sources o f communist agitation in Thunder Bay. Finns and Ukrainians, 
they believed, were at the root ofthe trouble. As in the case of Italians and Greeks during the 
pre-World War I labour turmoil, government officials and police merely selected the most vocal and 
visible ethnic minorities to condemn. The Finns were the third largest (sic) ethnic group hi Port Arthur 
(...) and were most susceptible to the charge.” (p. 3 IS). David Ratz’s Honours Dissertation, “The 96th 
Lake Superior Regiment in Aid o f the Civil Power, 1909 and 1912”, deals at length with labour strife 
prior to World War One and the involvement o f the local militia in quelling disturbances. For an 
examination o f labour at the Lakehead in the early part o f the century see Jean Morrison, “Labour in 
Fort William and Port Arthur, 1903-1913", in Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Papers and 
Records, vol. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 23-30; and Jean Morrison, “Ethnicity and Class Consciousness: 
British, Finnish, rad South European Workers at the Canadian Lakehead Before World War I”, in The 
r akehead University Review, vol. 9 no. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 41-34. An examination o f immigration in 
the early twentieth century which cannot be overlooked is James S. Woodsworth’s seminal 1909 work 
Strangers Within Our fiates (reprint o f 1909 edition, Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1972).




ethnic group after the “British”.150 In addressing the purported “red tendencies” of 
these groups, Chris Southcott offers an explanation for how the association of Finns, 
Ukrainians and Scandinavians with “Communism” came about:
The hostile anti-immigration environment of the Depression 
intensified the earlier trends toward ethnically based community support 
groups in the Lakehead. As it became evident that the Anglo-Canadian 
establishment was not prepared to accept the non-British immigrants as an 
equal part of their society, the latter continued to look inwards to their own 
ethnic communities as a means of defending their interests. During the late 
twenties and early thirties, the pre-W.W.I movement toward ethnically-based 
unions continued. These unions became involved in a series of bitter strikes 
during this period. This was especially true in the lumber industry, where 
drives and strikes by bush-workers led by Finnish-dominated unions, often 
erupted into violence. In addition to labour unions, certain ethnic groups 
carried their fight for better working conditions into the political realm. In the 
1920s and 1930s, various ethnically based socialist organizations in the 
Lakehead- Ukrainians, Finns, Scandinavians and others were established 
which actively participated in socialist movements. In particular, the Finnish 
Organization of Canada, the major Finnish social organization at that time in 
Thunder Bay, and the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association, a worker’s 
organization which also included Poles, Russians and other Slavic 
nationalities, were given special status in the communist party of Canada.151
During the early months of 1930, the mass demonstrations, public rallies and
parades organized by the “communists” began to occur with increasing frequency. In
February, the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle commented on a particular
gathering: “Ostensibly the demonstration is to be held as a token of sympathy for the
150 Statistics Canada, Census ofCanada (1921-1931). From 1921 to 1931, the percentage o f Port 
Arthur inhabitants o f British origin decreased nearly 10% from 63% to 55.5% while that of Finns 
increased by 5.9%, (the greatest increase by any ethnic group in that 10 year period). The Ukrainian 
population increased by 4.7% from only 0.6% in 1921 to 5.3% of Pott Arthur’s population in 1931. In 
Fort William, the “British” population percentage decreased by 5.9% from 60.2% to 54.3% while the 
Ukrainian percentage increased by 2.4% from 10.2% to 12.6%. By 1931, the Ukrainians were the 
second largest ethnic group at the Lakehead, comprising 9.5% of the total population of Port Arthur 
and Fort William combined. The Finns were the thud largest ethnic group at the Lakehead at 9.2%.
151 Chris Southcott, “Ethnicity and community in Thunder Bay” in Polyphony, vol. 9, no2.1987. 
pp!4-15. Anthony Rasporich’s “Ethnicity in Lakehead politics 1900-1930” in Polyphony, vol. 9, no 
2.1987, p. 61-66 which examines the roots o f repression and violence experienced by labour and 
ethnic groups at the Lakehead, largely supports Southcott’s contentions.
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unemployed... In reality it is designed to advance the cause of Communism over the 
entire continent of North America.”152 Whether or not this assessment was accurate 
is a moot point. The civic authorities would demonstrate by their actions that this 
perceived threat was to be taken seriously. The result would be a series of 
confrontations which polarized the Lakehead communities along class and ethnic 
lines.
IV
The “troubles” to which Desbarats alluded in his memorandum of 24 October 
1930 began in earnest on the morning of October 21st, when two hundred 
“communists” attempted to hold a demonstration in front of the Port Arthur Post 
Office. They were protesting the detention of two men who “had been taken into 
custody the night before, when a shouting, chanting crowd of 500 marched on the 
Whalen building”.153 The DMOI related in a memorandum on October 28th, 1930 
precisely what had occurred on the 20th and 21st:
On Monday, October 20, a report appeared in the press that serious 
trouble was brewing in Port Arthur due to the activities of the local 
communist organization in stirring up trouble among the unemployed. Later 
it was reported in the press that an organized mob had attacked the Chief of 
Police and one constable who were endeavouring to arrest one of the 
ringleaders. The mob assaulted the police and the prisoner escaped.154
152 The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. The Port Arthur Ncws-Chmniclc and Mauro. Thunder 
Bay: A History, p. 316. Mauro also writes: “ A circular, distributed in April, demonstrated that if the 
Communists ever got into a position to do so “murder would run riot through the highways and byways 
of every part of the Dominion.”
153 Mauro. Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316. and The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 21 October 
1930, “The communists were planning to meet the Port Arthur City Council in session, but council was 
not in session and police ordered the marchers on" (p. 1). On the 21st The Port Arthur Daily 
News-Chronicle gave the names ofthe men arrested: Frank Bruce, who had been involved in an illegal 
parade in Fort William the previous May, and John Carey. Both men were released on the evening o f 
the 20th but this “ may or may not have been known to the Communists”.
154 NAC, RG 24, series C-l. reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOI’s Memorandum of 28 October 1930. In
i
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Lt. Colonel Ruttan155, the Commanding Officer o f the Lake Superior 
Regiment at the time, was sufficiently concerned over the situation to dispatch the 
following telegram to MD #10 Headquarters in Winnipeg on October 21st:
“Communist activities here very pronounced STOP Disturbance here 
last night and again today when police forces openly defied STOP Police 
chief feels he should have assistance and suggests cooperation mounted police 
STOP Will keep you advised”
(signed) H.A. Ruttan, Lt. Col.156 
Reserve or off duty police were called into service and as these reinforcements 
arrived on Tuesday morning, the crowd of approximately 1000 people, which had 
gathered at Arthur and Court street, marched away. Later that day, delegates from 
Port Arthur’s “Unemployed Association” presented a petition with 825 signatures 
and a list of demands to City Clerk T. F. Milne and gave a deadline of 7:00 p.m. for 
the city to meet them. This ultimatum included demands for work and provisions for 
food and clothing as well as a hearing from the mayor and council. Police Chief 
Taylor is said to have responded: “I am of the opinion that it is not merely a case of 
unemployed endeavouring to get assistance, but that these reds are trying to stir up a
Mauro’s version of events, Police Chief George Taylor and two other policemen attempted to arrest 
one of the leaders and thirty men attacked them. (Mauro, p. 316). The Port Arthur Dally 
News-Chronicle reported on 21 October 1930 that Taylor and Sgt James Hutcheon, who had been 
“encumbered by their heavy coats”, were set upon by a yelling mob and were obliged to use their 
batons to defend themselves. The Fort William Daily Times-Jnunial reported that same davthat a 
crowd of 1000 had been on hand at the “near-riot” which took place at 10 JO in the morning, including 
members o f the Communist Party.
155 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Andrew Ruttan (1881-1958) was a prominent local realtor in the firm 
eventually known as Ruttan-Bolduc-Adderley founded in 1880 as Ruttan Estates. In 1926, Ruttan 
became the vice-president of the firm. He served overseas with the 94th Battalion C.E.F. and 
commanded the LSR from 1930 to 1933. (  Th* Fort w illim  Daily Times-Journal. 1 December 1958 
and The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 23 June 1934, in Thunder Bay Public Library Local 
Historical File, Business Finns -Thunder Bay, #24.)
156 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678,5 WC-317 para. 1. Confidential message o f 24 
October 1930, from Brigadier T.V. Anderson, DOC MD #10 to Secretary, DND re: Communist 
Activities, Port Arthur, Ontario.
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revolution...”157 Lt. Col. Ruttan reported to MD #10 Headquarters a second time on 
the 21 st of October:
“Situation here quiet at present but ultimatum delivered to city that 
unless certain demands are met tonight stores on main street are to be raided 
STOP Understand parade will take place at ten AM tomorrow STOP am 
placing guard on Armouries”
(signed) H. A. Ruttan. Lt. Col.158
That Lt. Col. Ruttan thought it necessary to place a guard on the Armoury 
(which was, in fact, a repository for scores of rifles and machine guns) illustrates the 
“perceived” gravity of the situation. In response to the threat that the Unemployed 
Association were going to enforce their demands by fighting, the entire police force 
and a number of citizens sworn in as special constables were on hand that evening but 
no further demonstrations took place (nor did the demonstration that had been called 
for at 10 O’clock the next morning). To further strengthen the police force, on
157 The Fort William Daily Titnes-Joamal. 22 October 1930. p. 1., and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A 
History, p. 316 The paper also comments: “ the demands sent in by the communist party or 
unemployed association of Port Arthur are considered of an extreme nature especially at this time of 
the year when work is so scarce.’’ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle printed a copy o f the 
demands submitted by the Unemployed Association in its 22 October 1930 edition. These were in the 
form of 14 separate articles and included demands for the formation o f a council elected by the 
unemployed to organize assistance and relief work, the distribution o f food and clothing on credit, free 
fare for travel to places of relief employment, suspension of debt payments, the abolition o f vagrancy 
laws, the elimination of favoritism in relief work distribution, free medical attention and a minimum 
wage o f 50 cents an hour for relief work.
158 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678,5 WC-317 para. I. Confidential letter of24 
October 1930, from Brigadier T.V. Anderson, DOC MD #10 to Secretary, DND re: Communist 
Activities, Port Arthur, Ontario. Brigadier Anderson included the following details to the Secretary 
with copies o f the telegrams sent on the 21st of October
“2. Col. Ruttan has been instructed that he should be guided in his actions by Sections 75 to 85 o f the 
Militia Act. (This refers to the section ofthe Act dealing with military aid to the civil power).
3. In order to protect the arms, ammunition and equipment, a guard o f three men drawn from the LSR 
has been placed on the PA Armoury. Authority is requested for the payment of this guard at public 
expense.
4. The OC LSR reported on the 23rd inst that the situation was quiet with the possibility that another 
crisis might be expected on Monday the 27th instant”
A Minute was appended to the letter “AG, Under the circumstances it seems reasonable that expenses 
incurred as outlined in para. 3 above should be a charge against the public. H H Matthews Col.” (This 
single sentence was the first reference to an issue which would go unresolved for several months.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
Wednesday, 22 October 1930 the Port Arthur Police Commission decided to enroll 
members of the Port Arthur Branch of the Legion and other ex-servicemen and 
citizens “for special police duty”.159
The enrollment, which began in the Legion Club rooms on Cooke Street on 
the evening of the 22nd, had garnered several hundred volunteers by the afternoon of 
the 23rd. The auxiliary police force was placed under the command of Lt. Col.
Milton Francis DSO (a member of the LSR until 1927) and Major J.G. Lumsen, MC, 
with Major A.W.S. Bennett, (an active officer of the Lake Superior Regiment) 
Captain J. Boswell and Captain T. Williams (another active officer of the Regiment) 
as platoon commanders, each in charge of a specific section of the city of Port Arthur. 
A system was also devised for dispatching the force whereby the siren usually used 
for fire alarms would alert the special constables.160 At 8.00 p.m. on the 23rd, 
authorities occupied the Port Arthur Armoury for the further enrollment and 
organization of special constables.161 The Officer in Charge of the Armoury had 
received an urgent request from the Mayor of Port Arthur on that date requesting its
159 The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal “Special Police to Help Force when Required” , 22 
October 1930. The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle announced the planned formation o f an 
auxiliary police force comprised o f city employees and citizens after a meeting o f the Port Arthur 
Police Commission, representatives o f the Provincial Police, officers o f the Legion and several other 
citizens, most o f whom were World War One veterans. Several past and present members o f the LSR 
were on hand, including Milton Francis, Neil Campbell, and A.W.S. Bennett. It was also reported that 
the auxiliary force would be distinguished by badges. The News-Chronicle wrote o f the registration 
drive for the force on the 23rd “The Port Arthur post of the Canadian Legion signed up practically as a 
body and in addition there were hundreds o f other citizens including merchants, clerks businessmen, 
laborers and representatives o f practically every walk o f life. Included in the number are nearly fifty 
law abiding Finns, who, by credentials, showed themselves to be o f the class known as “Whites” who 
are directly opposed to the principles o f Communism.”
160 The Fort William Daily Times-Journal. 23 October 1930, “ Port Arthur Quiet After Communist 
Clash, Police Say” p. S. Although no list ofthe “special constables” has been located, considering the 
great number of members o f the LSR who were also members o f the legion, it is not unreasonable to 
infer that, in addition to Major Bennett and Captain Williams, some ofthe “ex-military” personnel may 
have in fact been active members of the NPAM.
161 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 23 October 1930, “Organization of Special Police Force 
Continues”.
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use. After this request was conveyed to MD #10 Headquarters in Winnipeg, the use 
of the Armoury was immediately authorized as an “emergency measure” by Brigadier 
J.V. Anderson, the DOC of MD #10.162
The Unemployed Association may have been deterred from carrying out the 
threatened violence and raids by the enthusiastic response to the formation of the 
auxiliary police force. By the time 25 RCMP officers arrived in Port Arthur on 
October 27th, this “special force” had grown to several hundred members.163 The 
arrival of the RCMP officers from Regina, however, was uneventful and did not 
precipitate the crisis alluded to by Lt. Col. Ruttan in Brigadier Anderson’s October 
24th letter to the Secretary. The Mounties, under Inspector T. H. Irvine, were 
temporarily quartered in the old General Hospital building with beds supplied by the 
Newaygo Timber Company.
Mayor Gibbon, who met the detachment on the morning of the 27th, stated “I 
am more than pleased with the expression of loyalty shown by the citizens of Port 
Arthur in their turning out as voluntary policemen, in having the Mounties on hand to 
assist local police, we hope to be able to get along without calling on the citizens.”164
162 NAC, RG 24. series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, WC 317, letter o f 27 October 1930 from DOC 
MD #10 to Secretary DND re: Use o f Port Arthur Armoury by special police force.
163 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOl’s Memorandum of 28 October 1930.
A portion of the report reads: “On Thursday October 23, the Deputy Minister informed the DMOI that 
the Attorney General o f Ontario had spoken to him with regard to the unsatisfactory situation in Port 
Arthur and hinted at the possibility o f requiring military aid to the civil power. The DMOI at once 
telephoned the Assistant Commissioner, RCMP, Lt Col. A. W. Duffus, who informed him that reports 
received at RCMP HQ indicated that the situation at the time was fairly well in hand and that local 
authorities, while anxious, did not anticipate they would require military aid. Tbb more optimistic 
outlook wosportfy Ate to tkefoct that the cUuens generally were behM  tke local end provincial 
authorities and were ready to organize a force ofspecial constables In support o f taw and order.
(The italics are my own) Lt Col. Duffus also stated that there were then in Port Arthur ten members of 
the Ontario Provincial Police and that a detachment o f RCMP from the depot in Regina had been 
ordered to stand by ready to proceed to Port Arthur at a moments notice.” According to Mauro, 
“’Several hundred’ citizens joined the auxiliary police force” (p.316).
164 The Fart William Daily Times-Journal. 27 October 1930. “Detachment o f 25 Here From Regina.” 
The Port Arthur Deity News^hmnicle. 27 October 1930. The article “Tread o f Riding Boots and
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That very day the Mayor had met with D. M. Sutherland, the Minister of National 
Defense (and a former Commanding Officer of the 52nd Battalion) who was on his 
way back to Toronto after an inspection tour of Western Canada. Gibbon informed 
him of the situation in Port Arthur and the measures that had been adopted. “When 
told of the extensive organization effected he was confident that everything possible 
was being carried out and that the situation was in safe hands”.165
By the time the 800 members of the special police force marched from Legion 
Headquarters on Cooke street to the Port Arthur Armoury on the 27th to hear the 
Mayor speak, the crisis seemed to be over, though the state of affairs at the Lakehead 
was far from normal.166 The police chief took advantage of the now favourable 
circumstances in the city to adopt a more assertive posture. The first of several raids 
was conducted at the Communist headquarters on Bay street which failed to uncover
Jingle o f Spun Heard in Old Hospital Corridon” , offers a description of the RCMP’s occupation of 
the hospital, and o f their arms and equipment, which included “formidable looking" .303 Lee Enfield 
rifles and steel helmets “such as the soldiers used overseas” (p.l).
165 The Fort William Daily Times-Journal- 27 October 1930. “Defense Minister Met At Station.”
166 The Fort William Daily Times-Inumal. 28 October 1930, “Special Army Lines Streets o f Sister 
City” and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316. At this meeting, Chief o f Police Taylor referred to 
the communists as “a lot of dirty parasites without courage” , stating “We are not going to be dragged 
into the mud by a lot o f dirty parasites.” and “The one thing that they fear is deportation and we want 
to get rid o f them if  they are not prepared to take their chance with the rest and keep the peace”.
Mayor Gibbon o f Port Arthur stated “The Union Jack will stay nailed to the mast” and Lt Col. Francis 
congratulated City Council for its efforts and expressed his hope that those members ofthe special 
force who were out o f work would be given a job first In Fort William, city council met that evening 
to discuss the policy to be pursued in the event ofa situation similar to the disorders in Pott Arthur the 
week before. The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 28 October 1930 that Colonel 
Francis explained that the special force was not being disbanded and warned the men to be on guard. It 
was while the Port Arthur city council was in session that the auxiliary force made its demonstration of 
strength, “each man was given a white armlet to identify himself in case o f confusion... While the 
auxiliary force was on parade constables in pairs were doing their regular patrol work. Each city man 
on his usual beat was accompanied by a provincial officer. Four men were posted to the entrance to the 
city buildings where the council was in session. The mounted police detachment...stood ready at their 
local headquarters but received no call.”(p. 8).
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a suspected cache of weapons, but resulted in the confiscation of a great deal of 
Communist literature.167
The annual Armistice Day ceremony that year afforded civic authorities with 
an opportunity for a show of strength. To that end, what the Fort William paper 
described on 11 November 1930 as an “imposing” parade had been held the previous 
Sunday (9 November 1930) before an audience of thousands at the Port Arthur 
Armoury. The parade had formed up at the Veterans’ club rooms on Cooke street and 
marched to the Armoury with the MacGiliivray Pipe band in the van, followed by the 
Sea Cadets, the Boy Scouts, the Girl Guides, the LSR Regimental Band led by 
Bandmaster W. J. Gutteridge, members of the RCMP detachment stationed in the city 
under the command of Inspector Irvine, 400 members of the Port Arthur Legion, the 
Ladies Auxiliary to the legion, the “1st Lake Superior Regiment, 52nd Battalion 
C.E.F.” commanded by Lt Col. Ruttan, as well as the Signals Corps commanded by 
Major A. F. McDonald and the Medical Corps under Colonel Hardiman. The address 
was given by Brigadier General Alex Ross, CMG DSO, who had also addressed a 
gathering of ex-servicemen at the Legion the day before.168
167 The Fort William Daily Times-Journal 29 Oct 1930,“Red Headquarters Raided by Police”
Search warrants were taken out and searches conducted for weapons at the 216 Bay street premises.
The search failed to locate any weapons but “considerable red literature was confiscated.”
In The Scandinavian Home Society. 1923-93. (Thunder Bay: Scandinavian Home Society, 1996), 
Elinor Barr comments on the events o f October from the perspective of some o f the unemployed: 
“October 1930 was a month that could hardly be ignored. Opportunities for winter bushwork were so 
limited that the Port Arthur Police chief called in the RCMP to help deal with the demonstrations be 
expected to take place. Police Activities included raids on several Bay Street addresses, including the 
office o f the Unemployed Workers Association which counted many Swedes among its members.”
168 The Fort William Daily Times-Journal. 11 November 1930, “Imposing Military Parade is Held by 
Port Arthur Units” and The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 11 November 1930.





But what of the LSR? If the Regiment had played a part in the “show of 
strength” orchestrated by authorities during the Armistice Day ceremony, why was it 
not called upon to form part of the auxiliary police force itself? Aside from the 
provision of a guard at the Armoury from the 21st to the 31st of October, the 
Regiment was destined to play the role of spectator to the drama which unfolded from 
October 20th to early November. An article in the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle 
of Monday, October 20, 1930, which reports on the visit of Brigadier-General T. V. 
Anderson DSO to the Lakehead on the 18th indicates that the LSR could have fielded 
at least a platoon’s worth of troops (30-40 soldiers) during the disturbance. The 
article also reported that the Brigadier-General had been quite pleased with the unit’s 
performance. Such an endorsement from a high-ranking and decorated “professional” 
soldier should have laid to rest any questions concerning the LSR’s “reliability” or 
“suitability” for service in aid o f the civil authorities— and yet the unit was not called 
upon.169 The DMOI seems to raise the question of the use of troops in his October 
28th report:
With regard to the possibility of calling out troops, Lt. Col. Duffus 
thought this remote at the moment, and in reply to a query by the DMOI stated 
that in his opinion if such a contingency arose, it would be advisable to bring 
troops from Toronto and London rather than from Winnipeg. He agreed with 
the DMOI in support of this, that if Winnipeg were denuded of troops the 
communist activities might be transferred there from Port Arthur, Winnipeg 
still being an important HQ of the communist party of Canada, and the large
169 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 20 October 1930, p.3. “Visiting Officer Inspects Platoon 
at Manoeuvres”. Based on NAC RG 24, series c-l, reel c-8301, (25 Feb 1939 Reply from Secretary), 
the only reliable estimate of the unit’s numbers during the inter-war period, it can be deduced that the 
LSR had a total strength on paper o f between 40 and 175 all ranks, a number which likely varied 
considerably from year to year. The Fort William Daily Times-Journal reported on 11 November that 
the LSR had 70 men of all ranks marching in the Armistice Day ceremony held at the Cenotaph in 
Waverley Park. It is therefore certain that the unit had at least 70 men capable of coming to the 
assistance o f civic authorities.
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percentage of foreign population there creates a fertile soil for the cultivation 
of seeds of trouble, particularly among the unemployed.(...)
The press on October 27 reported that a detachment of 25 mounted police, 
with horses, under one officer, had been dispatched from Regina to Port 
Arthur, there to remain as a reserve in case of emergency, but to take no 
active part in policing the town unless specially called upon by the municipal 
authorities.170
The troops referred to in the report were Permanent Force soldiers, not 
militiamen. In fact, it would appear that the option of using the militia to help quell 
any disturbances too great for the police to handle was not even considered by the 
government and military commanders. This begs the question “Why Not?”
Certainly, there was a precedent for this type o f intervention at the Lakehead; the 
96th LSR had twice come to the aid of the civil power prior to World War One and 
had acquitted itself fairly well in discharging its task.171
There seems to be no clear answer to this question. By all appearances, Lt. 
Col. Ruttan was prepared to render assistance to civic authorities in an “official” 
manner with the deployment of troops had they requested it (as opposed to the 
unofficial support offered by individual members of the LSR who joined the auxiliary 
police force), but it appears that no such request was ever made, at least not formally 
in writing. An editorial in the Thursday 23 October 1930 edition of the Port Arthur 
Daily News-Chronicle raised the question o f who would pay for the maintenance of 
the special police force being formed at the time. It stated “the organization and 
maintenance of this force, probably through the winter, will entail a considerable 
expense, even if it should never be called on for active service” and asked “Why 
should not the Federal Government assume the expense?”172
170 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOI’s Memorandum of 28 October 1930.
*7  ̂ Ratz, “The 96th Lake Superior Regiment in Aid ofthe Civil Power, 1909 and 1912”, pp. 55-66.
172 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 23 October 1930. Editorial: “Who Pays for This?” The 
editorial argued that “each community is required to maintain law and order among its own citizens. 
When it is unable to do so, it may even call for military or other help.” but that the situation in Port
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Though the writer was probably unaware o f it, he may have touched upon the 
very reason that the militia had not been called out: the likely considerable expense 
to the crown of equipping, feeding, housing and paying for a substantial NPAM force 
over an undetermined period of time. Though the establishment of a far smaller 
RCMP detachment also involved an expense to the crown (but not the DND), it was 
one that was more easily justifiable, given the likely necessity of keeping that force 
available to quell any further disturbances which might occur and the fact that RCMP 
officers had to be paid regardless of where they were posted. If the question of who 
would cover the cost of the “volunteer” force was open to debate, the result of the 
deployment o f the militia was quite apparent; the federal government would foot a 
significant proportion, if not all, o f the bill.
To ascertain that the Department of National Defense was quite unwilling to 
absorb this considerable expense, we need only look at the controversy which arose 
surrounding the deployment of the small guard detail. The CO of the LSR, already 
constrained by directives from higher headquarters, was likely discouraged from 
taking a more active role in the disturbances by the debacle over the simple posting of 
a guard at the Armoury, which itself generated such a debate as to appear almost 
comical to the dispassionate observer. Undoubtedly, it was far from comical at the 
time. The paper trail which chronicles this controversy begins with a memorandum 
dated 31 October 1930, from the Adjutant General o f the Army, Brigadier A. H. Bell, 
to the DOC of MD #10. In this memo, the Adjutant General grants approval, after the 
fact, for the employment of 3 men to guard the Port Arthur Armoury, adding: “Due to
Arthur was not simply local in origin or significance but a “movement o f revolution aimed at the 
destruction o f constitutional government” and that “unemployment is but the excuse” as proven by the 
literature distributed in Port Arthur. The editorial argued that the Canadian government, which had 
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the detachment of RCMP quartered in Armoury, it is presumed that the guard has 
been withdrawn.”173 (It was in fact withdrawn that very day.)
Civic authorities did not share the Adjutant General’s belief that the arrival of 
the RCMP meant that the situation in Port Arthur had returned to normal. Such was 
the atmosphere of tension at the Lakehead that early in November, Mayor Gibbon of 
Port Arthur urged the authorities to establish the temporary detachment of Mounties 
as a permanent detachment in the city.174 On 6 November 1930 officials of the force 
declared that the detachment would stay at the Lakehead until such time as the 
Attorney General of Ontario deemed that their services were no longer required.175 
Contrary to the assumptions of the Adjutant General, however, these men had not 
been quartered in the Armoury, but in the Police Station downtown.176 They were to 
remain at the Lakehead indefinitely while the danger of further conflict remained.
If there had been any doubts at MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg of the 
necessity of posting a guard at the Armoury during the crisis they should have been
173 NAC, RG 24, scries C-t, reel C-5075, file 5678, HQC 363-28. Confidential Memo of 31 
October 1930 from Adjutant General to DOC MD 10 re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, Ont.
174 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 3 November 1930. The Ncws-Chronifilfi reported on 
Mayor Gibbon’s trip to Toronto: “Mayor goes east in regard to police. For the purpose of 
interviewing Attorney General W. H. Price and Hon. William Finlayson with a view to having the 
Department o f Justice maintain a detachment o f RCMP at Port Arthur during the coming winter, Mayor 
George Gibbon and D J. Cowan, MP, left this morning for Toronto. They have an appointment for 
tomorrow morning at 11 O’clock. In the event o f their being unable to reach a satisfactory agreement 
with the Attorney General o f Ontario, it is Mayor Gibbon’s intention to proceed to Ottawa with Mr.
Cowan to personally interview the Acting Minister o f Justice.” (p.2).
175 The Montreal Gazette. 6 November 1930. "Want Mounties to Stay Permanently” and IhfiJhtt 
William Daily T im e s - J rm m a l 5 November, 1930. “Mounties to stay in Port Arthur Till Trouble over.
The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 5 November 1930 that a telegram sent by Mayor 
Cowan had been received from Toronto indicating that he had been successful at having the RCMP 
retained in Port Arthur. On 6 November 1930, the paper stated “So far no representations have been 
made to establish a permanent post at Port Arthur or to reinforce the already existing permanent post at 
Fort William. The prospects are that when the present trouble subsides, the Royal Mounted will return 
to Regina.” (p. 1).
176 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential Letter o f 3 January 1931 
from DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND.
f
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quickly dispelled by a report out of Hamilton published on 8 November 1930 in both 
the Times-Joumal and News-Chronicle. The paper reported that several military 
weapons had been stolen from the storehouses of a construction company where they 
had been secured for several months. Hamilton police authorities believed that 
Communists in that city were responsible for the theft of ten “Snyder” pre-war army 
service rifles, 500 rounds of ammunition and 30-40 bayonets.177
A few weeks after the disturbance, the CO of the LSR sent a request to district 
headquarters in Winnipeg to authorize pay for the officer who was placed on duty at 
the Armoury to supervise the guard throughout the crisis. Brigadier Anderson, the 
DOC MD #10, forwarded a recommendation to the Secretary DND that “authority be 
granted for one officer to receive pay and allowance during the period o f his 
employment with the guard.”178 On December 20th, Brigadier A.H. Bell, the 
Adjutant General, sent the following response:
re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, ONT.
1. I am directed to point out that there is at the present time a detachment 
of ten or eleven Mounties, 3 members of the NPAM and 2 caretakers, one of 
whom is a resident in the Armoury
2. Attention is also drawn to 3DH letter ofthe 31st October last 
regarding the RCMP detachment, and it was thought the guard would be 
withdrawn following their arrival.
3. Before it can be decided to detail an officer for this duty, a detailed 
report will be required setting forth the whole situation in Port Arthur.
A.H. Bell, Brigadier, Adjutant. General179
177 The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 8 November 1930, “Bayonets and Rifles Stolen From 
Storage” and The Port Arthur Dally NewvChronicle. 8 November 1930. The “Snyders” refcred to In 
the articles were 19th century Snyder-Enfleld rifles. It was believed that the old ammunition might 
prove defective and authorities feared an attempt by the thieves to steal a fresh supply. The Port Arthur 
paper also reported that the day before had been the thirteenth anniversary o f the founding of the Soviet 
Union and though literature relating to the Soviets’ call for action was distributed in the city, there were 
no public disorders.
178 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential message o f 17 December 
1930 from DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur Ontario.
179 NAC, RG 24, series C -l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Message of 20 December 1930 from
; r
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In the face of his superiors’ intransigence, Anderson was obliged to prepare a 
report which was filed on January 3rd, 1931 in which he described the situation which 
had necessitated the posting of a guard supervised by an officer at the Armoury:
1. With reference to HQC 363-28-1 dated 20 Nov 1930, when Lt.
Col. Ruttan first reported the necessity for mounting a guard on the armoury 
in Port Arthur viz. on 22 Nov, he neglected to mention the officer. On the 
27th he mentioned the officer on duty with the guard, but meanwhile I had 
asked NDHQ to authorize a guard of 3 men only. Before submitting a 
supplementary request for authority to pay an officer as well Lt. Col. Ruttan 
was asked for more particulars. In due course I became satisfied that Col. 
Ruttan had acted wisely in detailing an officer for duty at the Armoury each 
day during which the guard was mounted viz. from the 21st to the 31st 
October, and it is for that period only that it is now desired to pay an officer.
2. The guard and officer were withdrawn on 31 October prior to receipt 
of HQC 368-28-1 of 31 October in which it was correctly presumed that such 
action would have been taken, but the assumption therein mentioned that the 
detachment of RCMP was quartered in the Armoury was incorrect; they were 
quartered downtown near the police station.
3. There had to be some officer to whom the guard could report and to be 
responsible for any action the guard might have been called upon to take and 
it was more economical to handle the situation as it was handled than to send 
a staff officer from here for the purpose.
4. I regret that my letter of the 17th December did not give fuller 
particulars and hope that in view of the above explanation my 
recommendation of the 17 ultimo will now be approved.
TV Anderson, Brig. DOC MD 10180
After a great deal more correspondence between the LSR, District 
Headquarters in Winnipeg and National Defense Headquarters in Ottawa, it was 
determined that pay would be allotted for all officers and ORs who had mounted the 
guard in October.181 Though this might appear to have been the only fair course of
Adjutant General to DOC MD #10 re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur Ontario.
18® NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential Report of 3 January 1931 
re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, sent by DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND.
181 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Correspondence o f 8 January to 3 
February 1931. re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur. Pay was recommended for the following 
Officer ranks:
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action, there was a great deal of debate concerning the entitlement of the militiamen 
to this pay. The conflict over the necessity of posting an officer to supervise the guard 
is particularly puzzling since adequate supervision of the troops on duty should have 
seemed essential to all involved. It is difficult to not be struck by the miserly attitude 
of higher headquarters regarding the disbursement of these funds, considering the 
important task that the troops and officers of the LSR performed. It is important, 
however, to view this debate in the context of the time it occurred. This reluctance to 
spend money on legitimate security concerns was indicative of the economic climate 
of Canada and the prevailing attitudes in the Department of Defense during the 
Depression. Clearly, there was little chance that the Crown would have proved 
willing to deploy the LSR during the crisis, given the expense involved.
One Captain x 3 days 
Three Lts x 2 days each;: 6 days 
One 2lt x 2 days 
Total: 11 days
The DOC MD #10 recommended that officers should receive pay appropriate to their rank with 
subsistence allowance:
Pay under article 269(a)
3 days at S JO $15.60
6 days at 3.60 $21.60
2 days at 3.00 $6.00
subtotal $43.20
Subsistence under article 269(c) -if precluded from residing at their usual place of residence
3 days at 2 JO $6.90
6 days at 1.80 $10.80
2 days at 1.50 $3.60
subtotal $21J0
TOTAL $64.50
The Adjutant General recommended authority be granted to pay officers, amount not to exceed 
$64.50.
Allowance for Officers included money for lodging, fuel, light, rations, and a servant: 1 dollar, 20-30 
cents, 10,50,30-40 cents respectively. ORs allowance for these items was 50,15,05,50 cents 
respectively (No servant’s allowance). On 3 February 1931, Authorization was granted for all pay.
: fr
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VI
Though the situation in Port Arthur had been stabilized by the end of 1930, 
civil strife would continue to plague the Lakehead over the course of the next few 
years. On February 25th, 1931, a demonstration by the “National Unemployed 
Worker’s Association” was held in Fort William, where a group of 100 persons 
marched down Simpson Street to a vacant lot at Simpson and Dease and, before a 
crowd of 1000 city residents, listened to speeches under the watchful gaze of a dozen 
policemen. That very same day, a group of unemployed workers assembled on a 
vacant lot between Lake Street and Cumberland Street in Port Arthur. After listening 
to a speech, they paraded up Cumberland toward Arthur Street. On this occasion, 
however, the authorities were not caught unprepared as they had been in October. 
After being halted by a roadblock set up by City and Provincial Police at Lincoln 
Street, the crowd was dispersed by a squad of Mounties led by Inspector Irvine which 
“riding 10 abreast, swept down Cumberland.”182 The demonstrators scattered and the 
parade was over. The quick and efficient manner in which this incident was handled, 
in which no violence erupted and none were injured illustrates that the establishment 
of a small RCMP detachment in Port Arthur had some positive effect.
During most of 1931, the focus of concern in the military district would shift 
from the communities of Northwestern Ontario to much closer to home for MD #10 
headquarters: the city of Winnipeg itself. Already, in November of 1930, there had 
been some clashes between police and communists.183 Early in the new year, there
182 The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 25 Februaryl931, “Unemployed Meet But No Disorders”, 
p.l and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 317. Two Finns were arrested following the parade and 
charged with obstructing a police officer, vagrancy, and with unlawfully marching in a parade.
182 The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 7 November, 1930. On 6 November, some two dozen 
police confronted about 500 protesters who raised their banners in front o f city hall in Winnipeg.
Though blows were exchanged on both sides, no arrests were made and none were seriously injured. 
Police managed to tear down the banners and restore order (p. 8).
i
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was a sense that trouble was brewing among the unemployed in Manitoba, which by 
the 19th of February numbered over 5000 in Winnipeg alone. A secret letter warning 
of the possibility of Communist disturbances was sent by the Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence to Brigadier Anderson on the 23rd.184 On 26 February 
1931, the day after the Port Arthur and Fort William marches, a major demonstration 
which was attended by 2500-3000 unemployed persons was held in Winnipeg despite 
the fact that the police had refused organizers a parade permit the day before.185
The atmosphere in Military District #10 remained tense after the disturbances 
at the Lakehead and in Winnipeg. On 29 April 1931, the DOC MD #10 sent an 
encoded message to the DND warning of the possibility of trouble on the 1st of May. 
The District Commander placed permanent force guards over militia properties in 
Winnipeg that day and made provisions to deploy Permanent Force soldiers if a 
request came from the Attorney General.186 In Port Arthur, a May Day 
demonstration resulted in 18 “savage” sentences handed down to labour activists.
I84 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Secret Leuers of 19 February 1931 
and 23 February 1931. (Files 19 and 20).
*86 Winnipeg Evening Trihune. Thursday 26 February 1931. p.l. Major occurrences like the 
Winnipeg demonstration meant that comparatively minor disturbances occurring simultaneously at the 
Lakehead went virtually unnoticed. It was thus perhaps fortunate that while authorities in the district 
were somewhat distracted by events in Winnipeg that might necessitate military intervention, no major 
demonstrations occurred at the Lakehead.
I86 NAC, RG 24, series C-l, reel C-5075, file 5678, Encoded message of 29 April 1931 from DOC 
MD #10 to DND. Permanent Force units, including the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry and Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), were to be 
stationed in Winnipeg on several occasions during the thirties. On the 27th o f June, the Deputy 
Minister asked the Adjutant General to dispatch the troops to Winnipeg from the Camp Hughes training 
Schools. An urgent telegram was sent on the 29th to the DOC MD # 10 informing him of this order.
The disorders in Winnipeg gradually petered out and, with the exception of a few incidents like the St 
Boniface strike o f 18 September 1931 (file 58), Winnipeg was plagued by few significant incidents. 
Given the precedent for civil strife set in Winnipeg during the General Strike o f 1919, it is 
understandable that the authorities there might have been inclined to nip any likely trouble in the bud 
early on. For more on the Winnipeg General Strike, see David J. Bercuson’s “The Winnipeg General 
Strike, Collective Bargaining and the One Big Union Issue” in Canadian Historical Review. (vol. 51 
no. 2, June 1970, pp. 164-177).
i
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The outlawing of the Communist Party that year resulted in a crackdown on 
demonstrations and a stiffening o f penalties.187
During the following year, more demonstrations and parades were held at the 
Lakehead. On the morning of 18 October 1932, a demonstration led by S. Whalen 
in protest of the cessation of city council’s meal-a-day programme was held in front 
of the old municipal building. After police arrived on the scene the crowd of 
300*400 men dispersed.188 Later that day, shortly before 7 p.m., S00 unemployed 
men marched on the Mayor of Port Arthur’s residence, located at 380 Arthur Street. 
The marchers, who demanded a meeting with Mayor P.V. Ibbotson, were intercepted 
by a cordon of twenty foot police, which included seven provincial officers, and 
slowly dispersed to Waverley Park and the comer of Regent Street This time, 
however, the intervention of the RCMP resulted in one arrest and a confused melee 
which left several demonstrators wounded, one of whom would die, allegedly from 
wounds sustained during his flight from the police. This tragedy would further strain 
the relationship between labour leaders and civic authorities during the thirties.189
187 “The Organization of Labour in Thunder Bay” in Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity, p. 143. 
The Communist Party o f Canada was declared illegal under Section 98 o f the Criminal Code and eight 
of its leaders were imprisoned.
188 The Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 18 October 1931. It was announced that afternoon that 
“bonafide transients” with vouchers from the chief of police would be provided with one meal a day.
189 The Fort William Daily Times-Jnumal. 19 October 1931, and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A ftistorv. 
pp. 317-320. The paper reported that Police Chief GeorgeTaylor had stated some of the protestors 
offered resistance to the police. According to Mauro, Chief Taylor claimed that eight mounted RCMP 
officers intervened when marchers had refused to clear the street Apparently the marchers were 
charged by the RCMP and chased through the park and over private property. Witnesses claimed that 
several marchers were left prostrated on the ground, but none appeared seriously hurt and no injuries 
were reported by the hospital. Though he had not ordered his men to use batons, Chief Taylor 
supposed that “they used their own judgement when resistance was offered.”(p. 320) The “Canadian 
Labour Defense League” charged that (Jrtio Jaaska, age 26, who died o f tetanus on October 27th, had 
been a victim o f police brutality. Prior to his death, the young Finnish immigrant was supposed to have 
said that he had been chased into some barbed wire and been knocked unconscious somehow. Dr. 
Eakins later reported that Jaaska’s only injury had been a superficial scratch on his nose. An inquest 
jury reported that there had been no evidence o f violence on the body and concluded that the young 
man had died o f lock-jaw. In The Fort William Daily Times-JournaL 28 October 1932, it was repotted 
that the victim had not received any medical treatment until he was brought to the hospital on 26
i
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VII
What is remarkable, perhaps, is that in spite of the great numbers of transients 
and unemployed190 at the Lakehead during the early thirties, there were few tragic 
episodes like the clash on 18 October 1932. To credit the LSR with any significant 
role in safeguarding the security of persons or property during these disturbances 
would be misleading. Aside from ensuring that no military weapons or equipment 
kept at the Port Arthur Armoury got into the wrong hands during the crisis of October 
1930, the Regiment had very little to do with quelling the civil disturbances which 
plagued the Lakehead during the early thirties. The unit must therefore bear little of 
the credit -  or blame, depending on one’s point of view — for the manner in which 
these situations were dealt with.
We are presented therefore with, if not a discouraging picture, at least an 
enlightening revelation regarding the LSR of the interwar era. The militia at the 
Lakehead, far from being encouraged in its initiative in contributing to community 
order and security, was denied its function as a military force “in aid to the civil 
power”. In spite of its precedent-setting intervention in the strikes of 1909 and 1912, 
the LSR was relegated to the role of spectator, shunted aside, marginalized. As we 
have seen, the first few months of the Depression witnessed at least one major crisis 
and several tense confrontations, and while all of this took place, the LSR stood by 
idly.
Was this a unique occurrence? Apparently not. In other such civil 
disturbances which were, if not endemic, certainly widespread throughout the
October, by which time the disease was so far advanced that it was impossible to save his life.
190 NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075 file 106. A report from the DOC MD #10 to the Secretary 
DND dated 7 June 1933 (Ref: GS 380) estimated the approximate number o f male unemployed in Port 
Arthur and Fort William at 2600.
i
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turbulent decade of the thirties, we find that it was various branches o f the police 
(city, provincial, and federal) occasionally supplemented by regular (permanent 
force) troops, who restored order.191 In a 27 October 1930 editorial in the 
News-Chronicle. citing the practice of appointing non-resident Crown prosecutors 
immune to local prejudices to deal with lengthy or important cases, the paper 
reflected on the sagacity of this type of this approach with regard to local security, 
stating that “It is not in the best interest of the community that residents be armed one 
against the other. Business and social relations cannot be entirely removed from 
consideration. Enmities that might be engendered, should a physical clash develop, 
would be potent with trouble for the future. It is much better that the preservation of 
the peace be left in the hands of an entirely impersonal organization.”192
Any contention that a NPAM battalion could be considered an “impersonal 
organization” must be dismissed. Indeed, if the preceding chapters have 
demonstrated anything, it is that the LSR was a military institution with deep social 
ties to the Lakehead communities. By their enthusiastic enlistment in the auxiliary 
police force, many members of the Regiment firmly demonstrated which camp they 
were in. Given the socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds of most of them, both 
their loyalties and prejudices could hardly have been in doubt In this respect the 
Lake Superior Regiment was rightly prohibited from involving itself in the disorders
191 For further examples o f labour violence and civil strife in Canada during the interwar years see 
Stunt Marshall Jamieson, Time* o f TmuhU- t A w  I Inre* and Industrial Conflict in Canaria
1900-66 (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968); James Strothers, No Fault o f Their Own: 
Unemployment and die Canadian Wf Mam ftaia 1014.1011 ^Tnmntn- University o f Toronto Press, 
1983); and Judy M. Torrance, Public V io len t ■» i**7-iQ»7, (Kington Mnntr>«l-
McGill-Queens University Press, 1986).
192 The Port Arthur Doily Ncwi-Chmniclc. 27 October 1930. The nener further praised the use of 
Mounties, stating that they constituted a “very visible and tangible representation o f authority...which is 
concerned only with the preservation o f life and of property, and the prevention o f violence, leaving 
matters ofpolicy to be settled in the constitutional wty."(p.4). A later editorial on 6 November 1930, 
praised the retention of the RCMP detachment at the Lakehead, stating that “a permanently organized 
and thoroughly trained and equipped body like the Royal Mounted with the tradition associated 
therewith is much to be preferred" (over the use of an auxiliary police force of local citizens).
!
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in Port Arthur and Fort William when a neutral alternative like the well-organized 
RCMP was available. The Regiment was therefore a victim, perhaps a fortunate 
victim, of thinking at the time which held that a militia battalion’s military function 
was subordinate and secondary to its role as a social institution.
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C o n tlB iio n
I
On 30 January 1946, the Lake Superior Regiment (motor) returned to the 
Lakehead after more than five years’ absence. Among the throng of well -wishers 
greeting the veterans were several former COs o f the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel 
Dear, Lieutenant Colonel Cook, Lieutenant Colonel Murrell and Lieutenant Colonel 
Keane, all o f them men who had been with the unit since its NPAM years.193 The 
day before the battalion’s return, the Lakehead papers had printed special “welcome 
home” editions. Among the various articles and stories detailing the exploits of the 
Regiment in the Fort William Daily Times-Joumal was “A Tribute To Those That 
Made the LSR Great” written by Lt. Col. Robert Keane. Part of this tribute read as 
follows;
A Tribute: To the tradition of the 52nd: There are so many individuals 
and associations to whom we must pay tribute. First of all, we have the spirit 
that kept the LSR alive during those years when it took a great deal of courage 
to even appear in a uniform in public. That courage sprang largely from 
tradition; die tradition of the old 52nd battalion CEF which the LSRfmotor) 
has the honour to perpetuate. In our unit, we had many boys whose fathers 
served with the old 52nd, and to these lads, no other unit could take its place. 
This spirit helped mould the unit in its early days and was a strength when 
tough periods were encountered later on. Therefore, may I say, let us pay 
tribute to the 52nd battalion CEF all that it stood for, and all that it passed on 
to the LSR (motor).
A tribute to those who gave experience: In the early days of the war there was 
a certain group of men who gave up their businesses and civilian undertakings 
in order that the new unit could have the advantage of their experience which 
had been gained the hard way in the previous war. The majority of these men 
knew full well that they would never leave the country with the unit and yet 
they found the time, and devoted every effort and gave of their experience to 
train younger men to take their places and make the unit the strong, 
well-co-ordinated body of men that it turned out to be...194
193 Sttntev- In the Face o f Danger, pp.316-317.
194 Pott William Dally Times-Journal. 29 January 1946. (TBPL Local History File; Military Forces 
and Defense-Thunder Bay, #2.)
! f
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As one who had experienced life as both a militiaman and a wartime soldier, 
Colonel Keane understood the contrast between militia and active service and was in 
a good position to truly appreciate the contributions of those who had kept the flame 
burning during the interwar years. By his eloquence, Keane expressed an 
understanding of the spirit of tradition and honour which compelled men to don 
military dress at a time when the military was very much out of fashion. It was one 
thing to serve in time of war when that was “the thing to do”, it was something else 
entirely to serve in time of peace, when one was subjected to scorn or indifference 
from those who did not understand the purpose or necessity of a reliable militia force.
Though it cannot claim any great share of the credit for how the LSR(m) fared 
during the war, the men of the NPAM-era LSR certainly deserve recognition for 
carrying on the traditions of the “fighting Fifty-Second” through the twenty year 
interval between the wars. The fact that the officer who commanded the LSR(m) 
throughout nearly the entire Northwest Europe Campaign of 1944-45 acknowledged 
both the 52nd and the militia-era LSR in his tribute to his Regiment illustrates the 
strong sense of continuity that existed between these three different incarnations of 
the unit.
It was stated at the beginning of this work that the intent was determine to 
what extent one of these incarnations, the Lake Superior Regiment of the 
Non-Permanent Active Militia, fulfilled both its military role and civic role at the 
Lakehead during the twenty-year period from approximately 1920 to 1940. I have 
therefore charted the course that the unit took after the re-organization of the early 
twenties when, in the face o f many changes, the militia was obliged to re-establish 
itself as a relevant segment of civil society in Canada. In order to emphasize the 
duality of the militia, the unit’s military and civic functions were examined separately. 
This enables us to draw conclusions on its success in each of these areas and avoid 
generalizations for, as we have seen, a failure in one area did not constitute a failure




in the unit’s mandate altogether. We also highlighted a particular series o f events 
which were to demonstrate the attitudes of military and civilian authorities toward the 
unit, confirming what we had learned in the previous chapters and shedding light on 
the motives which governed their decisions.
II
In Chapter One we examined the LSR as a military organization, from its 
re-establishment in 1921 to its eventual transfer to the Canadian Active Service Force 
in 1940. In regard to leadership and organization, the unit could not have hoped for a 
more solid footing. Thanks to both the efforts of the battalion’s dedicated promoters 
and the sense of duty and devotion which existed among a segment of the population, 
the Regiment attracted that core o f veterans who were to be so crucial in ensuring the 
survival of the unit. Throughout the twenties and thirties, the unit's officer and NCO 
complement had a large proportion o f World War One veterans. The experience and 
wisdom which these men brought to the unit was of immense benefit to the young 
militia era soldiers who enlisted during the interwar period. Many of these men 
would take the valuable lessons learned during these years with them when they 
crossed over to France in 1944 as leaders in their own right.
In examining the LSR’s strength, equipment and training, a grim picture 
emerged as the countless difficulties and challenges facing the unit were revealed. As 
a military organization, the Regiment was largely ineffective, and no amount of 
wishful thinking can make it otherwise. The scanty reports and returns from that 
period bear this fact out. The unit was cursed with bad equipment, lacklustre training 
and low strength, compounded by the indifference o f military authorities. The LSR, 
like many other NPAM units of the era, was also manifestly unprepared to undertake 
even small-scale military operations. It had little logistical or training support from 
MD #10 headquarters and few opportunities to train with other units in the district
»
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The themes of isolation, neglect and indifference on the part of higher 
headquarters which pervaded this section of my analysis also served to shed some 
light on the “personality” of the unit. If the accomplishments of the 52nd had 
established the foundations of the LSR’s regimental character, the unit’s difficult 
existence during the interwar years gave it an independent bent and rugged pride in 
“being able to get the job done” which were to characterize its service during the 
Second World War. It was in this manner that the unit was to benefit (although these 
benefits would not be apparent until much later) from the adverse circumstances 
under which it operated during the twenties and thirties.
Ill
In Chapter Two, I looked at the Regiment’s social links to the Lakehead 
communities, delving into its relationships with different segments o f local society, 
determining how it interacted with local authorities and the general public of the time 
and elaborating on the unit’s many activities. I also examined the recollections of a 
soldier, by means of an oral history interview, who served with the unit during the 
thirties. This was a valuable perspective on the Regiment from one of the 
rank-and-file o f that era — particularly valuable considering the dearth of information 
on the enlisted members of the unit during this period.
The integration of oral history into this work was done quite deliberately, as in 
discussing a military unit within a social history context, it was important to capture 
the human element or perspective, all too often lost amidst the descriptions of 
organization, command structure and sub-formations which accompany regimental 
history. It was also felt that examining the interviewee’s narrative in its entirety 
(within a single chapter) would convey the total experience of being a militia soldier 
of the LSR, including both the military and civic activities that he participated in. 
Through Colonel Gravelle’s vivid descriptions, we come to formulate an idea of what
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the militiaman of the thirties experienced, something which would have been difficult 
to determine if I had relied on more traditional sources. These recollections paint a 
picture o f an active, robust organization which in the late thirties, though poor in 
equipment and weapons, was thriving in its role as a community institution.
The many successes of the unit in integrating itself into the communities of 
the Lakehead contrasted sharply with the difficulties experienced in military matters. 
From the outset, the officers of the unit pursued a policy of developing close links and 
recruiting within the communities o f the Lakehead using the Regiment’s affiliation 
with the renowned 52nd Battalion C.E.F. as one of its main “selling points”. The unit 
also made great use of one of its most visible organizations, the LSR Regimental 
Band, as well as its messes and mess functions in cementing community links and 
raising the Regiment’s profile. In addition, the unit participated in many parades and 
public gatherings, including civic celebrations as well as those of military 
significance, providing itself with consistent exposure to the public. The 
effectiveness o f all o f these activities was to be demonstrated by the groundswell of 
support from community leaders and ordinary citizens alike which materialized for 
the unit at the commencement of the war-support which, as we have seen, went well 
beyond the bounds of general patriotism.
It is quite possible that the various petitions and political pressure which were 
brought to bear on the government to mobilize the LSR, initially into the Third 
Canadian Division, and later into the Fourth Canadian Division, influenced the final 
decision. If this was the case, the unit’s efforts in promoting itself among the 
communities o f Northwestern Ontario had certainly paid off. The fact that the unit 
was mobilized as a complete battalion rather than as part of a composite battalion (an 
amalgam of several different units) meant that the name of the Lake Superior 
Regiment would be included among the units o f the Canadian Active Service Force.
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The contrast between the unit’s successes as a civic institution and its relative 
failure as a military entity having been revealed, it remained to determine how this 
situation manifested itself in the context of events at the Lakehead. In Chapter Three 
I highlighted the unit’s involvement in the civil disturbances of the early thirties in 
Port Arthur and Fort William. It was revealed that the unit was not involved in the 
establishment of a security force and the restoration of order in Port Arthur, in spite 
of the fact that it had already discharged this type of duty twice earlier in the century. 
This “case study” provided both an example of militia/community relations during the 
era and an insight into the policies, both official and unofficial, which governed these 
relationships, taking into account economic, social, and political developments in the 
region and in the rest of Canada during the period. It also addressed the critical 
question of the unit’s “relevance”, both as a military formation and as a social 
institution.
The Lakehead disturbances, occurring at roughly the mid-point of this 
twenty-year period of study, provided a general idea of the government’s attitude 
toward the unit and the NPAM throughout the period. That is not to say that militia 
and defence policy remained static from 1920 to 1940, for even a cursory examination 
of Canadian history reveals that as early as the mid-thirties, the military was 
becoming an increasingly important priority for the government193. Rather, it 
allowed us to infer broad trends in policy. It was for this reason that the Sunday 
training issue was also examined, for unlike the labour disturbances which were 
particular to certain areas and military districts, Sunday training restrictions affected
195 See, for example, Wilbur, Richard, The Bennett Administration. 1930-1935. (Canadian Historical 
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all of the military districts o f Canada, and thus represented a policy decision which 
had a broad scope.
What a study of the disturbances cannot fail to reveal is that in spite of its 
mandate as a NPAM unit to assist civic authorities in time of need (through sections 
75 to 85 of the Militia Act), the LSR’s deployment in aid of the civil power was not 
considered a viable option by authorities at the time. We may even go one step 
further, citing the miserly attitude of higher headquarters toward the disbursement of 
any funds, and state that the LSR was discouraged from taking any action whatsoever 
during this crisis. The only real security measures undertaken, the placing of a guard 
on the Port Arthur Armoury, were through the initiative of the unit’s Commanding 
Officer and did not originate through orders from NDHQ. Having confirmed within 
this analysis that the LSR did indeed have the manpower and capability to contribute 
to the “Security Force” which was created in the aftermath of the 1930 disorders, we 
can only conclude that the decision to exclude the unit from participating in this effort 
was based more on political and/or economic reasons rather than concerns over the 
unit’s ability to discharge this duty.
It is quite possible that authorities recalled that in the aftermath of the 1909 
and 1912 strike interventions at the Lakehead, the military had become very 
unpopular among certain segments of the Lakehead’s ethnic communities. When, at 
the outset o f World War I, the 96th LSR was tasked with providing guard details at 
various points in the region, its members, as representatives of the military, were 
subjected to abuse, insults and even threats of violence.196 Authorities, realizing that 
a similar action in 1930 might reinforce this legacy of animosity toward the local 
militia among labour organizations (and the rapidly growing ethnic groups, like the 
Finns and Ukrainians, associated with this and other more “insidious” movements)
196 Ratz, “The 96th LSR in Aid o f the Civil Power, 1909,1912”, and Stanley, In the Face of Danger.
p. 6.
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were likely wary of recreating a situation similar to that which existed in 1909 and 
1912. It is also possible that the authorities had doubts over the unit’s reliability or 
suitability for the task at hand, though this would have been an unreasonable fear 
considering that the DOC had expressed his satisfaction with the unit’s performance 
and discipline just days before the crisis erupted. Although the course of action 
adopted by military and civic authorities may have ultimately spared the unit from the 
animosity of a large segment of the Lakehead’s population, ultimately, this decision 
amounted to disregarding one of the unit’s military functions in favour of preserving 
its civic one.
V
This study was derived from the sad reality that in Canadian historiography, 
the role of the militia as a civic institution in peacetime has been largely overlooked. 
Due to this fact, the public at large has only a partial understanding of the role of 
militia units, ignoring the various peacetime contributions o f reserve regiments (like 
disaster relief, a function the militia has carried out throughout its history even up to 
the present day) and failing to see the military as an integral part o f the community 
with historic ties often dating back well over a century.
The fact is that the Lake Superior Regiment was ultimately more important, 
and for that matter, more successful as a social institution than as a military entity. 
Despite the best efforts of some, this was an era when the militia, like the military in 
general, lacked clear direction and suffered neglect197 It was considered far more 
important to promote good relations and a positive public image than to achieve any 
high standard of military readiness. During this period, some of the alternative
197 This neglect manifested itself in numerous ways, including, much to the detriment of posterity, 
slipshod record keeping. The result ofthis unfortunate lapse is a serious lack o f information on the 
members of the LSR, particularly the non-commissioned members, which constituted a significant 
obstacle in this work.
Ii
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functions which might once have been the domain of the militia were being taken up 
by the civic, provincial or federal police forces, which had expanded and developed a 
great deal since the early years of the century.198
In the face of the declining necessity of maintaining the militia as a “force for 
order”, that is to say, an auxiliary force or a pool of reinforcements which could 
augment the regular police in times o f dire need, the NPAM sought to expand its role 
as a civic institution. To this end, units like the Lake Superior Regiment vigourously 
pursued their community interests, either consciously or unconsciously taking on a 
more ceremonial or symbolic role as a “garrison force”: a largely passive or benign 
military representative of the federal government in civil society. That is not to say 
that these units abandoned their military role entirely; as we have seen, training 
carried on throughout the two decades of peace between the wars.
Because the LSR was not placed in a situation which put it at odds with a 
particular segment of Lakehead society as its ancestor, the 96th, had been, the unit 
enjoyed a notably harmonious existence with the community in general, not simply 
the civic authorities or the Anglo-Celtic portion of the population. Throughout the 
period o f 1920 to 1940, there were no documented instances of clashes between 
militia soldiers and civilians at the Lakehead. This atmosphere, undeniably more 
congenial than that of the pre-World War One era, allowed the spirit o f friendship 
between the Regiment and its home cities, to grow and develop throughout the 
interwar years, establishing a strong, lasting bond between them.
An editorial in the 29 January 1946 edition o f the Fort William Daily 
Times-Joumal aptly encapsulated this bond which, forged in peace and reinforced in
198 For a description of the growth and development o f the Ontario Provincial Police see, for 
example, DahaD. Higley, Q P.P .: The Hi«mrv n f  th» Ontario Provincial Police. (Toronto: The 
Queen’s Printer, 1984).
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time of war, tied the Lake Superior Regiment irrevocably to the communities of the 
Lakehead:
It is true that many of the members of the unit did not and will not 
reside at the Lakehead and it is true that many of our Lakehead servicemen 
were active in other units of the army or in the air and naval forces. The fact 
remains that the Lake Superiors, in an organizational sense, represent these 
two cities at the head of the lakes and the Lake Superior country.199
This bond did not simply come into existence upon the LSR’s mobilization. It
was a link which came into existence through a long familiarity and friendship,
nurtured by twenty years’ worth of activity in the community, so that in 1940, the
battalion which departed for Camp Borden truly represented “the two cities at the
head of the lakes and the Lake Superior country”.
To the dedicated men and officers of the militia era LSR must go much of the
credit for this state of affairs. Perhaps their greatest contribution was simply their
mere presence, their commitment to ensuring the continued existence o f the militia
tradition at the Lakehead by steadfastly carrying on with the mundane tasks which
characterized the NPAM of the interwar period. That the unit survived a difficult
period intact was the accomplishment. The fact that, in 1946, many erstwhile militia
soldiers were able to witness the triumphant return of the battalion which bore the
name of their Regiment, the name it had carried since 1905, was testament to this
small victory.
199 Fort W illim Daily Time«-Jnumal 29 Jan 1946, editorial (TBPL Local History File; Military 
Forces and Defense, Thunder Bay, #58.) The realities o f wartime service were such that by 1944,a 
large proportion o f the LSR(m)’s officers and men, because o f transfers or reinforcement drafts, were 
not “Northwestern Ontario” men.
|
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Appendix
Some Brief notes on the Commanding Officers of the LSR, 1921-1945:
Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Young was appointed the first Commanding Officer 
of the Lake Superior Regiment after its re-constitution on IS July 1921. He replaced 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.C. Young, who had been the Acting CO of the 96th LSR which, 
from 1916 to 1921, had existed only as a theoretical depot. (In Stanley’s In the Face 
of Danger. Lt. Col. J.A. Little is listed as the CO of the Battalion from 1911 to 1921). 
Colonel J. D. Young was a highly decorated officer of the 52nd who rose to the rank 
of Major during the war and was a recipient of the Military Cross (2 Bars), as well as 
the Distinguished Service Order and a Mention in Dispatches. He was succeeded by 
L t Col. J. C. Hunter in 1923. (Stanley, In The Face of Danger, pp. 41-42, p.338).
Lieutenant-Colonel James Campbell Hunter, bom in 1881, first came to 
Lakehead in 1904. Prior to the war he was a member of the staff of G.R. Duncan and 
Company and a member of the 96th LSR from 1911 on. He enlisted when war broke 
out and served in the Army for five years. For part of this time, he was with the 52nd 
Battalion. After being invalided from France, he served for two years with the 
General Staff in England. He was discharged in July of 1919. After his return to the 
Lakehead, he was appointed assistant tax inspector at the inception of the Fort 
William office in 1920. In July of 1921, J. C. Hunter, a Captain at the time, was 
appointed the Adjutant o f the newly reconstituted Lake Superior Regiment. In 
October o f 1923, he became the Commanding Officer o f the unit: “Inspector Hunter 
rose to the rank of Colonel (sic) succeeding Colonel John Young in that capacity 
when the Lake Superior Regiment was formed". In 1924 he was succeeded by 
Colonel J A .  Crozier. He was promoted to the inspectorship o f the Fort William Tax




district on June 11,1934. (Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. June 11,1934,
“Colonel J C Hunter named Inspector for income taxes.”)
Lieutenant-Colonel James Alexander Crazier was bom near Orangeville 
Ontario, May 28th, 187S. The son of a Presbyterian minister, Colonel Crazier 
graduated in Arts from Queen’s University in 1896 and in Medicine and Surgery from 
McGill in 1899. That year he joined Lord Strathcona’s Horse and served in the Boer 
War. Upon returning to Canada, Dr Crazier practiced medicine at Copper Cliff,
Ontario, briefly before moving to Port Arthur early in the new century. An active 
medical practitioner, he was medical consultant for both the CPR and CNR. He was 
a member o f the advisory board of the old Railway Marine and General Hospital in 
Port Arthur and played a prominent role in the establishment o f the new General 
Hospital. Among the many and varied offices he held were: President of the Port 
Arthur Club, the Conservative Association, Thunder Bay Medical Association, life 
member o f the Shuniah Lodge 287, GRC, AF, and AM; and member of the Port 
Arthur branch, Canadian Legion. Dr Crazier was Medical Officer of Health for Port 
Arthur for many years and Surgeon for the District Jail. He served overseas in the 
First World War with the 8th Battalion CEF and at the close o f hostilities, resumed 
his affiliation with the Lake Superior Regiment, replacing Colonel Hunter as 
Commanding Officer in 1924 and serving in that capacity until 1927. In 1942,
Colonel Crazier retired from his medical practice and moved to Port Credit, where he 
passed away in 1951. fFort William Daily Times-Joumal. 2 January 1951, “Dr J.A.
Crazier Passes at 75 at Port Credit: Prominent Lakehead figure for nearly half a 
century.”)
Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Young Harcourt was bom in 1878. A Civil 
Engineer by profession, he worked for the Public Works Department of Canada from
f
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1905 until his departure from the region to serve in the Great War. In charge of Lake 
of the Woods and tributary waters navigation improvements from January 1913 on, he 
testified at the Public Hearings on The Levels of the Lake of the Woods, held in 1915.
(TBPL Local History File, Politics and Government, NWO, Item #40, p. 873-884.).
After the war, Colonel Harcourt joined the Lake Superior Regiment and was involved 
in several local engineering projects. He wrote the article “Breakwater construction 
in Port Arthur Harbour” (in Engineering JnumalT vol. 14, April 1931, p. 215-226, 
noted in TBHMS Papers and Records vol. V, 1977, p. 22). In 1927, he replaced 
Colonel Crazier as Commanding Officer of the unit and held that appointment until 
1930.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Andrew Ruttan was bom in Winnipeg in 1881, 
where he enlisted in the armed forces at the age of 16. He came to Port Arthur in 
1905, transferring to the 96th LSR, and joined the Real Estate firm of Ruttan Estates 
Ltd. He participated in the 96th LSR’s aid to the civil power operations as a 
Lieutenant in 1909 (Ratz, “The 96th LSR in Aid of the Civil Power, 1909 and 1912”, 
p. 31). After the outbreak of World War One, on 5 August 1914, Ruttan, then a 
Captain, was put in charge o f the elevator guard in Port Arthur and a few days later, 
took a detachment of 58 men to guard the power plant at Kakabeka Falls. (Stanley, In 
the Face n f Danger. p.8l Later in the war, Ruttan joined the 94th Battalion CEF, and 
went overseas as a Major. He rejoined the LSR after his return to the Lakehead. He 
also went back to work at his old company, later serving as the President of Ruttan 
Estates Ltd., Ruttan-Bolduc Ltd. and in 1926, he became the Vice-President of the 
amalgamated firm of Ruttan-Bolduc-Adderley Ltd. In 1930, he replaced Colonel F.
Y. Harcourt as the Commanding Officer of the Lake Superior Regiment and served as 
CO until 1933. He was active in the Navy League and served as the chairman of the 
Sea Cadets for many years. Ruttan was also a  veteran member of the Canadian
i r
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Legion and belonged to St John's Anglican. Church. At the age of 77, Ruttan died in 
hospital following a heart attack. (Fort William Daily Times-Jotimal. I December 
1958, “Prominent Port Arthur Man, Colonel Ruttan Passes.")
1I
j Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Sextus Dear was bom in 1883. His military career
began in 1906, when he first enlisted in the LSR. He went overseas with the 
Winnipeg Rifles (8th Battalion CEF) as a Lieutenant. At the close of the war, he was 
Second in Command o f the Reserve Battalion at Shomecliffe and Seaford. He was 
mentioned in despatches for “valuable service in the field”. He continued his 
association with the Lake Superior Regiment as a Major after the war, and was 
appointed the CO o f the Regiment in 1933, at which time he was promoted to the 
rank of L t Col. On 2 July 1940, the Port Arthur City Council appointed Dear as the 
Officer Commanding the Volunteer Civic Guard of Port Arthur (an organization of 
several hundred veterans) in accordance with the Canadian Legion, Port Arthur 
Branch's recommendation. Colonel Dear also became an honourary member of the 
OPP for civil guard purposes. (Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 3 July 1940, 
“Heads Civic guard”)
Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Cook was bora at Didsbury, Lancashire, England 
in 1892. He came to the Lakehead in 1911, joining the Bamett-McQueen Co, Ltd., a 
contracting firm o f which he would eventually become President, in 1912. In March 
of 1915, he enlisted in the 52nd battalion CEF and was commissioned in August of 
that year. He went to France with the battalion, taking part in all engagements until 
November 1917 when he was appointed the Officer Commanding Casualty Company, 
18th Reserve Battalion. After demobilization in July 1919, Colonel Cook returned to 
Bamett-McQueen, where he superintended the construction o f some of the mammoth 
grain bins at Port Arthur and Fort William. (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 29
i
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January 1946, “Unit had tough march”, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces 
and Defence-Thunder Bay, #70.) In 1933 he joined the LSR as a company 
commander with the rank of Captain. In 1937, he was promoted to Lt. Col. and was 
appointed to command the unit, succeeding Colonel Dear. After the transfer of the 
LSR to the Canadian Active Service Force in June 1940, he continued to command 
the battalion during the months of training in Canada and went overseas in 1942, 
ahead of the unit, meeting it there when it arrived on 1 September of that year. He 
commanded the regiment until illness forced his retirement as CO in November of 
that year. (Fort William Daily Times-Joumal. 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History 
File; Military Forces and Defense Thunder Bay, #57)
Lieutenant-Colonel James Edward Victor Murrell was bom at 
Southend-on-Sea England in 1904. He was a highway construction contractor by 
profession, and one o f the road builders who “pushed the Trans-Canada eastward 
from the Lakehead through the wild rock and bush country of Lake Superior and up to 
Nipigon”. (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle. 29 January 1946, “Unit had tough 
march”, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defence- Thunder Bay, #70). 
He first enlisted in Port Arthur in 1923 with no. 17 company, 10th Signal Battalion, 
Canadian Corps o f Signalers. He transferred to the LSR in 1925, and became a 
Sergeant in B Company. In 1926 he received his commission. Shortly after, he was 
appointed the battalion signal officer and in 1935 was promoted to the rank of 
Captain and appointed adjutant, a position he held until 1939. He commanded the 
Royal Guard o f Honour for their majesties the King and Queen in Port Arthur in 
1939. From 1939 until mobilization he was the acting Second in Command of the 
battalion, and upon mobilization received a “well earned” majority and appointment 
as Second in Command. It was as Second in Command that he took the unit overseas 
in August 1942, being met by Colonel Cook at Liverpool. “After becoming CO in
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March of 1944, L t Coi. Murrell led the unit through final preparations for the 
crossing to France, and took the Regiment across the Normandy beaches in July. He 
led the Regiment in the heavy fighting which followed soon after the arrival in France 
until wounded and forced out of action in August 1944.” fFort William Daily 
Times-Joumal. 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and 
Defense- Thunder Bay, #57 .)
i!
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Angus Keane was bom in Fort William on May 
14,1914. At the age of 15 he enlisted in the Fourth Field Ambulance and was a 
Sergeant by 1930. In 1935, he received his commission with the LSR. In 1937 he 
went to England to gain experience while serving with the Middlesex Regiment.
With the rank of captain, he was appointed Adjutant of the LSR in 1939 and 
continued to hold this appointment after mobilization in 1940. He trained with the 
Regiment until 1941 when he went overseas on detachment with the Cameron 
Highlanders for six months. Keane returned to his own unit in January 1942 and 
stayed with the LSR until mid-summer of 1942, when he joined the paratroop corps 
and began training at Helena, Montana. While making a practice jump he suffered a 
fractured ankle which forced him from the paratroops. He nevertheless continued on 
active service and was on the General Staff in Ottawa for 10 months, followed by a 
four-month staff course at RMC in Kingston. Upon arrival overseas in November o f
1943, he was attached to General Staff Headquarters, Second Canadian Division. In 
May 1944, he returned to the LSR(m) just in time for the Normandy Invasion and was 
Second in Command when the unit went to France in July. He took command o f the 
Lake Superiors when Lieutenant-Colonel Murrell was wounded in action in August
1944, and led the Regiment throughout the rest of the campaign. JFort William Daily 
Times-Joumal. 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and 
Defense- Thunder Bay, #57.)
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